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Starting in the mid-1990s and well into the early 2000s, many white residents of 
Cupertino, California were fed up with the growing numbers of Chinese immigrant 
neighbors and what they thought to be the subsequent loss of “community” in their 
neighborhoods.1  One of fifteen incorporated cities and towns of Santa Clara County, 
Cupertino witnessed a nearly two-fold increase of the city’s Asian population from 23% 
to 44% between 1990 and 2000 while the white population dropped from 74% to 52%, 
White residents were saddened by loss of Cupertino’s “outwardly-facing” culture and 
ethos.2  These residents bemoaned what they perceived to be the disappearance of 
neighborhoods where parents congregated, daily, at mailboxes with their neighbors, spent 
time landscaping their yards, and watched their children play together in the streets. In 
contrast, new Chinese immigrant families, most of whom if not all of who were 
participants in the regional and globalized high-technology industry associated with 
Silicon Valley, did not seem to share the same interests.  White residents complained that 
these Chinese families instead chose to live individual lives, driving straight into their 
garages and going right into their homes.  Once inside their homes, white neighbors 
                                                
1 Cupertino, California is one of the fifteen incorporated cities and towns of Santa Clara County. As I will 
go into more detail later in the introduction, Cupertino’s origins centered on racial homogeneity and border 
containment contradicts its reality as a desirable residence for Chinese and, more recently, Asian Indian 
high-tech workers and their families.   
2	  As I discuss in chapter 4, white residents’ define “outwardly facing culture” to mean a separation between 
public/private, work/leisure associated with their ranch homes.  In that chapter, I argue that white residents 
deploy this term “outwardly facing culture” as indicative of community behavior to contain the 
pervasiveness of neoliberal economic policies.  In several interviews, white residents used “outwardly 
facing culture” to describe American culture versus Chinese immigrant cultures.   
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assumed, Chinese parents forced their children to commit all their time to schoolwork 
than timeless American activities of childhood leisure.3 
 White residents were saddened by how these high-tech Chinese families 
transformed not only who now demographically made up the community but also how 
one defined and practiced what constitutes a “community” in Cupertino.  In order to 
mediate neighborhood tensions between white and Chinese residents, the city manager 
Dave Knapp helped in revamping the existing Neighborhood Block Leader Program 
(NBLP) to find common ground between these seemingly disparate cultures.  Under 
Knapp’s guidance, the NBLP was meant to help white and Chinese residents find 
community through collective action (Che 2003a).  For Knapp, this included such things 
as neighborhood watches, traffic issues, and emergency preparedness.  White residents 
were startled by the totalizing effect of this Chinese directed high-tech industry.  
Residents and local cultural critics complained that Silicon Valley industries breed a 
workaholic obsession for wealth at the expense of timeless values of marriage and family 
time.  Within the context of their neighborhoods, white residents complained the tearing 
down of one-story tract ranch homes in order to construct their dream “monster homes” 
was just another example of how Chinese families made decisions solely motivated off 
economic rationality.  With respect to “monster homes,” white residents were disturbed 
that their Chinese neighbors built homes for equity, creating dimensions and layouts that 
maximized the land values.   According to white residents, such decisions were 
                                                
3 I use Chinese, Chinese American, and Chinese immigrant interchangeably.  I understand that there are 
differences based of immigration, nationality, dialect, and class.  In Cupertino, this refers to Chinese people 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China.  At times, these differences matter as Cantonese Chinese 
may attend Cantonese-language Chinese language schools.  And older Taiwanese immigrants may not talk 
to Mainland Chinese people due to cross-strait relations.  But in Silicon Valley, the high-tech economy is 
the commonality that has made “Chinese culture” a trans-Pacific business strategy that overcomes all 
geopolitical conflicts of the past. 
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intrinsically constituted by the Silicon Valley culture and thus led to the decimation of the 
“rural” ways of Cupertino (Che 2003b).4  Literally spilling into the streets, these tensions 
were mounting, so what was Knapp’s solution?  He decided to try to convince white 
residents that their highly educated, entrepreneurial Chinese neighbors and their high 
achieving children were boosting their property values and local school rankings (Knapp 
2010).  
 I begin this dissertation with Dave Knapp because my interview with him and 
many others reveal the crucial roles that race and place play in debates about the fate and 
future of the idea of “community” in Cupertino and the trans-Pacific high-tech 
development in the production of the ideal Silicon Valley subject.5  Knapp’s privileging 
of Chinese immigrant ways of life as the local common denominator among residents 
seems to reflect an inversion of the region’s previous racial hierarchies (Ku and Marino 
1998; Pfaelzer 2007; Chang 1997; Tsu 2006).  Unlike earlier Chinese communities either 
forcefully driven out of Santa Clara County or expected to conform to regional white 
cultural norms, Knapp’s comments reflect a growing regional perception that high-
technology companies and the Chinese immigrants that either own or work for them 
anchor Cupertino and Silicon Valley identity.  Like the “monster homes” that now dot the 
Silicon Valley, these high-tech campuses cast a large shadow upon the physical and 
cultural geography of the city.  Corporations and regional government understand the 
financial value that Chinese immigrants of high-tech industries bring to Silicon Valley 
                                                
4 monster home refers to a style of residential vernacular architecture that Cupertino residents consider to 
be “non-American” because it its size and conventions. I discuss this in more detail in chapter 4. 
5 Typically, Silicon Valley refers to the region of the greater San Francisco Bay Area known as Santa Clara 
County, which sits at the southern end of the bay.  Other cities not in Santa Clara County, such as Mountain 
View and Fremont, home to many high-tech firms, are also included in the spatial boundaries.  In this 
dissertation, I tend to use Santa Clara County and Silicon Valley interchangeably. But when narrating the 
history of the area as it shifted from a predominantly agriculture to high-tech, I use Santa Clara County and 
Silicon Valley as temporal markers. 
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present and future growth.  The discursive binding of Chinese immigrants and culture as 
high-tech industries demonstrates how civic life and regional economic priorities 
converge.  Regional economic development policies have gone so far as encourage 
investment in Chinese neo-Confucianism as a business strategy to aid in transpacific 
business.6  It has become common sense within high-tech industries that these timeless 
notions of Chinese cultures function as forms of labor discipline, which dovetail perfectly 
with the mantra of Silicon Valley where work is play.7   
In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between Chinese immigrants and 
economic development in the late twentieth-century and twenty-first century Silicon 
Valley as the region was transformed from a Cold War suburb founded on military 
defense research of high technology to a trans-Pacific hub of Chinese high-tech business.  
I examine the relationship between regional government’s investments in Chinese 
material and visual cultures and the daily practice of Chinese culture by Chinese 
immigrant high-tech entrepreneurs within the context of U.S.-Greater China economic 
development.8  I argue that the figure of the Chinese immigrant entrepreneur plays an 
essential role in Silicon Valley’s self-portrait of achieved multiculturalism and this form 
of multiculturalism enables and encourages the proliferation of neoliberal economic 
policies.  
The debate about who should and should not represent Cupertino’s history hinges 
upon the on-going naturalization of transnational Chinese people, culture, and high 
                                                
6 For more on Neo-Confucianism as a discourse of Chinese diasporic culture and globalization, see (Dirlik 
1999) 
7 The local obsession with work, permeating all forms of social life, is considered one of the great but also 
worrisome things about Silicon Valley life.  Rather than separating work and play as two temporally and 
spatially distinct activities, high-tech workers, instead, view work (innovation) as a form of play.  I talk 
more about this in chapters 4. 
 
8 By “Greater China,” I refer to the places of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
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technology business.  As a Pacific Rim hub of high-tech business, Cupertino and Silicon 
Valley’s alleged cosmopolitanism as a transnational space of Chinese cultures and 
commodities is more than just an abstract set of cultural practices of its recent Chinese 
immigrant communities.  That is, Chinese immigrants are commonly written into Silicon 
Valley narratives as contained by the success of their small businesses and multi-million 
dollar high-tech firms.   These particular spaces and the local encouragement of Chinese 
cultural visibility and consumption offer a unique lens towards understanding how 
coordinated spaces of transpacific business between Greater China and Silicon Valley 
produce contemporary racial hegemonies regionally.  Thus, in this project, I analyze the 
built environment of economic activities, but I show that the description and analysis of 
must not be limited to a focus on high-tech firms.  Rather, this dissertation takes into 
account a wide range of non-high-tech sites in order to provide a fuller and richer portrait 
of social and economic life in Cupertino: retail businesses, city parks, groceries, 
educational institutions, and residences.  
I show how urban planners, elected officials, city boosters, and residents 
collectively debate with one another on building density, landscaping, and the interior 
and exterior design of commercial and residential zones.  By paying attention to these 
debates, I show how various Cupertino actors articulate and communicate their beliefs, 
which are raced and classed, about how Chinese subjects should populate and reproduce 
the neoliberal economic conditions that have led to the region’s economic success.  In 
addition to paying attention to these debates and conversations, I focus on the 
architectural and landscape style of these built environments because they work so 
powerfully to convey and confirm Silicon Valley’s reinvention of itself as a cosmopolitan 
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Pacific Rim hub that is tolerant of Chinese immigrants.  But I also examine how residents 
re-interpret existing iconic Silicon Valley places as means of situating themselves within 
a this gradually changing region.  Particular places contribute to narratives of Silicon 
Valley’s boom and bust mythology and Chinese immigrants re-imagine spaces through 
their daily activities to re-orient Silicon Valley as a place conducive to Chinese economic 
success and transpacific business with Greater China.  It is these reinvented narratives of 
the region’s alleged exceptional standards of living wherein Silicon Valley distinguishes 
itself from the rest of the United States. 
I situate this dissertation within contemporary debates about U.S.-China economic 
partnerships and how these policies are implemented at the local and regional level.  
While many regions across the United States have tried to revitalize their regional 
economies and center cities by considering implementing federal immigration programs 
aimed at luring international Chinese capital investment, contingent issues regarding 
urban-planning and “multiculturalism” are a windows towards discussing pertinent issues 
such as who are the ideal people to rebuild and reside in these new transnational 
economic hubs and who, ultimately, will be left out from these discussions.  Silicon 
Valley has been particularly important in these national debates about future directions in 
urban-planning because of its purportedly remarkable blend of higher educational 
institutions, high-tech firms, and Asian cultural diversity driving the wealth of the region.  
According to statistics collected by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000, the median price of 
a home in Santa Clara County is more than double that of the rest of California (2000). 
The median household income of Santa Clara County was nearly $27,000 more than the 
rest of the state (2008).  The idealized upper-middle class Silicon Valley Chinese 
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immigrants are part of why various redeveloping U.S. metropolitan areas seek foreign 
direct investment from China. 
But a my research shows, the highly racialized nature of debates over who should 
own and live in Cupertino – which leisure activities, child rearing philosophies, work 
ethic should be encouraged and which should not – reveals multiple conflicting views 
and narratives about Santa Clara County’s past and Silicon Valley’s future.  In the 
regional and national imaginary, Cupertino symbolizes a home away from home for 
Chinese immigrants, but it also exemplifies Asian American achievement in the political 
arena (Gonzales 2009; Glantz 2011).  In 2009, Cupertino was the third city in the country 
and the first in Northern California to have a city council with an Asian American 
majority (all three members were Chinese).  In Santa Clara County alone, the Asian 
population grew 25% between 2000 and 2010 (Glantz 2011).  In 2000, people of Chinese 
descent were nearly 24% of Cupertino’s population and over 53% of the Asian 
demographics (Santa Clara County, Ca  2000).  Cupertino’s high-standards of living are 
attributed to the growing Chinese population, many of whom either work as engineers or 
as CEOs of their own start-ups.  Between 1980 and 2000, the median family income in 
Cupertino jumped more than 200% from $33,249 to $100,411 (Santa Clara County, Ca  
2000; Santa Clara County, Ca  1980).  That figure exceeds by more than $25,000 than the 
median family income of the rest of Santa Clara County (State and County Quickfacts: 
Cupertino, Ca 2000  2009). 
But Cupertino’s geographical location also merits attention. The city is 
sandwiched between the sprawling racial polyglot of San Jose and Santa Clara directly to 
the east and the white NIMBY-ism cities of Los Altos and Los Gatos to the west, this 
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locating Cupertino at the nexus of another set of conflicting narratives about the region’s 
history of racial formation and economic development.9  Before incorporating in 1955, 
Cupertino went by the name of “The Old Westside.” which referred to the hinterlands of 
San Jose when downtown was once seen as a distant 6 miles away.  Cupertino began as 
an intersection that was neither here nor there.  Simply known as “The Crossroads,” a 
service station and a general store anchored the beginnings of expanding settlement in 
what would later become Cupertino.  Though for the longest time, “The Crossroads” 
existed as a place where local farmers from towns and cities miles away would come by 
to pick up more supplies.  Because of Santa Clara County’s agricultural history, the 
region was nicknamed “The Valley of Heart’s Delight” for its deep groundwater and rich 
topsoil, which led to a global market of fruit orchards and wineries at the end of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.  White transplants and immigrant Europeans 
bought parcels of land in the Old Westside and began producing apricots, prunes, plums, 
and wine. 
But after World War II and with the growth of the burgeoning high-tech industry 
largely funded by military defense contracts, many of the original Cupertino families 
gradually foresaw the economic boom associated with land development.  Some sold 
their land to developers to build subdivisions for newly educated white high-tech workers 
and their families.  Some landowners sold their property while also starting their own 
construction firms, cashing in on the erasure of Cupertino’s agricultural history in more 
ways than one.  The industry of land-speculation was well underway throughout other 
                                                
9 NIMBY is an acronym that stands for “Not In My Back Yard.”  The western border of Santa Clara 
County, which also aligns itself with the region of the bay area known as the “peninsula,” is known for 
stringent building policies with the aims of restricting growth to low-density single-family housing.  The 
hills of the peninsula are seen as the exclusive residences of many of the Bay Area’s wealthiest people, 
which include Silicon Valley’s high-tech rock stars.  
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parts of Santa Clara County as many speculators purchased declining farms and resold 
them to developers for huge profits (Downie Jr. 1971).  The memory of these families 
now exists as mere street names, which border the sprawling corporate headquarters of 
Apple Computers.  These high-tech firms have become more important local landmarks 
for visitors to see than the historical tourism the city promotes.   
Cupertino’s contemporary view of itself as a “small town,” however, partially 
developed because of the contrast between Cupertino and the sprawling and unplanned 
growth of San Jose during the 1950s, a period when the goal of San Jose’s city manager 
A.P. Hamman was to do everything in his power to make San Jose the Northern 
California equivalent of Los Angeles.  With local city planning commissioners and 
Chambers of Commerce in the hands of merchant boosters and other powerful 
businessmen, it was inevitable that San Jose would annex more and more land to increase 
personal profits and city tax revenue streams (Downie Jr. 1971; Findlay 1992).  In order 
to defend itself against San Jose’s “tentacle”-like growth, the place informally called 
“The Crossroads” formalized its boundaries and Cupertino sough incorporation, which 
became official in 1955.10   
Because San Jose sought to acquire more and more of Cupertino’s land for further 
economic investment, some Cupertinians pursued incorporation in order to protect their 
area’s autonomy.  These advocates of incorporation felt that San Jose didn’t have its 
region’s best interests in mind as this “distant government” had little desire to “preserve 
the rural character” and protect “farmers. . . .against urbanization and industrial forces 
                                                
10 A popularly reprinted image of Cupertino’s annexation campaign shows a map of Santa Clara County 
with the proposed Cupertino’s borders shaped like a jigsaw puzzle piece.  Octopi named after different 
Santa Clara County cities surround Cupertino with their tentacles wrapped around proposed Cupertino city 
borders. The slivers of land extending off the main bulk of land demonstrate how regional annexation was 
piecemeal and also rapidly occurring all over Santa Clara County.   
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from neighboring communities” (Cupertino Chronicle 1975).  Cupertinians were not 
against economic growth, but seemed wary of having it in their city.  But most 
importantly, the advocates desired to preserve the city’s community, which has been 
narrated to me by local historians and older residents as manifesting in mutual financial 
support among residents and businesses.  According to the City of Cupertino website, 
San Jose’s development still exists symbolically to determine Cupertino’s “community 
character” (History).  But Cupertino’s racial proximity to the restrictive development of 
its richer and whiter neighbors to the west also factors into the relationship between white 
and the theme of rurality.  This relationship manifests in Cupertino’s present day re-
telling of its own historical narratives.  In the late twentieth century, these contemporary 
notions of community, however, transformed into racially charged cultural, economic, 
and political exclusion towards the growing Chinese immigrant population. 
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, Cupertino’s expanding subdivisions signified 
the arrival of a new economic regime.  New residents, many whose life chances and 
opportunities in California were shaped by federal government subsidies, became active 
agents in the making of Silicon Valley history.  When VALLCO shopping mall opened 
its doors in 1976, an odd exhibit juxtaposing local history of apricots and electronic 
manufacturing and innovation welcomed mall patrons.11  But it also reflected a city 
divided over the benefits and costs of development ("Doyle's Passion for History: How 
They Named It Cupertino"  1977).  Landowners had varying ideas of how best to develop 
the land and residents were torn over whether issues such as education, sewage, and parks 
were better uses of land than a larger shopping center.  But the dominant contemporary 
                                                
11 VALLCO refers to the principal developers of the shopping mall and adjacent business and industrial 
park. The names include the Varian Associates and the “original” Cupertino families: Leonard, Lester, 
Craft, and Orlando. 
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narrative of Cupertino’s history as only agricultural erases the reality that many of its 
families were interested in redeveloping the land for their own financial benefit.  While 
agricultural and viticulture existed as dominant industries up until the 1950s, the 
contemporary notion that Cupertino’s anti-development authenticity strategically forgets 
the pro-development interests of many of its residents.  This brief retelling of the building 
of VALLCO historicizes how Cupertino is stuck between competing ideologies of its past 
and present.  The site and sight of development demonstrates the relationship between the 
built environment, economic development, and local subject making. 
Currently, the class geography of Cupertino, from the hills of the west to the 
flatlands of the east, is indicative of these competing ideologies and the way that race is 
central to residents’ spatial understanding of an authentic Cupertino.  At the turn of the 
20th century, wealthy San Francisco capitalists spent their summers in the Monta Vista 
neighborhood along the foothills.  Today, this neighborhood is still considered an 
exclusive area and, also, the other original downtown in local histories.  I strongly believe 
that the race and class characteristics of this neighborhood’s past are why it is represented 
as a historical landmark in the era of increased Chinese immigration.  The peninsula has 
been a racially segregated place, which white residents utilize local civic organizations to 
police the racial and cultural characteristics of the residential landscape against Chinese 
immigrants (Ong et al. 1996).  In several informal conversations about Cupertino’s 
incorporation, residents claimed that the flats to the east, bordering the cities of Santa 
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Clara and San Jose, were “ghetto,” citing the racial differences and lack of landscaping 
typically seen in Cupertino neighborhoods.12   
Beginning in the 1980s, the need for more office space to accommodate the 
growing high-tech industry meant that remaining older structures in the city, some 
historical residences or businesses that had either been abandoned or vandalized beyond 
repair, had to be torn down.  As transpacific business between Silicon Valley and Greater 
China grew in the 1990s as did the Chinese populations, the new visual and material 
economies of meanings of race and high-tech contradicted the whiteness that 
Cupertianians had secured with incorporation in 1955.  Ironically, many of Cupertino’s 
postwar high-tech population retreated to “the rural,” a romanticized yeoman past of 
manual labor they never experienced.  Or if they did, these white middle-class engineers 
experienced it merely as consumers. 
The conflicts in Cupertino are not just about racial economic competition, but the 
stakes in the visual and material cultures of the city, which race and power are bound 
together.  Contrary to the regional, if not national, perception of Silicon Valley as a place 
of colorblind meritocracy, my project departs from these dominant myths to show how 
racial hegemonies undergird changes to regional economies.  A study of Silicon Valley is 
particularly timely given the presence of Chinese investment in U.S. economies and vice 
versa. While recent scholarship on technology in Asian American Studies focuses on the 
production of transnational community formations through high-speed 
telecommunications and other digital media, I instead focus on the political economy of 
technological development in the United States.  I argue that politics of technological 
                                                
12 When attending local Cupertino civic organization meetings, some members were very enthusiastic about 
telling me about Cupertino’s distinctive characteristics vis-à-vis San Jose.  Even today, the specter of San 
Jose’s unyielding development seemed to still haunt these resident’s sense of self and community. 
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development is significant to our understanding how Asian American and Asian 
immigrants, particularly Chinese immigrants, make sense of their national and racial 
subjectivities.  Several studies on contemporary Chinese communities in Silicon Valley 
claim that Chinese identity formation and cultural retention exists external to economic or 
political structures.13  In my dissertation, however, Chinese immigrants situate their 
understanding of “America” and “Chinese” within a larger historical trajectory dating 
back to U.S. Cold War diplomacy centered on hegemonic political and economic 
expansion into Asia.  Histories of U.S. aid towards developing Taiwan as an economic 
ally to strategically contain the spread of communism in Asia show how technological 
industries, whether through manufacturing or educational exchanges, guide Taiwanese 
immigrants identities and their identification with “America.”  U.S. high-tech immigrant 
development, Cold War geopolitics, and their relationship to global economic 
restructuring show how contemporary and historical narratives of American 
technological progress constitute Chinese immigrant subjectivities.   
This project also departs from conventional scholarly discourses of 
suburbanization, which tend to focus on the white-black dyad of suburban formation and 
policy-making.  By exploring Asian American and Asian immigrant suburban 
community formations, this project emphasizes the ways that racialized subjects are, at 
times, included within suburban planning projects.  Scholarly discourses of urban 
redevelopment tend to situate white middle-class residents and workers as the ideal 
                                                
13 See Bernard Wong. The Chinese in Silicon Valley: Globalization, Social Networks, and Ethnic Identity 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006). Shenglin Chang. The Global Silicon Valley Home: 
Lives and Landscapes Within Taiwanese American Trans-Pacific Cultures (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006).  Wei Li and Edward J.W. Park. “Asian Americans in Silicon Valley: High-Technology 
Industry Development and Community Transformation.” In From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New 
Asian Communities in Pacific Rim Countries, ed. Wei Li. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006). 
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subjects of revitalization, often at the exclusion of blacks and Latinos.  More recently, 
studies of historical preservation and tourism of ethnic districts demonstrates the limited 
ways that culture as entertainment, but not politics nor collective historical memory, 
exists within cultural geographies of neoliberal city planning.  The commodification of 
culture reveals how economic development contains the ways communities of color are 
allowed to occupy the city.  In the context of U.S.-Greater China economic development, 
I consider how Chinese people and culture contribute to city planning decisions.  Cities 
and metropolitan areas across the United States and the world attempt to recreate the 
proper blend of Silicon Valley’s civic and cultural institutions in hopes of maximizing 
wealth.  With its historical and contemporary economic ties to “greater China,” Silicon 
Valley’s cities exist as “models” for other regional economies that have and hope to 
invest in high-tech.  As “The China Century” exists as a discourse of U.S. economic 
development, the study of Asian American communities in Silicon Valley can contribute 
to the scholarship on “American cities.” 
But the inclusion of Asian Americans within urban planning projects cannot be 
purely be understood through existing frameworks of inclusion and exclusion.  This 
project contributes to studies of Asian immigrant suburbanization by considering the 
limits and possibilities of economic citizenship.  Social scientists theorize the clustering 
of ethnic economies and ethnic residential spaces through enclave theory or more 
recently ethnoburbs to explain how the push and pull factors of global economic 
restructuring create migration patterns away from city centers towards suburbs and 
exurbs.  These studies show how suburbs and exurbs have become ideal locations for 
global capitalist investment, naturally drawing a range of skilled and semi-skilled Asian 
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labor in white-collar jobs.  Contrary to analyses of urban enclaves, suburban studies tend 
to celebrate Asian middle-class achievement through spatial economic and residential 
integration throughout the suburban geography.  While these studies focus on Asian and 
“mainstream”(white) relations, they only emphasize the question of Asian economic 
proximity to white residents as the benchmark for national belonging.  My project 
extends this discussion to critique of the conditions of economic citizenship and to ask 
what kinds of race and class exclusions are enabled by these alleged suburban racial and 
class equivalences between Asians and white residents.  By historicizing the relationship 
between whiteness and suburbs and whiteness and Asian American community 
formations, this project contributes to growing scholarship that demonstrates the 
racialization of economic citizenship.  Further, this dissertation necessarily examines how 
these paradisiacal portrayals of Silicon Valley’s Asian and white harmony is sustained 
through the material and discursive exclusion of particular race and classed subjects, 
particularly African Americans and Latinos. 
In the following section, I describe the theoretical framework that informs how I 
understand the production of Chinese immigrants as the ideal subject of Silicon Valley.  
Also, I discuss, briefly, my methods and the topics of the following chapters. 
Chineseness as Cultural Citizenship 
I situate my interpretation of “Chineseness” within U.S. political and economic interests 
with Greater China, Silicon Valley’s reliance upon transnational Chinese business, and 
U.S. multiculturalism.  Due largely to increased capital investment from Greater China, 
Chinese-owned businesses in Silicon Valley has drawn local, regional, and national 
attention.  Due to this dynamic, learning and respecting Chinese culture has become an 
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economic priority for various localities.  Following the post-World War II project of U.S. 
multiculturalism, the institutionalized tolerance of Chinese cultural practices within 
public education, civic organizations, and tourist industries contributes to Silicon 
Valley’s aim at recruiting more of Greater China’s seeming untapped and never-ending 
foreign direct investment.  I see the presence and circulation of Chineseness in Silicon 
Valley as a cultural performance of regional belonging based on the intertwining of race, 
everyday behavior, and market logics.   
I understand the regional practice of Chineseness through what Aihwa Ong 
describes as “cultural citizenship.”  Drawing from Michel Foucault’s concept of 
subjectification, Ong theorizes cultural citizenship as a relationship between individuals 
and the state:  
[t]he cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often 
ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that 
establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory.  
Cultural citizenship is a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs 
of power linked to the nation-state and civil society (1996, 738). 
In her research on wealthy Hong Kong business people and Cambodian refugees, Ong 
examines the cultural processes by which various civil institutions and social 
organization mark Asians racially across a black-white spectrum based on economic 
value and productivity.  In the form of race and class-based accumulation of skills, 
knowledge, and taste cultures, human capital facilitate the ability of Asians to leverage 
their national belonging and access to resources.   
 Andrea Louie’s study of “Chineseness” as an open signifier that gains its meaning 
within a variety of political, economic, and cultural contexts has also influenced my 
analysis.  Recent Chinese mainland (PRC) interests in the Chinese diaspora for global 
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economic reinvestments, according to Louie, are a different project than the 
assimilationist bend of U.S. cultural citizenship.  While both nation-states contain and 
restrict the meanings of “Chineseness,” Louie’s study shows that Chinese are asked to 
perform exoticized and decontextualized forms of culture that marginalizes them from 
the American mainstream (Louie 2004).  While Louie’s notion of Chineseness as cultural 
citizenship takes stock of mainland politics, Lok Siu’s diasporic critique of cultural 
citizenship shows how geopolitics connects nation-states together.  In analyzing Taiwan’s 
annual convention for the Chinese Association of Central America and Panama, Siu adds 
that cultural citizenship within a nation-state thereby grants access to transnational 
community formations and resources.  Siu’s understanding of cultural citizenship shows 
how homeland and diaspora become discursively bound places where meanings of 
Chineseness are negotiated and agreed upon (Siu 2001).   
 My understanding of Chineseness as cultural citizenship is also informed by 
Inderpal Grewal’s concept of “transnational connectivities” (Grewal 2005).  By 
interrogating how middle-class Indian Americans and Indian nationals were produced in 
the 1990s as neoliberal subjects, Grewal defines “transnational connectivities” as 
transnational networks that create “subjects, technologies, and ethical practices” (Grewal 
2005).  She reads the gendered and class representations of these neoliberal Indian 
diasporas within the context of marketing of both Indian Barbie and magazines for non-
resident Indian re-investment in India’s growing economy.  Grewal argues that class 
matters to how India and the United States appropriate rights discourses, such as 
feminism and civil rights, to incorporate previously excluded identities into the nation-
state.  Through institutionalized practices and discourses, nation-states make and 
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mobilize these particular subjects within the global economy in order to open up and 
exploit new global markets for economic development (2005).  By nurturing particular 
race, class, and gendered subjects within emerging transnational connections, citizenship 
is restrictive and exclusive.  It is through this framework that I interpret Chineseness as 
an everyday cultural process of citizenship within Silicon Valley life.  It is through the 
imperatives of international, national, regional, and local interests in Chinese foreign 
direct investment that I interrogate the local desire in promoting Chinese cultural 
tolerance and practice within various institutional spaces. 
Neoliberalism and the Silicon Valley Exception 
Public and academic debates over the factors that contribute to Silicon Valley’s success, 
defined by the celebrity-hood of risk-taking overnight-millionaire entrepreneurs, 
collectively confirms that the mobility of labor is what drives innovation.  In Silicon 
Valley, the notion of mobility refers to the collaborative culture of individuals, who may 
come together many times across competing firms to develop their ideas, innovate new 
technologies, and leave their jobs to create their own start-ups.  Gone are traditional 
notions of company loyalty and the standardized 9-5 workday.  Part of the allure and the 
intrigue of Silicon Valley’s life, its seeming inversion of social hierarchies through its 
democratization of cool starring tech nerds and geeks, is the privileged status of high-tech 
knowledge, which exemplifies the particular “West Coast” culture of labor that breaks all 
the rules of work and play in the United States.  AnnaLee Saxenian describes “the culture 
of the valley” as a “culture of change: the peer pressure and social pressures support risk-
taking and people changing jobs a lot.  The velocity of information is very high – much 
higher than the rest of the country” (Saxenian 1994).  Saxenian’s observations point to 
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the totalizing life of high-tech labor that engulfs individuals, families, and friend-
networks through everyday practices of happy hour socializing at bars, weekend dinner 
parties in the comforts of homes, and/or slumber parties at work.  Even though the culture 
of collaboration is encouraged within and across firms, the high-tech entrepreneur, the 
risk-taking individual working to be his own boss, represents the ideal career-trajectory.  
On-going myths of meritocracy circulate and constitute Silicon Valley as a world of 
opportunity where anyone can be an entrepreneur regardless of race, age, and social 
status.  So long as you network and build your human capital, individuals can transform 
that human capital into other kinds of capital and wealth. 
 In order to understand the seeming exceptional place of Silicon Valley, I draw 
from studies of neoliberalism.  While neoliberalism is commonly understood as economic 
doctrine centered on deregulation, dismantling the welfare state, reducing educational 
spending, minimizing the size of government, and increasing the role of the private 
sector, the labor cultures of Silicon Valley show that neoliberal economic policies cannot 
be separate from political and cultural arenas (Duggan 2003).  Due to the economic 
priorities of Silicon Valley, various public and private institutions collaboratively work 
together to shape regional evaluative judgments of what is appropriate and inappropriate 
everyday conduct.  For these reasons, neoliberalism also operates as a form of governing.  
Following Michel Foucault’s concept of “governmentality,” which refers to the array of 
techniques that systematically guide and regulate everyday conduct,  neoliberal 
governmentality involves “extending and disseminating market values to all institutions 
and social action” (Brown 2003).  More specifically, neoliberalism “interpellates 
individuals into entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life,” encouraging idealized 
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citizenry constituted by the overlapping language of personal responsibility, self-
enterprise, and individual ambition (Brown 2003).  Moreover, neoliberal ideology 
“relieves the discrepancy between economic and moral behaviors by configuring morality 
entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences” 
(Brown 2003).  In Silicon Valley, the desire to accumulate wealth through 
entrepreneurship reflects the institutionalization of neoliberal ideology within 
overlapping political, economic, and cultural contexts.  
 Silicon Valley’s allegedly unique cultures of innovation, tied together by themes 
of labor discipline and U.S. multiculturalism, demands further inquiry into the spatial 
particularities of neoliberalism.  Beginning in the 1980s, national and regional media’s 
coverage of Silicon Valley’s high-tech success framed Chinese immigrants as 
instrumental to the multibillion-dollar regional and global economy.  This visibility 
contributed to existing but also reinvented myths of California’s cultural exceptionalism.  
My understanding of Silicon Valley cultural exceptionalism is informed by Aihwa Ong’s 
notion of “exceptions to neoliberalism,” which she defines broadly as institutionalized 
practices that depart from neoliberal policy to exclude and include certain subjects.  The 
neoliberal developments between Asia and the United States, Ong argues, relies upon the 
coordination between spaces, sutured together by the planned circulation of capital, 
knowledge, and people.  The transpacific expansion of neoliberal economic development 
necessitates systems of governmentality to coordinate these “special spaces of labor 
markets, investment opportunities, and relative administrative freedom” (Ong 2006).  I 
use Ong’s formulation of exception to describe the cultural exceptions of Silicon Valley 
high-tech economy, which include ethnicized notions of labor discipline. Neo-
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Confucianism is understood as a set of hierarchical cultural relationships between family 
members.  Within Pacific Rim and globalization discourse, Neo-Confucianism becomes 
an exclusive transpacific business culture, shaping how transnational Chinese 
businessmen and women conduct business across time and space. Silicon Valley is a 
particularized place that strategically includes Chinese students, engineers, scientists, and 
entrepreneurs, and their families, who are the privileged and mobile individuals who 
possess the human capital to align with local terms of citizenship.  
Space, Governing, and The Architectures of Community 
In Cupertino, California, local debates over who and how one constitutes “community” 
often revolves around changes to the built environment.  With residential, educational, 
and commercial spaces renovated and reorganized to cater towards the growing Asian 
population in the city, white residents complain that changes to these local spaces have 
altered the “culture” of the city forever.  By culture, residents describe not only what they 
see – homes, shopping centers, and schools – but their everyday experiences of moving 
through these spaces.  These particular relationships that white and Chinese residents 
create between the built environment and everyday behavior extend beyond questions of 
economic competition between different raced-communities.  The local stakes in the 
design and utility of spaces demonstrate how architecture matters to changing global 
economic priorities in the region and its totalizing effect on everyday life.14  Race, 
                                                
14 For studies of the relationship between Silicon Valley high-tech industries and its distinct way of life or 
effects on identity formations, see: J.A. English-Lueck. Cultures@SiliconValley (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002).  Shalini Shankar. Desi land: teen culture, class, and success in Silicon Valley 
(Durham: Duke University Press). Elsa Davidson. “Success Stories: Young People’s Aspirations and the 
Politics of Class in Post-Boom Silicon Valley.” (PhD diss., City University of New York, 2006). I position 
myself differently from these texts as my project focuses on the ways that Chineseness is deliberately 




production, and market forces shape not only how architecture symbolically includes and 
excludes people from community, but also how architecture produces the ideal subjects 
of community.  
Through the term “architectures of community,” I describe this relationship 
between architecture and governing through everyday conduct.  Although the term 
derives from the title of Peter Katz’s book on New Urbanist design, The New Urbanism: 
Towards an Architecture of Community, my analysis critiques his analysis of design 
philosophies and its affect on community building (Katz, Scully, and Bressi 1994).  The 
questions of community in Cupertino echoes what Katz (and other architects) had been 
lamenting, which was the loss of “community” resulting from sprawling, unplanned 
suburbs and exurbs.  With the distinct zoning patterns of suburban sprawl, Katz argued, 
public life was decentralized.  In response, Katz and other New Urbanist supporters and 
practitioners, such as Peter Calthorpe, encouraged vertical-oriented high-density mixed-
used structures, which allegedly offered more everyday spaces of social interactions that 
suburban car culture and single-family housing had destroyed (Calthorpe and Poticha 
1993).  In addition to improving social life, New Urbanism was also meant to alleviate 
environmental pollution and to create economic sustainability.  Like many critics of New 
Urbanism, I, too, connect discourses of community directly to the social reproduction of 
race and class exclusion.   
My usage of architectures of community derives from geographer Denis 
Cosgrove’s theorization of landscape as “a way of seeing the world” in which we 
“discover its link to broader historical structures as a social product.”  That is, historic 
context and power relations situate the normative “mode of life” portrayed within a re-




iterated representations of a place (Cosgrove 1984).  Suburban studies of whiteness have 
also informed my understanding of both the material and aesthetic production of racial 
hegemonies through the built environment.  My analysis of the material production of 
space draws from studies of institutionalized racial segregation such as George Lipsitz’s 
analysis of “the white spatial imaginary,” which refers to the exchange value linked to the 
laws and policies constituting white property ownership (Lipsitz 2007).  My analysis of 
architectures of community also draws from visual cultural studies scholar Dianne 
Harris’ concept of “habit of perception.”  She theorizes how whiteness was reproduced 
by the photographic conventions of seeing race in post-World War II housing 
advertisements.  Harris argues that the re-iterated ways of looking at particular residential 
spaces, such as the angling of images, the scenes of domesticity, and the absence of black 
people in advertisements, normalized the racial expectations of place and conduct within 
suburbs across the United States (Harris 2007).  I am not only interested in how places 
are materially constituted, but also how places are strategically designed towards 
visualizing ideologies.  
Architectures of community emphasizes the centrality of space to the production 
of power.  This idea draws from Michel Foucault’s theoretical framework on the 
extensive proliferation of power within all areas of social life.  As Foucault’s explains, 
“Power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself 
into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday life” 
(Foucault and Gordon 1980).  For Foucault, power requires consent, meaning that people 
and institutions necessarily matter to the reproduction of power.  He introduces the idea 
of “disciplinary power,” where the principle of institutional “surveillance” becomes a 
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mechanism of power and social control.  In historicizing “surveillance” of various 
institutions, such as hospitals, prisons, military barracks, and workplaces, Foucault shows 
that the arrangement and organization of spaces and contingent modes of surveillance 
create knowledge of individuals that normalize particular kinds of behavior and subjects.  
The knowledge of an institution, how it is rationalized as a space, and how individuals 
are evaluated within these spaces are central to what Foucault describes as “Power-
Knowledge.”  Through the lens of “surveillance,” Foucault argues institutional places and 
the contingent forms of knowledge production are what enable power to proliferate. 
Methods and Chapter Outline 
In order to understand the relationship between neoliberal market forces, Chineseness, 
and space in Silicon Valley life, I utilize both historical and ethnographic methods. While 
this dissertation engages with neoliberalism as economic policy, archival methods are 
unable to account for how neoliberalism permeates in non-economic institutions and 
creates racialized power relations within social life.  I spent over 16 months in the San 
Francisco Bay Area conducting research and the deliberate range of sources that I chose 
to collect reflect the topics but also the institutions that collectively enable neoliberal 
ideology to proliferate.  For my ethnographic fieldwork, I conducted thirty in-depth 
interviews with publicly elected officials of Cupertino, parents and volunteers of three 
different Chinese schools, volunteers and historical re-enactors at the Cupertino 
Historical Society, festival organizers, and real-estate developers and real estate agents.  I 
attended ten Cupertino Historical Society events, observed three Chinese Schools 
spending over forty hours observing events, classes, and meetings.  I have attended 
various civic meetings including the Cupertino Chamber of Commerce, Planning 
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Commission, City Council, Rotary Club, and the Cupertino Historical Society.  These 
generous research participants shared their time, thoughts, and memories and on various 
occasions invited me over to their homes.  I also spent a lot of time at several coffee 
shops and cafes around town meeting with research participants.  These spaces are 
important to take note of given the fact that different city institutions considered these 
sites of economic activity as symbols of successful urban planning and the creation of 
civic life.  
 I chose to study particular Chinese people and expressions of Chinese culture 
based on how both contributed to the economic priorities of Silicon Valley.  The white 
and Chinese residents that I interviewed were as active in city and community 
development as representatives on city council, planning commissions, city of Cupertino 
and Chinese language school boards, the Cupertino Historical Society, and local service 
organizations.  These particular institutions play and important role in the fate and future 
of Cupertino community.  My observations of people and institutions led to me to 
conclude that “culture” in Cupertino and Silicon Valley referred to such places as grocery 
stores, shopping centers, residential architecture, and natural landscapes.  Local practices 
of Chinese culture, however, went beyond this to include dance, martial arts, language 
study, study habits, food and drink, filial piety and homeownership.  But both groups, 
white and Chinese residents, hegemonically interpreted “culture” as an economic 
practice.  Through my research, white and Chinese residents explained the stakes in 
protecting and encouraging particular kinds of everyday behavior that allowed them to 
claim place and resources in Silicon Valley.  
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The juxtaposition between white and Chinese residents, however, does not mean 
that I see these two racialized groups to be ideologically different and diametrically 
opposed on all issues.  Different perspectives on development not only exist between 
white and Chinese communities but within these communities as well.  For the most part, 
white and Chinese residents had divergent views regarding economic growth.  But, there 
were several issues where white and Chinese residents formed alliances in attempts to 
halt development.  But their reasons for battling development, varied at times.  For 
example, when white and Chinese residents formed alliances against condo development, 
white residents used maintaining “green space” and the region’s agricultural history  was 
the primarily reason Cupertino should halt high-density residences and the building of 
monster homes often constructed and occupied by Asian and Chinese residents.  For 
many white residents, their ability to restrict residential development tied directly to their 
attachment of a visual economy of whiteness that symbolized historical forms of 
institutionalized power and the exclusion of people of color.  Asian and Chinese residents 
were less concerned with green space and more concerned with sustaining their property 
values, which the proximity of high-density housing could possibly affect.  Some white 
residents, however, welcomed development and saw multiculturalism as beneficial to 
their children’s education, suggesting that diversity would help their children interact in 
an increasingly global economy.  Several white residents I casually chatted with at local 
service organizations appreciated Silicon Valley’s range of immigrant cultures and how 
this turned their children into “citizens of the world.”  With regards to transpacific 
development, there was a wide range of responses from Chinese parents spanning from 
complete apathy to downright obsession.  Some parents informed me that the only news 
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they paid attention to everyday was financial news, which they strategically made time to 
catch up on in the evenings and afternoons while waiting for their children’s extra-
curricular activities to let out.   
For these reasons, I try to treat white and Chinese residents experiences with 
nuance.  This project aims to show how different residents of Silicon Valley, specifically 
white and Chinese, interpret and navigate the seemingly all-encompassing neoliberal 
economic policies of Silicon Valley in their everyday lives.  I show how the dominant 
neoliberal economic policies constitute how individuals and communities identify 
themselves and their place within the Pacific Rim region they live in.  But I also show 
how their desires and anxieties of the past, present, and future are bound by the boom and 
bust of Silicon Valley economic structures.  While peoples’ everyday decisions may not 
be contained by transpacific economic development, this project shows that transpacific 
economic development is a reality that Silicon Valley residents contend with on an 
everyday basis within a range of social, economic, and political institutions.  As a result, 
the conflicts and alliances between white and Chinese over different issues regarding 
development show the contradictions that late twentieth and twenty first century 
neoliberal economic development creates within the dominant visual and material 
economies of meanings.15   
I conducted archival research at the San Jose State Library, examining over 30 
years of San Jose Mercury Newspaper articles on local perceptions of the high-tech 
development and the cultural changes to the area. I similarly examined over 30 years of 
coverage from the local newspaper, The Cupertino Courier, which was both available 
                                                




online and in print form at the Cupertino Historical Society and the Cupertino Public 
Library.  The Metro Times, a Santa Clara County lifestyles weekly, and the San 
Jose/Silicon Valley Business Journal, were useful references as both prioritized economic 
development in their coverage of regional affairs. I reviewed the transformation to 
Cupertino commercial and residential building ordinances as well as reviewing meeting 
minutes and recaps from the last 20 years, which are available on the City of Cupertino 
website. I collected textbooks and yearbooks from the Silicon Valley Chinese Schools. 
Further, I have also examined several policy initiatives regarding economic growth, 
created between the partnership between regional government, higher education, and 
private economic research institutes.  
In Chapter 1, I examine these institutional partnerships and policy initiatives 
regarding the regional investment in Chineseness and economic relations with Greater 
China.  I focus my attention on one particular report titled “The Ties That Bind: The San 
Francisco Bay Area’s Economic Links to Greater China” (2006), which creates a 
continuous narrative of Chinese immigrant entrepreneurship, work ethic, and high-tech 
that aligns with neoliberal discourses of flexibility and labor disciplining.  Chapter 2 
argues that Cupertino’s economic development plans centered on New Urbanist mixed-
use developments aim to normalize neoliberal governmentality through the practices of 
consumer culture.  In analyzing two separate development plans to create new tax 
revenue streams, I show the contradictory ways that economic development enables and 
limits Chinese immigrants who reside in Silicon Valley and Cupertino. The next chapter 
also focuses on architectural design with regards to debates over what residential 
vernacular architecture should portray community life.  Local white portrayals of monster 
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homes as places consumed with work, I argue, are a reflection of how neoliberalism in 
Silicon Valley has transformed race and gender expectations by integrating the private 
sphere as the public sphere in order to naturalize the home as a place of surveillance, self-
enterprise, and economic efficiency.  Lastly, Chapter 5 examines how Chinese 
immigrants psychically map themselves in the future of Silicon Valley.  Different 
Chinese immigrants shared with me their attachment to Silicon Valley by particular 
globally recognized high-tech corporations.  These immigrants, however, narrate the 
circulation of Chinese capital across the visual and material culture of the region as 
indicative of Silicon Valley’s recent success.  I examine Chinese immigrant speech acts 
in their everyday practice of Chinese transnationalism, wherein they reference and 
appropriate mythic Silicon Valley places and institutions to reinvent Silicon Valley’s 
future as a Pacific Rim hub.  I contend that Chinese immigrants appropriate dominant 
“scripts” of Silicon Valley mythologies in order to center themselves as the ideal subject 
of Silicon Valley’s present and future.  These narrative performances of Chinese 
transnationalism visualize and constitute a future of Chinese Silicon Valley dependent 
upon neoliberal ideology. 
An analysis of the daily life of Chinese immigrants allows us to see the 
importance and impact of Silicon Valley, Chineseness, and Greater China to the making 
of cities.  Through a study of built environments, we begin to see how space matter not 
only to the history of Silicon Valley’s development, but also how it matters to the 
circulation of Chinese people, capital, and ideas within the structures of global capitalism 
in the late twentieth and early twenty first century.  Various areas across the country have 
begun to seek out foreign direct investment from China in order to revitalized decaying 
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cities. Given the conditions of this contemporary moment, research on Silicon Valley 
offers much insight to the fate and future of American cities.  The making of cities 
reveals new areas of social inquiry about cities, who will populate them in the future, and 








CHAPTER 2  
Boom to Bust: Transpacific Business and the Visual and Spatial Culture of Chinese 
Hegemony 
 
Throughout the 1990s, regional and national media narrated the effects of Silicon 
Valley’s rapidly declining defense industry and its surging fields of consumer-oriented 
technologies as the end of the white race and the paradisiacal Asian polyglot that lay in 
its wake.  Regional press, such as the San Jose Mercury, announced Silicon Valley’s 
white men as outsiders in a growingly Asian-dominated high-tech industry with such 
article titles as “No More Mr. White Guy” and “War Surplus Job-Market Misfits” 
(Thurm 1996; Rodriguez 1991).  With an end to the Cold War, declining military 
contracts meant layoffs at many defense divisions of tech firms and, most often than not, 
these skills for rocket-making did not translate into the Valley’s current trends of 
information technology systems.  Articles such as these portrayed the loss of the Valley’s 
white identity through the disappearance of military defense.  In explaining the white 
exodus, exemplified by the disappearance of white neighbors or white co-workers, these 
articles suggest that what was left, though not true at all, was a technological environment 
now populated and directed by Asians. 
The generational changes to Silicon Valley’s industries and ways of life, however, 
were like two trains passing in the night and were hardly explained in local and regional 
media.  Asian immigrants, particularly Chinese from Greater China, became media 
darlings and were explanation for Silicon Valley’s booming economy and standards of 
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living.  Since the late eighties, regional and national media along with local residents 
describe the San Francisco Bay Area, but more specifically Silicon Valley, as a home 
away from home for it’s Asian residents.  In a 12 March 2011 article in The Bay Citizen, 
contributor Aaron Glantz treads well-worn celebratory paths that regional and national 
press have laid out for decades already, which is the dominant Chinese cultural and 
economic geography that is expressive of the region’s exceptional lifestyle of racial 
tolerance and equality.1 To make his point, Glantz, like many other cultural critics of 
Silicon Valley, observes the advanced degree carrying Chinese engineers eating and 
mingling at a popular town center occupied by Chinese eateries.  But Jin Hu Jiang, one of 
Glantz interviewees, reminds readers why he is attracted to the region: “This is the best 
place to find high-tech work in the States” (Glantz 2011). 
This chapter examines the historic factors that have shaped the relationship 
between corporate spaces and Silicon Valley’s racial hegemonies.  As journalist accounts 
of Silicon Valley’s contemporary history seemed to announce, Asians are the present and 
the future.  The region’s Asian visual culture symbolizing Silicon Valley’s purported 
meritocracy and ideal path to success in high-tech – literally in its buildings of Asian-
owned high-tech firms or Asian shopping centers – did not just occur by happenstance.  
As scholars of Silicon Valley emphasize, various actors and institutions strategized over 
urban planning of post-war and late twentieth century built environments to communicate 
the ideal race and class subjects to build, contribute, and extend Silicon Valley’s 
                                                
1	  For more recent thoughts on the South Asian and Chinese financial success and why they as immigrants 
are seen in Silicon and nationally as necessary to the United States, see such: Vivek Wadhwa. “A Fix for 
Discrimination: Follow the Indian Trails.” Techcrunch.com, Feb. 21 2010, Accessed Feb. 21 2010, 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/21/a-fix-for-discrimination-follow-the-indian-trails/.  Matt Richtel. “Tech 
Recruiting Clashes With Immigration Rules.” NYTimes.com April 11, 2009, Accessed April 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/business/12immig.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. Mike Swift. Blacks, 
Latinos, and women lose ground at Silicon Valley tech companies. Mercurynews.com. Feb 13. 2010, 
Accessed Feb 13, 2010. http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_14383730?nclick_check=1	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economic development from U.S. military research to what it is now as a multi-billion 
dollar global industry, largely predicated on U.S.-Greater China ties.  Even the minute 
details of interior and exterior design of work spaces have been shown by scholars to be 
important to shaping the behavior of work cultures, particularly when coordinating and 
collaborating amongst various high-tech hubs across the globe (Martin and Baxi 2007).  
This chapter historicizes how race and visual cultures of work have been intertwined in 
the local and regional meaning making of Silicon Valley as an exceptional place to live.   
Local celebratory ideas that Silicon Valley is and was never racist, however, have 
a larger trajectory that is sustained by the material and discursive absence of particular 
race and class subjects, namely African Americans, Latinos, and natives.  Through 
genocide, legal and extra-legal segregation, and local re-iterated cultural narratives of 
Santa Clara County, white hegemony proliferated to all aspects of life.  The dominant 
spatial imaginary of the late twentieth and twenty first century Silicon Valley, however, 
has been meritocratic spaces of Asian economic activity filled with Chinese and Indian-
raced bodies visibly normalized through these everyday narratives of spatialized cultural 
consumption and high-tech work.  I examine late twentieth century, twenty-first century 
corporate and regional government produced narratives of Silicon Valley that rely upon 
the spatial imagination of a regional, yet transnational Chineseness.  I focus on how these 
narratives encourage trans-Pacific business with Greater China by reinventing and 
articulating the terms of Chineseness through contemporary Silicon Valley neoliberal 
economic policy.  But I focus on the reoccurring theme of space in the lives of Chinese in 
Silicon Valley.  The relationship between Chinese places of business and social activity 
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as one and the same frames the presence of Chinese in Silicon Valley as representing 
Silicon Valley’s past, present, and future. 
This chapter traces the relationship between racial hegemonies and labor within 
the context of urban planning. First, I examine how agricultural economies of Spanish 
and American empires in the eighteenth and nineteenth century of what its now known as 
Santa Clara County gave way to particular visual cultures of whiteness. These 
paradisiacal portrayals of white settlers and white ethnics profiting from the rich topsoil 
and deep ground water for agricultural abundance are how the region has been 
nicknamed “Valley of Heart’s Delight.”  Next, I examine how whiteness as a race and 
class ideology became embedded within suburban-planning centered on the burgeoning 
high-technology industries funded in large part by the Federal government for military 
defense during the Cold War.  The next section of this chapter focuses on the historical 
roots of Asian, migration primarily Chinese engineers and scientists, to Silicon Valley.  
This particular section shows the larger historical trajectory of Chinese presence in 
Silicon Valley that dates back to U.S. Cold War diplomacy involving foreign aid to 
Taiwan and the subsequent educational exchanges that, in part, fostered increased 
Chinese migration to the region.  By tracing these suburban developments around 
boosting economic activity in Silicon Valley, I show how race has been significant to the 
federal, regional, and local government investments in its celebratory portrayals of its 
economy, Asian workforce, and work cultures.  Lastly, I examine contemporary policy 
papers published by the Bay Area Economic Forum to show how Chinese hegemony 
involves spatial and visual cues, which follows a larger history of space and visual 
cultures in the meaning making of Silicon Valley. 
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Agricultural History and “The Valley of Heart’s Delight” 
As the “official” origins narratives go in Cupertino, California, European heritage marks 
the beginning of local history.  Oddly, two different figures and waves of migration, as 
historians have delineated as competing empires of Spain (later Mexico) and the United 
States, escalating into violence and other legal issues, are neatly folded together by local 
Cupertino historians and residents to explain the region’s portrayal of itself as 
multicultural and, yet, firmly unadulterated white American.  In particular, the local 
explanations of Stevens Creek, a small waterway that runs through several cities along 
the peninsula and cutting through the Monta Vista neighborhood of Cupertino, as the 
original site and sight of Cupertino settlement instantiates race and place together within 
the context of agricultural economic development.  That is, Stevens Creek exists as the 
site where Juan Bautista de Anza, a Spanish explorer set out in 1775 on an expedition 
granted by the viceroy of New Spain to colonize Northern California, came in contact 
with Natives en route to the Port of San Francisco (I was reminded on numerous 
occasions by locals that de Anza did not kill any natives on his expedition).  Stevens 
Creek and Stevens Creek Boulevard, however, get its name from Elisha Stephens, a 
hunter, trapper, and explorer of French and English ancestry who in 1859 settled in the 
area by planting a vineyard and blackberry patches nearby where de Anza made contact 
with natives (Cupertino Chronicle 1975).  The preservation of Stevens Creek today as a 
park trail, green space that some white residents continue desperately fighting to 
preserve, reflect how notions of agriculture as nature sustain visual economies of race, 
place, and power.  
The white hegemony produced through the visual culture of agriculture that 
Cupertino residents choose to remember obscures the complex racial hierarchies that 
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existed prior to white American settlement.  The Ohlone had inhabited the area six 
thousand years prior to Spanish exploration and like many other natives in the area in 
what was called Alta California, hunted various types of animals and harvested different 
local plants.  Spanish colonialism, however, ushered in a new set of racial identities and 
hierarchies.  When it came to natives, colonists used cultural parameters of catholic 
religiosity as a civilizing regime for emerging agricultural industries.  This became 
judgment of to what extent Ohlone could claim Spanishness.  Due to the geographic 
distance from Mexico in addition to the relative lack of foreign settlement, children of 
Spanish settlers and natives often became full members of colonial society.  The region’s 
growth was from within as opposed to from immigration, wherein its settler population 
developed largely from mestizo or mulattos who shared Spanish, native, and African 
ancestry.  Natives, however, were still considered by the local population as inferior and 
uncivilized (Pitti 2003).  With Mexican independence in 1821 and the secularization of 
Missions and other social arenas, a new sense of Mexican nationalism that sought to 
incorporate the native as a full citizen irked the residents of Alta California.  The region 
and its people developed its own cultures around racial difference given its relative 
seclusion from the rest of the Mexican world.  The emerging Californio identity gained 
its meanings culturally as Spanish given its geographic-distance from Mexico. 
Before and after the Mexican-American war (1848), white American settlers in 
California had begun to use legal and extra-legal means of instituting a new American 
society constituted by white supremacy.  A new political economy of agriculture, the 
“family farm,” became a new civilizing practice aimed at erasing Californio, Mexican, 
and native history from the cultural and economic geography (Pitti 2003, 32-35).  In 
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controlling the legal process, white Americans used the law to dispossess Californios of 
their own land.  Moreover, white Americans hegemonically controlled the visual cultural 
terms of belonging through their economic activities.  The new migrants brought with 
them Jeffersonian ideas of (white) humanity articulated through republican citizenship.  
Santa Clara County boosters updated Jeffersonian concepts of the family farm headed by 
the father and supported by the mother and children.  This discursively bound race, 
family and nation within the context of individual (family) enterprise and upward 
mobility (Tsu 2006).  Within California, white American enterprise was relationally 
constituted against what they thought to be the lazy and non-enterprising lifestyle of 
Californios.  In order to replace Mexican ranchos and communal grazing lands with 
republican notions of private property, farmers erected fences across tens of thousands of 
acres for the mass cultivation of wheat, barley, and other grains (Pitti 2003, 36).  White 
Americans plowed roads, created irrigation systems, uprooted trees and other native 
shrubbery, justifying the environmental destruction by emphasizing the agricultural 
abundance of the land as proof that Californios (who eventually had become lumped with 
Mexicans and natives as ‘uncivilized’ within white American society) were not 
productive peoples (Pitti 2003, 39, Tsu 2006).  This became the hegemonic visual 
cultures across the Valley.  
The financial success of the expanding orchards across the region, specializing in 
apricots, prunes, pears and cherries, concretized the individualistic ideology of the family 
farm.  The visual culture of orchards, symbolized by the individual family, 
communicated and affirmed to other white farmers and other residents the narrative of 
how the future of the region should be economically developed and what racial identities 
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could direct its growth.  The orchards stretching across the valley, constituted by the 
continuous specter of Mexican non-productivity, made the sight and activity of male 
manual labor the expected gendered conduct of the region.  Gone and forgotten, too, were 
the sparsely populated pueblos, the ranchos, and Mission life.  Poem and songs situated 
Californios and Mexicans in a distant past, putting American agricultural industriousness 
within the present.  Locals anglicized the linguistic pronunciations of Spanish-named 
places to further distort histories of genocide, forced removal, and political 
marginalization.  Ironically, the Jeffersonian aesthetic of Santa Clara County blended 
both romanticized notions of agrarian life with modern cities of technological 
advancements, including railroads, streetcars, and other amenities.  Cities, settlement, and 
development spatialized and visualized Manifest Destiny as an undeniable event, which 
white Americans were meant to inherit based off their productivity.  The visual context of 
family farming and private property would become the basis for the marginalization of 
Asian immigrant and Asian American farm labor within Santa Clara County (Tsu 2006).  
This relationship between “nature” and white supremacy sustained itself into the 
electronics age post-World War II.  In the post-World War II period, boosters for high-
tech development would reinvent the pastoral within the built environment to recruit a 
different laboring class to the region.   
Suburbanization of Silicon Valley 
The relationship between the built environment and the development of the high-tech 
economy has contributed to the racial hegemony of what is now known as Silicon Valley.  
Contemporary celebratory interpretations of Silicon Valley work cultures of collaboration 
and innovation, a seeming Petri dish of contacts among various peoples and cultures that 
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miraculously create cutting edge technologies, abstracts how race and class have mattered 
to the federal, regional, and local government investments in high-tech research.  While 
electronics research existed in the area before the post-World War II suburbanization of 
what, at the time, was predominately farmland, the strategic urban planning of industrial 
and residential spaces sought to sustain the hegemonic whiteness of the region.  Although 
industrial parks and residential subdivisions were built forms built upon farmland, 
ushering in a new era of economic abundance, the careful attention to preserving the 
pastoral within high-tech architectural aesthetics reaffirmed whiteness through the visual 
culture of high-tech suburbanization.  
 In the period directly following World War II, the suburbanization of science was 
quickly underway and underwritten by the federal government. With the growing 
relationship between higher education, scientific research, and military defense within the 
context of the Cold War and actual wars, such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War, 
physics and engineering were academic fields that were steadily growing and outpacing 
most other doctorate programs across the country.  Within these contexts and the millions 
of dollars dedicated by the federal government for military defense research at national 
laboratories and high-tech firms across the country, physicists and engineers reached 
celebrity status within the U.S. popular imaginary (Kaiser 2004).  The G.I. Bill, providing 
war veterans access to higher education like never before, and the U.S. Army erecting 
tens of thousands of prefabricated houses around nearby laboratories and firms 
demonstrated the elevated status of science and scientists as the preferable suburban 
occupation and resident.  This is a point that cannot be overstated. 
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 The racialization of science and suburbs went hand in hand, tightly contained with 
the suburban lifestyles of consumerism and familial leisure that quickly came to define 
post-war national identity.  According to David Kaiser, only one in ten physics students 
were foreign born, which was due to the fact that only United States citizens were 
allowed to work in Atomic Energy Commission funded laboratories in the post-World 
War II period (2004).  Students were mostly drawn to careers in science and engineering 
given the middle-class lifestyle they hoped it would provide based off their expectations 
of what kind of annual salaries they thought these careers would offer (Kaiser 2004). Jo 
recruitment advertisements printed in national periodicals and newspapers contributed to 
these expectations with images of a plentiful life of leisure: playing golf, watching 
television, playing with children, and driving luxury automobiles.  These particular 
images discursively bound whiteness, class, labor, and place together in defining the 
idealized subject of suburban life.  
While firms lured scientists and engineers to work for them through advertising 
that promised suburban lifestyles of expendable income and leisure time, the post-war 
national and regional development of high-tech was also a matter of post-industrial city 
planning (O'Mara 2005).  Higher educational institutions, high-tech firms, land 
developers, and local, regional, and federal government strategized together on how best 
to foster research and development (R&D) through city planning of suburbs.  These 
suburbs, places of social engineering where whiteness structured national economic re-
alignments and federal subsidies, transformed the relationship between how people lived, 
worked, and expressed their racialized national identities.  The careful blending of 
educational institutions, high-tech firms, and subdivisions of single-family detached 
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homes tightly contained the social worlds and daily rounds of its idealized demographics 
of white scientific workers and their families (O’Mara 2005).  In the national public 
imagination, suburbs are commonly associated with sprawl and the decentralization of 
public life (or lacktherof).  But the suburban forms of scientific research, which come 
together in what historian Margaret Pugh O’Mara defines as “cities of knowledge,” 
reveal that the relationship between race, class, and the built environment created public 
life around high-tech research (O’Mara 2005, 1). 
 More specifically, architectural style was central to the urban-planning strategies 
as it communicated who could ideally become a part of these new emerging, consciously 
planned communities.  In post-war society, race and location proved to be an important 
concept in high-tech development and city planning.  With the on-going threat of the 
Cold War and global nuclear warfare, the dispersal and decentralization of military 
defense institutions and high-tech firms outside of center cities quickly transformed 
residential patterns of baby boomers in the United States.  Boosters and state and local 
officials of these emerging suburban cities utilized low-taxes and other financial 
incentives to pull high-tech industries and federal funding for these knowledge industries 
away from center cities.  From the federal research polices allocating multi-million dollar 
contracts for military defense to the public-private partnerships at the state, regional, and 
local level, which provided subsidies for firms in order to make their jurisdictions more 
business-friendly, “cities of knowledge” reflect the national “social welfare” aimed at 
empowering white people and improving their standards of living through city-planning 
(Leslie and American Council of Learned Societies. 1993; Saxenian 1994; O'Mara 2005; 
Lowen and NetLibrary Inc. 1997).   
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 Whiteness was central to the particular manifestation of these “cities of 
knowledge.”  The aesthetics of the “city of knowledge” communicated the cultural 
framework that supported these national, regional, and local policies of white privilege 
and wealth accumulation associated with high-tech labor.  Since the late nineteenth 
century, Santa Clara County existed as a summer retreat for wealth San Francisco 
capitalists who sought refuge from the ills that seem to define center cities at the time.  
Places such as the Monta Vista neighborhood in Cupertino with its bungalows and 
cottages set against the rural landscape of orchards and nurseries visualized a race and 
class difference from the urban density and the conflicts of race and labor commonly 
associated with it.  The industrialization of places like San Francisco with its immigrant 
and working class laborers were part of a larger cultural imaginary of center cities as 
dangerous, dirty, and diseased places harmful to white residents and their businesses. 
Revitalizing declining cities through technology failed for a variety of factors such as 
lack of open space.  But the racial demographics of places such as Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania and Berkeley, California (read as black), even with nationally-ranked 
research universities as anchors to development plans, could not create the right and 
white “climate” to encourage investment (O’Mara 2005, 8, 130).  In the post-war era, 
racial conflicts associated with civil rights movements and labor union uprisings of center 
cities made suburbs ideal places for new race and class-targeted economic developments. 
 While white suburban residents of Silicon Valley welcomed tax-revenue from 
new businesses, maintaining the look of race and class exclusive suburban life was 
central to sustaining and improving property taxes (Self 2003).  In the context of the 
Silicon Valley, the paradisiacal portrayal of itself as a non-racist place emerges from the 
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lack of people of sizeable communities of color that could threaten economically white 
supremacy, but also the push factors of de-skilling and racial segregation that made 
relocating to the area challenging (Tsu 2006, (Ruffin II 2007).  Maintaining architectural 
continuity of the built forms of cities of knowledge – industrial parks, educational 
institutions, and residential subdivisions – was crucial to integrating high-tech seamlessly 
with existing and emergent suburban cities and the aesthetics of pastoral retreat from 
center cities.  The pastoral setting of American universities purportedly offered students 
and faculty a place set apart from the engines of industrial capitalism (O’Mara 2005, 60).  
The geographic distance translated into a psychic distance with the intention of providing 
students and faculty the space – literally and figuratively – for unadulterated intellectual 
pursuits for the sake of intellectual pursuits and nothing else.  The varied actors invested 
in high-tech development drew from this legacy of the pastoral associated with education 
in designing the exclusive architectures of sciences and engineering, suggesting that the 
pastoral “look” and “feel” would improve innovation.  Industrial research parks were 
designed to be the anti-factory: they tended to be low-rise modernist buildings, which 
required ample green space surrounding it to further instantiate research as part of the 
suburban form and lifestyle.  The design of industrial parks showcased the future of 
American as places of technological development, while hiding the industriousness 
commonly associated with working-class places of manufacturing within center cities 
(O’Mara 2005, 64-65(Findlay 1992). 
 Stanford University’s Industrial Park set the precedent for creating the idyllic race 
and class-based scientific community precisely for its attention to the pastoral.  From its 
inception, the aesthetics of its campus reflected historic anti-urban movements in 
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California.  John Muir’s writings of environmental conservation and the necessity of 
California landscapes as therapeutic to the contextual perception of the social ills of 
industrial cities shaped how Leland Stanford interpreted the local bucolic settings into the 
campus architecture.  Leland Stanford’s university was heavily planned as he deliberately 
drew from the mission architecture of the histories of the American West, particularly the 
romanticized colonial era (O’Mara 2005, 101-102).  The low-slung buildings offered 
views of the mountain range along the peninsula directly to the west and also to the east.  
Similarly, the designs of the mid-century industrial park, the Stanford shopping 
center, and the high-end single-family residences were meant to blend in with these 
existing priorities for the pastoral.  To placate neighbors, strict building codes prevented 
building density from filling in green space.  The building designs might not have been 
architecturally noteworthy.  But the most important feature of these buildings was that 
they were unobtrusive to the existing residential area.  The planning among Stanford 
administrators, local government, land developers, and architects made scientific research 
a race and class-based community, which the shopping center reflected the class-identity 
of its residents (O’Mara 2005, 117).  Architects and merchant builders used modernist 
residential architecture to bring outdoor living within the home through design details, 
drawing from the racialized visual culture of the pastoral to create a desire for what was 
commonly known at the time as “California living.”  Together, urban-planning as a form 
of social engineering contained white identity through the aesthetics of the suburban 
forms of science and engineering.  Further, connected white identity with labor and 
wealth accumulation through property values associated with aesthetics of the suburban 
forms of science and engineering.   
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In Santa Clara County (and later as Silicon Valley), the visual economy of the 
pastoral was part and parcel to the relationship between white hegemony and the region’s 
rapidly expanding high-tech industries.  Changes to U.S. political economy would 
transform the racial priorities of Silicon Valley’s economic development as it shifted 
military defense research to consumer-oriented products. The following section discusses 
the push and pull factors that brought Chinese immigrants to the Silicon Valley.  
The Exceptional Chinese of Silicon Valley 
A commonly circulated joke that “Silicon Valley is built on ICs” – not integrated circuits 
but Indian and Chinese engineers – reflects the relationship between race and economic 
development that has come to give meaning to Silicon Valley place.  This particular 
saying assumes that Asian Americans’ experiences in the region began with Silicon 
Valley, often forgetting the contributions Asian Americans made to agricultural 
industries and their experiences that critique the alleged myths of Santa Clara County’s 
anti-racism.2  But this joke doesn’t just emerge from the fact that Indian and Chinese 
engineers make up the largest ethnic groups of all Asians in high-tech fields, but also the 
increasing number of Indian and Chinese entrepreneurs that are executives and owners of 
high-tech firms in the area.  During the 1980s and well into the 1990s, Indian and 
Chinese workers complained of the “glass ceiling” where they were compensated 
                                                
2 In Cupertino, locals retelling of Cupertino’s agricultural past ignores the history of Chinese and Japanese 
nurseries in the area.  It was not until the late nineteen nineties when then-city council member Michael 
Chang, also a professor of Asian American Studies at Cupertino’s De Anza Community College, wrote a 
book with the Cupertino Historical Society about Chinese and Japanese nurseries and experiences of 
discrimination did the historical society begin integrating artifacts of Asian Americans into it’s exhibits.  
For more on Anti-Asian exclusion in Santa Clara County, see Cecilia Tsu. “Grown in the ‘Garden of the 
World:’ Race, Gender, and Agriculture in California’s Santa Clara Valley, 1880-1940.” (Ph.D diss., 
Stanford University, 2006). Jean Pfaelzer. Driven Out: The Forgotten War Against Chinese Americans. 
(New York: Random House, 2007).  Glenna Matthews. Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream: 
Gender, Class, and Opportunity in the Twentieth Century.” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  
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similarly to their managers but were consistently passed on for promotions to middle and 
upper-management.  Other experiences of discrimination related to the “glass ceiling” 
effect included venture capitalists refusal to provide seed money if an Asian person was 
the president of an Asian-owned company (Saxenian 1999).  Ironically, the “glass 
ceiling” that Asian engineers and entrepreneurs faced created the conditions for Asians to 
become leaders of Silicon Valley’s growth into the twenty-first century.  Chinese people 
would further develop the region’s transpacific business with Greater China and change 
the identity of Silicon Valley towards its contemporary narrative of a cosmopolitan hub 
of Asian cultures.    
In response to racial discrimination in the work place, Indians and Chinese 
formed their own ethnic-based professional networks locally and transnationally, pulling 
resources such as knowledge and capital together to help fund start-up companies.  Many 
of these networks were based off social needs for community based on shared language, 
culture, and educational, and, of course, professional backgrounds.  AnnaLee Saxenian 
emphasizes the on-going discursive relationship between Asian ethnicity and economic 
development: 
These organizations combine elements of traditional immigrant culture with 
distinctly high-technology practices: they simultaneously create ethnic identities 
within the region and facilitate the professional networking and information 
exchange that aid success in the highly mobile Silicon Valley economy (Saxenian 
1999) 
 
These ethnic networks have contributed to the steady financial growth of Silicon Valley’s 
multi-billion dollar high-tech industry.  By 1998, Asians made up a quarter of senior 
executives of Silicon Valley tech businesses.  Immigrant-run companies collectively 
accounted for more than $16.8 billion in sales and 58,282 jobs in 1998 alone.  Between 
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1980-1998, 17% of all high-tech firms were run by Chinese (Saxenian 1999).  As shown 
by these numbers alone, these ethnic networks contribute to job and entrepreneurial 
opportunities in California and in other Chinese countries.  These social and professional 
networks have been such a huge part of this growth that the local media dubbed one 
Chinese ethnic organization, Chinese Software Professional Association (CSPA), “The 
Silicon Valley Entrepreneur’s Secret Weapon” (Saxenian 1999).  Once denied capital 
investment based on the legacy of white “old boys networks” of Silicon Valley, Asian 
immigrants, ironically, find themselves the target of new venture capital firms, dedicated 
primarily to funding projects between Silicon Valley and Asia (Saxenian 1999).  
 The larger numbers of Chinese people in Silicon Valley high-tech industries 
wasn’t just by happenstance, but rather, like post-War Silicon Valley, part of federal 
policy aimed at recruiting particular kinds of labor to fulfill shortages in science and 
engineering.  Furthermore, U.S. Cold War diplomacy also explains the Taiwanese 
population in science and engineering settling in such places as Silicon Valley, New 
Jersey, and Massachusetts, where electronics research hubs were established resulting 
from military defense spending.  With the Chinese Nationalists (KMT) falling to the 
Communists (CCP) and ultimately retreating to the island of Taiwan, the United States 
began to strategize how to affirm their political and economic hegemony in Asia under 
the guise of the “democracy.”  John W. Garver argues that the United States chose not to 
directly influence political reform for fear that it would alienate the Nationalist 
government, possibly encouraging defection towards the communists.  Instead, the U.S, 
Garver argues, chose to introduce democracy through economic aid that would promote 
foreign private investment, initially through land reform and then through textiles 
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manufacturing and agricultural export economies (Garver 1997).  Chintay Shih, Kung 
Wang, and Yi-Ling Wei note that high-tech development came in four stages, which the 
1960s ushered in an era of industrial manufacturing of electronics for foreign companies 
such as General Instruments, Texas Instruments, RCA, Sanyo Electric, and more (Shih 
2006).  
 The nurturing of high tech research in Taiwan, however, extended beyond 
manufacturing.  During the 1960s and 1970s, educational and professional exchange 
programs between Taiwan and the United States in the context of engineering knowledge 
sharing created channels for science and technology talents to move between the United 
States and Taiwan (Shih 2006; Ong, Bonacich, and Cheng 1994).  Although the United 
States had little input on Taiwan’s educational systems, these existing channels helped 
foster the development of engineering programs in Taiwan universities (Ong, Bonacich, 
and Cheng 1994).  Many Taiwanese people, having trained at United States universities, 
returned to become faculty members, teaching and nurturing an emerging labor force that 
had learned of “America” through electronics manufacturing in Taiwan and of the 
economic opportunities in Silicon Valley.  The lack of jobs in Taiwan for graduating 
engineers pushed them to places such as Silicon Valley to find work.  When asking 
Chinese parents how they had heard about Silicon Valley growing up in Taiwan, several 
mentioned the recruiters and scientists from major high-tech firms who taught them about 
new developing technologies.  One particular parent mentioned as a child passing by an 
electronics manufacturing plant in his backyard on his way to work when he lived in the 
rural outskirts of Taipei.  U.S. labor shortages in skilled labor, such as science and 
engineering, led to revisions in immigration laws in 1990 that dramatically increased the 
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preference category of occupational immigrants from 54,000 to 120,000.  It is through the 
entanglement of high-tech industries and educational opportunities that Silicon Valley 
emerges as the representation of “America” for Chinese immigrants.  
But corporate discourses on Asian American economic success, epitomized by the 
cultural visibility of Chinese shopping centers and the riches of high-tech workers, 
obscure the drastic inequalities within the varied kinds of labor that make up the high-
tech industry.  While corporations and local media parade Chinese workers as symbols of 
the Valley’s transcendence of racism, where job flexibility (and insecurity) is locally 
promoted as entrepreneurial spirit and unlimited opportunities, this image of success is 
unattainable by many women and immigrants of color who toil as temporary skilled and 
unskilled workers.  These temporary workers make up a sizeable portion of Silicon 
Valley’s high-tech labor and reflect the often un-spoken side of the regional economy’s 
labor disciplining.  As observers of Silicon Valley note, consumer products matter more 
than the people that work on them.  In their study of the environmental hazards and 
inequalities embedded within the local manufacturing of high-tech products, Lisa Sun-
Hee Park and David Naguib Pellow suggest that labor is “hyper-regulated” rather 
“deregulated,” as technological environments such as “clean rooms” and the contingent 
protocol of training workers to labor in these environments are meant to protect the 
computer chips than the lives of people who make them.  The regional discourse about 
access and inequality tends to revolve around the notion of the “digital divide,” which 
focuses upon the differences in access and learning of new computer technologies.  That 
is, the digital divide discourse affirms dominant mythic narratives of opportunity that if 
everyone regardless of race, class, and gender learned how to use a computer, then 
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everyone would be able to partake in the wealth that Silicon Valley has to offer.  Aihwa 
Ong notes that skilled South Asian engineers and computer scientists on H1-B temporary 
work visas are subjected to labor contracting companies, also known as body shops, that 
control where they work and when they get paid.  These body shops often use these 
temporary workers’ desires to obtain citizenship as leverage to exploit them by extracting 
more from their paycheck, controlling where they work, and how much work they can 
actually find (Ong 2006, 163-165).  As a result, companies tend to hire through body 
shops as they provide a more cost efficient labor pool that they are not obligated to 
provide benefits to.  In turn, that affects the ability of people of similar skill in the United 
States to find jobs.  These kinds of labor disciplining reflect the neoliberal “exception,” 
which finds ways of including particular Chinese subjects at the expense of those here 
temporarily whose basic rights are suspended.   
 But as Margaret Pugh O’Mara suggests, the deliberate design of high-tech built 
environments as college campuses was meant to obscure the manufacturing that was 
being done within many of these suburban spaces.  Because of the visual cultures of race 
and class associated with factories of center cities and the billowing smoke from its 
chimneys, which did not fit in the white and wealthy suburban and bucolic settings 
outside of San Francisco and Oakland, high-tech campuses disguised manufacturing as 
just like any other low-slung mid-modernist building, the popular architectural design at 
the time.  This strategic way that particular subjects are made visible and invisible within 
local discussions about labor and architecture reveal how the exceptional neoliberal 
economic developments are enabled on an everyday basis.  In the following section, I 
examine a policy report and interrogate how retellings of historical narratives instantiate 
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the relationship between Chinese immigrants and Silicon Valley within the context of 
transpacific economic development.  The policy emphasizes that Chinese immigrants 
have also been enterprising peoples that have contributed to the building of Silicon 
Valley since the mid-19th century.   
“Ties That Bind” 
In November 2006, the Bay Area Economic Forum released a publication titled “Ties 
That Bind: The San Francisco Bay Area’s Economic Links to Greater China,” a report 
addressing how best the region’s businesses, local government, and educational 
institutions could continue to build on existing transpacific economic relations.  The 
particular report was timely given how multiple factors including increasing competition 
in the global marketplace, stricter U.S. immigration policies post-9/11, and economic 
restructuring in Greater China made business with the United States less financially 
attractive for Chinese businesses.  For example, Chinese countries such as Taiwan 
lowered the threshold to developing cross-strait economic development with China by 
providing state-subsidies for business and exemptions from the military service for 
students who decided to stay at home to attend universities (Ties That Bind: San 
Francisco Bay Area's Economic Links to Greater China  2006).  “Ties That Bind” offered 
a review of various existing Chinese transnational institutions – educational, professional, 
cultural, and community-based – that enabled Silicon Valley to be the prime and ideal 
location and leader in facilitating business with Greater China to the rest of the United 
States. 
 Regional media has documented the economic relations and contributions of 
Chinese immigrants within Silicon Valley, particularly documenting how transpacific 
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Chinese businessmen and women shuttling between Greater China and Silicon Valley 
facilitate multi-billion dollars worth of business annually.  What I am choosing to focus 
on in this report, however, is how the Bay Area Economic Forum historicizes 
contemporary regional business with China as a continuation of over 150 years of 
Chinese economic presence in the San Francisco Bay Area.  Specifically, it is the re-
narration of Chinese economic presence articulated through an essential and timeless 
Chinese culture, which I believe deserves attention.  In this report, the Bay Area 
Economic Forum aims to normalize Chinese people and culture as historically and 
unequivocally responsible for the making of California’s robust economy centered on 
entrepreneurial spirit.  By culture, the report names family and hierarchical social 
structures, work-ethic, and educational achievement as intrinsically “Chinese” in nature 
and naturally why Silicon Valley’s economy has been so successful.  But it is the 
blending of the economic and cultural spaces of Chinese communities within this 
narration that specifically produces Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs as the normative 
subject of the San Francisco Bay Area in the 21st century.  
 Culture has grown to become part and parcel to regional and national discussions 
of understanding not only the context for how to work with Chinese businesses, but also 
how to recruit Chinese businesses within a competitive global market.  Lenny Mendonca, 
Chairman of the Bay Area Economic Forum, emphasizes that the “Bay Area economy. . . 
. also benefits from. . . .a diversity of cultures, which heighten its role as a global 
intellectual and commercial center” (Mendonca 2008).  The emphasis on culture, 
however, tends to distinctly refer to “Chinese” with reference to the region’s economic 
abundance.  The Bay Area Council (BAC) and the Association for Bay Area 
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Governments (ABAG), the two advocacy groups teaming up as the Bay Area Economic 
Forum, working together on economic climate in order to address “quality of life” issues 
that are important to both entities.  The ABAG is a non-profit group that is made up of 
locally elected officials from the 101 cities and towns across the 9 counties, which they 
define as the “San Francisco Bay Area.”  Established in 1961, ABAG addresses issues 
regarding regional economy, but also housing, transportation, education, and 
environmental concerns that come with continued economic growth.  ABAG has been an 
important institution to study given the regional housing mandates that they encourage 
local jurisdictions to abide by.  Oddly, they have no actual power to enforce the increase 
in housing – below market value and not – to meet the needs of new jobs. The presence 
of ABAG reflects the synergistic, but often conflicted relationship between resident, 
local, and regional government.  The BAC, however, is made up entirely of businesses 
including Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Pacific Gas and Electric, and Kaiser Industries.  
Originating in 1955, the BAC was an offshoot of the Metropolitan Defense Council, 
which was led by local businessmen and politicians.  With the regional economy 
booming during World War II, the BAC wanted to sustain this growth, an outcome of 
private-public partnerships.  The BAC is another reflection of how wartime industries 
around high technology have shape the planning around the suburbanization of Silicon 
Valley. The goal of the BAC is to forecast economic trends and to set long-term agendas 
for the region, which one of their initiatives, the only one that is centered on a 
relationship with a country and group of people, is “China.” The BAC’s “China Policy” 
aims to continue developing “bilateral trade and investment promotion between. . . . two 
regions.”  In 2010, the BAC established their physical office in the “Knowledge and 
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Innovation Community” in the Yangpu District of Shanghai, China with the hopes of 
“building a lasting conduit for sharing capital, ideas, innovation and resources” between 
the regions.   
 While the Bay Area Economic Forum produced several different reports 
regarding Chinese investment throughout the 21st decade, Ties That Bind was the only 
that explained Chinese as always and already exemplary of what Chairman Mendonca 
described as the necessary relationship between “diversity of cultures” and “global 
intellectual and commercial center” that is Silicon Valley.  The report, over 170 pages in 
length, is organized into five chapters, with the first two historical (“A Rich History of 
Work and Reward” and “New Networks Emerge”) and the next three describing existing 
and emerging business opportunities.  Right off the bat, the name of the first chapter sets 
the tone for the report, which “rich” appears to be a double entendre for the depth of 
Chinese labor history in the area and, also, the wealth, financially, that Chinese 
communities have contributed.  Moreover, the BAC reduces Chinese experiences in the 
Bay Area to “work” and the “rewards.”  The rewards are clearly delineated in the 
“Executive Summary,” preceding the chapters, which offer various monetary statistics of 
how much money Chinese students, scientists, and businessmen and women offer to the 
regional economy (i.e $127.5 million in tuition and living expenses).  
 The main point of the historical chapters is to show the entrepreneurial aspects of 
Chinese culture that has historically been endemic to the formation of Chinese immigrant 
communities in the San Francisco Bay Area.  This report suggests that in spite of 
hardships including racial discrimination and anti-Asian violence (resulting in death), 
Chinese people persevered and labored along to create their own economic institutions 
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around a shared ethnic identity.  Further, this report portrays Chinese cultures of work 
ethic as giving Chinese the innate ability to overcome all economic obstacles, de-
emphasizing anti-Chinese racism to any ordinary roadblock to overcome when starting a 
business.  This chapter of the report moves chronologically beginning with the push and 
pull factors that led to Chinese migration to the United States in the mid-nineteenth 
century, swiftly portraying Chinese laborers of the past as the ideal worker of the present: 
Many Chinese immigrants traveled to the United States under labor contracts with 
merchants in China or with American middlemen who solicited them and 
arranged their passage. . . .But contracts often proved unenforceable and laborers 
ended up mining or prospecting on their own in the Sierra foothills.  Chinese 
workers distinguished themselves as hard workers and shrewd entrepreneurs 
(2006, 13).  
 
While this passage shows the forms of racial discrimination that Chinese laborers faced, 
it recuperates the narrative by spinning it positively to show Chinese people continued to 
be “hard workers” that were “shrewd” enough to be enterprising in spite of these 
conditions.  The chapter adds that while anti-Chinese racism was an “unfortunate reality,” 
Chinese people were still able to diversify their revenue streams.  That is, Chinese people 
were able to “dominate the shrimp industry” by opening up their exports to markets in 
their homelands (2006, 15).  Their communities, which Chinese American Studies have 
demonstrated to be forms of race-based economic exclusion, are rewritten in this 
narrative as intrinsically Chinese characteristics of work ethic and individuality.  What is 
problematic about these representations are how Chinese experiences of survival become 
interpreted through the normative contemporary lens of neoliberal systems of 
governmentality.  The establishment of restaurants, laundry services, theaters, and places 
of social and economic life are no longer about legalized racial segregation and policing. 
Instead, the places reflect the entrepreneurial spirit of Silicon Valley life.  In this case, 
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entrepreneurialism refers to notions of self-management and the reliance upon oneself to 
provide for ones own needs.  For the reader, sentences describing the physical formation 
of Chinese communities cues up ideas of independence and success built upon self-
reliance outside of government assistance: “Even enduring the 61 years that the 
Exclusion Act was in effect in the U.S. . . .Chinese entrepreneurs prospered in farming, 
manufacturing, retail business, banking, hotels and property” (2006, 21).  
 Chinese culture, again, surfaces in the report as naturally a part of the cultural 
landscape and built environment of metropolitan financial areas, but solely contained by 
financial institutions such as banking.  In a section of the first chapter titled, “Making – 
and Breaking – the Banks,” Chinese laborers are explained as the main reason for why 
Wells Fargo became a successful banking institution.  It wasn’t just that Chinese laborers 
were loyal customers, but also that Chinese laborers predicted that the corner of an 
intersection that Wells Fargo was built on in San Francisco had more acceptable 
properties of Feng Shui.  Prior to that, another bank had asked Chinese laborers to build a 
bank on opposite corner.  The Chinese laborers refused given that the granite used 
allegedly was not meant for that location, Feng Shui-wise.  As a result, Chinese laborers 
refused to conduct their banking there because it was “unlucky.”  As the report adds, 
Wells Fargo thrived off Chinese loyalty and opened their headquarters with “Chinese 
ceremonies to ward off evil spirits ”(2006, 19).  The particular incident frames Chinese 
culture and American business as a likely pairing.  Moreover, it emphasizes Chinese 
culture literally embedded within the built environment of cities such as San Francisco, 
constructed within this report as the most important port and financial area to conduct 
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business to China.  Again, Chinese people can only be understood by their financial 
presence communicated through the cultural and physical geography.  
 Further, essentialized perceptions of Chinese family values and social structure 
explain the particularity of Chinese business practices between these coordinated spaces 
of economic development.  When explaining professional associations, the glass ceiling 
is de-emphasized (mentioned only once) in order to stress the values of Chinese cultures 
towards knowledge and capital circulation within regional and trans-Pacific 
collaboration: 
The Bay Area benefits from a unique structure of family, provincial, academic 
and professional networks within and among the various overseas Chinese 
communities.  These mutually supportive links have grown out of successive 
waves of immigration, but reflect commonly held values about the importance of 
education; family and social hierarchy; professional advancement, and 
entrepreneurial initiative (2006, 21). 
 
This portion of the report describes the cultural structures that guide collaborative 
Chinese business practices.  But like every other impression of Chinese culture in this 
report, all forms of cultural life become folded into business.  Chinese family and 
education cannot be understood outside of “professional advancement” and 
“entrepreneurial initiative.”  In Silicon Valley, everyday decisions become translated into 
economic calculations.  The dominance of knowledge industries in Silicon Valley 
economies ensures that educated Chinese students, scientists, engineers, businessmen and 
women, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists represent the normative subject of Silicon 
Valley.  The report functions to further normalize the prioritization of business with 
Greater China by hegemonically enforcing Chinese culture through spatial and visual 
cues across Silicon Valley cultural, economic, and physical landscapes.  
 
 58 
 The final chapter, “Building Bridges, Leveraging Assets,” provides several 
suggestions of how the normalization of Chinese culture across these various landscapes 
will create the perfect cultural conditions to lure more international Chinese investment to 
Silicon Valley.  This final portion describes how the Bay Area can leverage their existing 
assets, claiming itself to have been historically accepting and nurturing of Chinese 
cultures since the first Chinese arrived on the West Coast.  But it is important to note the 
particular hegemonic way that the BAC encourages the consumption of Chinese culture 
throughout the visual culture of the region.  Besides encouraging Chinese language 
education throughout K-12 education and junior colleges, the BAC believes local 
jurisdictions should “Promote the Bay Area as a destination for Chinese students and 
leisure travelers” because “[a]s personal income in China grows and more Chinese travel 
abroad, the Bay Area should also be aggressively promoted as a culturally welcoming, 
language-friendly destination for Chinese tourists” with the “facilities developed to 
support them” (2006, 141).  The spatial and visual reinvention of Silicon Valley into what 
seems to be a Chinese culturally dominant region aims to make these coordinated spaces 
of economic development similar to Chinese homelands to facilitate the ease of business 
transactions.  The last asset, “Support cultural activities that strengthen Bay Area-China 
linkages,” further emphasizes the necessity of affirming Chinese culture spatially with 
“the proposed development of a classical Chinese garden in San Francisco” because it 
can “raise the Bay Area’s profile, strengthen its identity with China, and attract U.S., 
Chinese and other visitors” (2006, 141).  The Asian Art Museum, as explained by the 
BAC within this report, is one of these necessary institutions that demonstrate to 
Americans the value of Chinese people, culture, and transpacific business (2006, 45). 
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 In the “Ties That Bind,” the BAC re-narrates the San Francisco Bay Area as a 
place that has had a long, thriving history of Chinese transpacific relations and economic 
development.  In obscuring violent histories of anti-Chinese racism, “Ties That Bind” 
emphasizes the transnational Chinese communities and the Bay Area as always, already 
welcoming of not just Chinese cultures and commodities, but Chinese people, too.  But 
what seems particularly significant to emphasize is the visual cues of Chineseness that 
are written into this history of particular kinds of places and activities that helped define 
Chinese life and the life of the San Francisco Bay Area.  By naming Chinese cultural 
places, such as tea gardens or museums instructive of Chinese cultural traditions, the 
BAC hope to secure a future of the San Francisco Bay Area enabling of economic 
relations with Greater China. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how contemporary state and corporate narratives frame 
Chinese engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs as the ideal subjects to populate Silicon 
Valley and the Greater San Francisco Bay Area.  This ideal subject, however, is tightly 
contained by the places of labor.  In these narrations, whether it is engineering or laundry 
services, BAC explains places of Chinese economic activities as the always and already 
existing cultural geography of the region.  For example, limited economic opportunities 
as a result of de jure and de factor segregation, according to the BAC, is what encouraged 
Chinese communities to be entrepreneurial, pulling resources together to establish ethnic 
economies.  The point of these narrations were not to suggest Chinese resistance, but, 
instead, to reinvent a history of Chinese entrepreneurship as naturally a part of the San 
Francisco Bay Area.  These narrations are instructive of what constitutes the ideal subject 
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and the market forces that structures the places that discipline everyday behavior.  With 
the prioritization of trans-Pacific economic development, the BAC wants to manipulate 
the cultures of its built environment to make the region more hospital towards educated 
and human-capital rich Chinese people. 
 The BAC’s policy initiative at re-organizing the political, economic, and cultural 
geography of the San Francisco Bay Area follows a larger history of Silicon Valley’s 
urban planning centered on high-tech development.  Racial preference of Chinese people 
diverges slightly from the earlier race and class exclusions carefully planned within the 
designs of the Silicon Valley’s built environments and communities.  Boosters, 
developers, educational institutions, and local governments tried to align city planning 
with whiteness, its meanings contained literally by high-tech campus walls and its 
subjectivity performed daily by the people who moved through its buildings and 
accompanying racially exclusive sub-divisions.  In the following chapters, I examine the 
various places of Silicon Valley, which have been part of the visual and material culture 
of racial hegemonies.  With shifting economic trends prioritizing Chinese immigrants, I 
examine more closely how battles over public spaces reflect larger shifting racial 









CHAPTER 3  
Shopping at the Crossroads 
 
 
When Business Journal Silicon Valley/San Jose broke news on April 4, 2003 that San 
Jose, California-based developers Emily Chen, John Nguyen, and Alan Wong purchased 
the failing VALLCO shopping mall in Cupertino, California and reported that they 
planned to turn it into an “Asian Marketplace,” white Cupertino residents demanded a 
portion of the upcoming city council meeting on April 15 be dedicated to voicing their 
concerns to the new owners of what they saw as the racial divisiveness of another 
Chinese shopping center.1  The owners, specializing in retail development of overseas 
Asian goods throughout Silicon Valley, were not present at the meeting.  But in spite of 
what Dennis Brown, attorney for the trio of developers, said about the owners valuing 
Cupertino citizen input on future development, multiple residents referenced the Business 
Journal article as proof that the developers planned to market their development towards 
Asians only.  In spite of the overwhelming popularity of Pan-Asian shopping centers of 
stores predominately selling Chinese goods throughout this period, these residents 
claimed that the rumored VALLCO plan was “counter-productive and not in the best 
interest of the city.”  By that, some residents, bothered by the sights and smells of 
Chinese culture, and city council reminded the owners (via Dennis Brown) that 
VALLCO is “close to the heart of the community and it is also a community asset.” 
                                                
1 VALLCO refers to the principal developers of the shopping mall and adjacent business and industrial 
park. The names include the Varian Associates and the “original” Cupertino families: Leonard, Lester, 
Craft, and Orlando 
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Together, they warned about destroying the non-revenue generating ice-rink because it 
was a “community asset” in addition to encouraging VALLCO to be more community 
oriented by adding childcare services and a mainstream grocery store.  
This particular episode over the pending purchase of VALLCO Fashion Park and 
the local white resident and city council demand for community input reveals how race, 
immigration, community, and consumer culture converge in the context of economic 
development in Cupertino.  The new Asian ownership of VALLCO occurred at time 
when Chinese strip malls, such as the neighboring Cupertino Village less than a quarter 
mile down the road, were lauded in local media for their economic success serving a 
growing Asian immigrant population in the San Francisco Bay Area.  Cupertino, like 
many other areas across the Bay Area, witnessed a large spike in Asian residents during 
the 1990s.  For Asian developers, transforming VALLCO into a lucrative Asian shopping 
center seem to make perfect business sense for a shopping mall that had been losing 
brand-name retailers and tax-revenue for the city for almost a decade.   
But local attempts at blocking the rumored Chinese mall by demanding that the 
developers serve the community needs framed economic development as a moral 
judgment of what kinds of local values the built environment of consumerism should 
reflect and encourage. While these development plans were consistently portrayed as 
racial tensions among white residents and Chinese immigrants over different cultural 
particularities (of shopping), both sides used consumer culture – what could be sold and 
purchased based off VALLCO’s development and design – to frame what it means to be 
a part of the community.  Moreover, this episode reveals how governing has become a 
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relationship between residents and developers, with the local government emphasizing 
private investment as what sustains the community.  
This chapter examines how consumer culture, at times articulated through rights 
discourses of Asian cultural and economic inclusion, has become a form of governing in 
Silicon Valley.  As market logics exist as moral evaluations about what should be the 
local cultural lifestyle, who best represents this lifestyle, and how to nurture these 
lifestyles among residents through urban-planning projects, I argue that that these on-
going questions about community and economic development demonstrate how 
neoliberalism operates as a system of governmentality in Silicon Valley.  While private-
public partnerships, labor discipline, and deregulation of high-tech industries reflect 
Silicon Valley’s neoliberalism as an economic policy, the on-going debates over 
preserving Cupertino culture show that systems of governmentality are at work in 
extending these market logics to all aspects of social life, specifically when it comes to 
identity.  Governmentality refers to the everyday procedures and strategies aimed at 
governing individuals through the language of freedom.  Rather than the governing of 
populations occurring through state coercion, the language of freedom is articulated 
through the notion of timeless moral values of personal responsibility and individual 
choice.  As we see in the case of Cupertino’s mall development, governmentality 
“relieves the discrepancy between economic and moral behavior by configuring morality 
entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences” 
(Brown 2003). 
The city council, residents, and developers identifying of built structures, such as 
malls, as places for community action reflects the relationship between architecture and 
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governing in what Nikolas Rose defines as “government through community” (Rose 
1999).  For Rose, communitarians see themselves and their affinities towards each other 
as a “third space,” which exists as a “moral field of binding persons into durable 
relations” outside of the corrupted civic life created by the State and capitalism (Rose 
1999).  But these communitarian identities, Rose argues, become mobilized as segmented 
populations, which political parties and new markets can exploit and govern through 
communitarians perception of having “shared values.”  For these purposes, this “third 
space” takes shape in physical form, which techniques of subjectification are “visualized, 
mapped, surveyed, and mobilized” (Rose 1999)  Space is important for understanding 
how particular subjects are managed and nurtured within this framework of 
governmentality. 
These “architectures of community,” specifically these urban-planning projects in 
Cupertino, guide how privileged subjects emerge in Cupertino.  This relationship reveals 
the particular neoliberal discourses and practices of Silicon Valley that maintain these 
exceptional narratives of itself through the everyday social life.  This case of VALLCO 
Fashion Park as well as other sputtering retail tax-revenue generating projects shows that 
individuals and groups of varying interests in Cupertino seek to manage themselves by 
creating particular subjects that will boost sales-tax revenue and save their city services.  
In this chapter, I examine these local debates and escalating conflicts over the direction of 
economic development and civic life.  In these conflicts, I focus on the varied discourses 
and subjects of neoliberalism in Silicon Valley, which moral arguments about lifestyle 
and diversity become conditions for generating tax revenue.  By varied, I am describing, 
on the one hand, the regional investment in the consumerism of Chinese culture as 
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systems of governmentality, which people locally and publicly resist in Cupertino.  On 
the other hand, wealthy white and Chinese residents created an unlikely alliance over the 
racial danger they assume mixed-use development would bring to their community.  I 
trace how these two different threads are interwoven in the contradictory making of the 
ideal subject of Silicon Valley through the interrelated, on going, and never-starting 
VALLCO Redevelopment Plans and “The Heart of the City” shopping district.  Both are 
related to one another in the failed attempts at creating a centralized shopping district of 
mixed-used development.  Also, both events show the contradictory ways by which 
Chinese immigrants appropriate neoliberal discourses to emerge as community members.  
In the first section of the chapter, I trace how local residents and the city have responded 
to the decline of VALLCO and the anxiety around its recent Asian ownership.  I situate 
this discussion of creating demand for Asian/Chinese consumer culture within discourses 
of U.S. multiculturalism. The second section of this chapter analyzes “The Heart of the 
City” design plans to develop a downtown shopping district along the main commercial 
and retail artery of Stevens Creek Boulevard, a six-lane street. I show how these mixed 
used projects, inspired by New Urbanism’s ideas of recreating ‘community’ through 
sociability, exist as architectures of governing that aim to contain the practices of civic 
life to consumer 
VALLCO Fashion Park  
With Asian (predominately Chinese) investors and developers taking ownership of 
VALLCO Fashion Park in the early 21st century (and amassing loans into the hundreds of 
millions), their expected, but failed, plans at developing a shopping center of Asian 
(predominately Chinese) retailers reflects the market-driven decisions of economic 
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development in Cupertino. As wealthy Asian families with dual-incomes easily clearing 
$130,000 per household have transformed the race and class profile of Cupertino and the 
surrounding affluent suburbs, developing VALLCO Fashion Park into an Asian shopping 
center made perfect business sense for these new investors and developers.  In spite of 
local resistance to Asian ownership and local fears that these investors don’t represent the 
shopping needs of the (white) “community,” investors used a variety of tactics to assure 
residents that their economic investment is, indeed, in the interest of locals.  Although 
these investors have failed miserably at delivering their promises, the battles between 
residents and Asian investors and developers of VALLCO Fashion Park show how the 
encouragement of class-based culture as entertainment in the context of shopping has 
become a discourse of civic life in Silicon Valley, which in other jurisdictions within the 
county has become the norm.2 This was less as an attempt to revitalize an unofficial 
historic institution of Cupertino, but rather a regional reflection of how globalization 
discourse and corporate development has shaped the conditions of citizenship in Silicon 
Valley.  Recognizing how white residents have tried to preserve any building in town that 
predates the 1980s high-tech construction as a historical place of “community,” Asian 
developer attempt to appeal to “community” by emphasizing how the transnational Asian 
consumer cultures resembles the “authentic” white Cupertinian upper-middle class 
demographics. 
                                                
2 Arlene Davila describes the difference between ‘culture as ethnicity’ and ‘culture as entertainment’ as a 
difference in politics. When describing tourism development of ‘ethnic neighborhoods’ in Harlem, New 
York, Davila argues that culture as ethnicity reflects the local prioritizing and promoting of community 
values and collective memory, which are at odds with dominant neoliberal urban-planning that reframe 
culture “as a venue of entertainment and consumption located in identifiable structures and places ready to 
generate profit, employment, and visitors” (105).  I draw from Davila’s distinction of these two terms to 
describe the particular class-based notion of culture that Chinese developers try to use in attempt to gain 
citywide acceptance of their development plans.  (Dávila 2004) 
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As I mentioned in chapter 1, regional government encourages opportunities for 
cultural exchange between Chinese and bay area residents – cultural festivals, language 
study, and shopping centers of Chinese retailers – to facilitate economic development 
between the San Francisco Bay Area and “Greater China.”  Multicultural economic 
exchanges in Cupertino, however, have always been difficult to encourage as residents 
have used public newspapers and pressured city council to stop the presence of Chinese 
businesses that they deem to be un-American for the failure to use English signage 
(Marino 1998a; Mehta 1995; Che 2003a; Lee 1999; Collins 1996b, 1996a; "Letters"  
2002).  The city held several public forums, inviting mediators, to help discuss the visual 
culture of Chinese businesses spreading across major commercial and retail centers in the 
city (Enders 1998b; Berton 1998).  In fact, long before VALLCO Fashion Park was 
purchased by it’s first Asian owners, Asian restaurants, stores, and retail centers were 
slowly becoming more and more exemplary of what Bay Area media sources were 
describing as reflective of the regions’ racial diversity (Rockstroh 1987; Villagran 1987; 
Moreillon 1987; Villagran 1989; Suryaraman 1990; Gugino 1990; Schwanhausser 1991b; 
Kato 1993; Eng 1993; Perkins 1996; Tran 1998; Ha 1999; Rockstroh 2002; Reang 2003; 
Perkins 2006).  But for the most part, the articles featured a similar narrative arc in 
defining Asian identities in Silicon Valley by their economic vitality mapped onto visible 
public space.  Similarly to high-tech industries, Asian land developers and entrepreneurs 
have been lauded by local press and local jurisdictions for revitalizing local economies 
through their niche ethnic markets that have been lucrative given the exponential growth 
in Asians to the region throughout the nineteen eighties and nineties (Sarmishta 2003).  In 
cities such as Mountain View, some Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs see themselves as 
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responsible for reviving downtown, which consists of five blocks along Castro Street and 
roughly two blocks wide on all perpendicular streets that cross it: “If there were no 
Chinese restaurants, this town would be dead…The Chinese restaurants really helped 
revitalize, but people don’t understand that” (Anderson 1990).  And this has become the 
typical trend throughout the nineties well into the present, such as Cupertino Square, 
where an Asian land or retail developer invests in a declining shopping center with a low 
vacancy rate, invigorating it with local or overseas capital to open an offshoot of a 
popular restaurant in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or China.   
Between the 1987 and 1992, the number of Asian-owned businesses increased 
anywhere between 50-100%.  The San Jose Mercury News review of city business 
licenses found that in the first nine months of 1992, 1,508 new Asian-owned firms were 
launched in San Jose alone (Johnson 1992).  In the article “Asian Businesses are 
Snowballing in South Bay,” San Jose Mercury contributor Steve Johnson connects the 
growth of Asian-owned businesses with the emergence of local yet nationally and 
globally recognized Asian-owned high-tech businesses and the subsequent growth in 
Santa Clara County Asian demographics, a 161% increased between 1980 and 1992 
(1992).  However, it is the visual presence and success of these Asian strip malls than the 
high-tech businesses themselves, which seem to reflect the region’s diversity.  The allure 
and intrigue of Silicon Valley’s diversity includes “tea houses” serving “Pearl milk tea,” 
which Asian youth described locally as “the Starbucks of Asian culture” and are 
reportedly more popular among Asian youth than “mainstream” coffee shops (Pacio 
2002). Part of the fascination with Silicon Valley and the San Francisco Bay Area in 
general was how culturally integrated and purportedly accepting the place was given the 
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larger clusters of ethnic-specific and/or pan-ethnic shopping centers.  During the nineties, 
there was a local understanding that the cultural mixing and mingling was a stark contrast 
to the rest of the country and that Silicon Valley invented a new culture that was both 
transnational, but also a hybrid blending of east and west, north and south (Johnson 1991; 
Rodriguez 1991; Mclaughlin 1994; Stocking 1999; Rockstroh 2002). The emergence of 
Asian retailers and this experience of consuming Asian culture suggest that Silicon 
Valley defies historical conventions of immigrant narratives, where new immigrants in 
Silicon Valley are not “assimilating” but making “America” into mini-version of their 
homeland.  In a 1992 San Jose Mercury article titled “Asian Markets take to competitors 
with One-Stop shopping,” food editor Sam Gugino describes Asian supermarkets in 
Cupertino to be representative of the “global village” (1992).  Instead of describing the 
global village as simply information technologies facilitating cross-border 
communication at faster speeds, it is imported goods that can now be found in Silicon 
Valley that allow communities to stay in-touch with their “cultures.”  More so, the 
Silicon Valley also represents a cultural mix amongst different racial and ethnic groups:  
The Tropicana, whose patrons are predominantly Latinos, is a hint of what the 
Silicon Valley of tomorrow may look like – a place where national borders are 
blurred.  A Chinese couple who own a clothing store there speak fluent Spanish.  
An Asian noodle house will be part of the merchant mix once the center gets its 
face lift later this year.  And a local Korean-American church picks the center to 
preach to a mostly Latino audience (Gugino 1992). 
Local residents and cultural critics interpreted the diversity of Silicon Valley to revolve 
around the representations of ethnic cultures safely within the arena of consumer cultures, 
particularly around food.  But more importantly, the exceptional stories of diversity often 
used spatial and temporal markers to describe the sensory experience of Silicon Valley as 
something that is seen, smelled, and physically understood at a historic moment in time. 
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And moreover, the concept of “assimilation” was not part of the local grammar, as it 
could not describe this purported unimpeded sustaining of “culture” seen, smelled, and 
tasted within pan-ethnic strip malls.   
But things were not so easy in Cupertino, which historically has defined itself and 
gotten its identity against the development of San Jose.  As mentioned in Chapter 1 
Cupertino’s push for incorporation occurred in the early 1950s when the city of San Jose 
sought to center its economy on high-tech industries, strategically annexing as much 
surrounding land as possible for future development.3 These particular race and class 
boundaries seemed to apply to Chinese economic development in Cupertino.  Cupertino 
already had another part of the VALLCO development, VALLCO Village, an open-air 
town center, transformed into its present day Cupertino Village shopping center of 
predominately Chinese retailers and restaurants. Local residents lamented the loss of 
VALLCO Village as evidence of Cupertino’s authentic white, European history, 
collective memory, and public spaces when the annual Oktoberfest fundraiser, hosted by 
the Rotary Club, was no longer held there and eventually died out as a result of declining 
attendance. This history is worth noting because of the larger trajectory of anti-Chinese 
sentiment towards Chinese businesses in the city but also the slow process of integrating 
multicultural consumer culture as a practice of proper citizenship in the city.   
In 1996, the failing VALLCO Village was bought out by Sand Hill Property 
Company, headed up by the husband and wife team Peter and Susanna Pau.  Cupertino 
                                                
3 As I mention in the introduction, white residents of Cupertino characterize their city as white, wealthy, 
and anti-development vis-à-vis their historic and geographic distance from San Jose and their proximity to 
the Peninsula, the western portion of the Bay Area that historically has been where wealthy white 
capitalists of San Francisco would vacation in the summer time.  Many local white residents of Cupertino 
often desire to be like the cities along the peninsula, seemingly classic-Americana small-towns with quaint 




Village was the first Asian-themed renovation effort they had ever done.  Moved by the 
growing Asian population in Silicon Valley, Peter and Sandy “saw a demand” but clearly 
distinguished the new Asian American as culturally distinct from “[t]he first generation 
[consumers] that shop in Chinatown in San Francisco” (Marino 1998a).  Peter and 
Sandy’s evaluation of second and third-generation Asian Americans utilized particular 
code words, such as “highly educated and Westernized,” to ensure that their project 
would blend seamlessly into the suburban cultural geography, consciously distinguishing 
Cupertino Village’s Asian patrons civility against the historical and racialized space and 
imagination of urban places such as San Francisco and Oakland Chinatown (Marino 
1998a).4  Peter and Sandy painted a picture of the future of Silicon Valley, where 
residents harmoniously blend Eastern and Western cultures in a culturally hybrid 
shopping center, formerly geared towards white clientele and hopefully still. 
Unfortunately, the culturally hybrid mix of “Eastern” and “Western” stores that 
Peter and Sandy promised never happened.  Strangely, white residents began accusing 
Chinese people of lacking community.  But white residents drew their racialized 
boundaries of the community around economic development. The large chain store to 
anchor the Cupertino Village ended up being Ranch 99, a locally based Taiwanese 
immigrant owned supermarket chain that sells predominately Chinese goods but with a 
mix of other Asian ethnic food stuffs and some things commonly found at an “American” 
                                                
4 Chinatown as a place and symbol in the national popular imagination has often served to distinguish what 
is “American” (read=white) based off the racialized space of Chinese settlements. As Kay Anderson and 
Nayan Shah have shown in their research on Vancouver and San Francisco’s Chinatowns, respectively, the 
racialization of Chinese living quarters and commercial areas as deviant from white living and work 
conditions in various health, urban planning, immigration discourses continuously framed Chinese “places” 
as enabling deviant behavior. Therefore, I see the conscious choice by Sand Hill Property Company to 
carefully make these distinctions as part of their strategy of penetrating, non-threateningly, suburban 
economic development.  See, Nayan Shah. Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s 
Chinatown. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  Kay Anderson. Vancouver’s Chinatown: 
Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991). 
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chain store as well.  White residents vociferously demanded that Asian business owners 
provide “English” language signs and the local conversation about “English-only” 
became framed by white residents as Asian non-interest in being a part of the community.  
Other ways that Asians have been accused, in the context of business, as unwilling to 
“assimilate” are through white resident’s accusation of Asian business etiquette as 
lacking a sense of civility. White residents have complained about poor customer service 
directed towards them by Chinese retailers and restaurants – ignoring white patrons or 
not honoring verbal contracts when purchasing things.  
When it comes to business, community refers to particular kinds of social 
performances centered on economic exchanges.  But the sense of loss or lack of 
community is continuously framed by white residents by the lack of “American” retailers 
and “American” products, which allow them to engage in what they perceive to be 
“American” social, not economic, exchanges. This particular rhetoric of the shopping 
center as the place of white civic life, however, has its roots dating back to post-world 
war II suburbanization.  Historian M. Jeffrey Hardwick writes that Victor Gruen, Jewish 
exile-cum-inventor of shopping mall design in the United States, was intent on designing 
shopping centers as the epicenter of civic life in post-World War II suburbs, where he felt 
civic life did not exist. As suburban development stretched out far and away from even 
the fringes of city centers, Gruen desired to create the density of cities through the built 
environment.  In an attempt at critiquing the “social isolation” of suburbs, which Gruen 
felt the growing car culture was productive of, Gruen sought to “recreate public culture 
full of entertainment events, density, and crowds. Consumerism, in Gruen’s vision, would 
become a way to express social connections and to reconstitute a social community 
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through consumerism” (Hardwick and Gruen 2004).  Gruen, according to Hardwick, 
recognized that the bottom line was to generate profits.  And despite his supposed 
attempts at social justice agendas of creating urban form in suburbs, Gruen was at times 
self-obsessed with creating whatever his imagination came up with no matter how 
financially unsound his plans were.5   
Liz Cohen, however, argues that these notions of community at the shopping mall 
were developed through racially exclusive urban planning tactics.  Whether it was market 
segmentation, the routes of bus-lines never traversing certain race and class city and 
neighborhood boundaries, or the State prohibiting consumers to picket or protest political 
issues on private property, the postwar suburb and the on-going privatization of public 
space made shopping an act of what Cohen describes as “consumer citizenship” (Cohen 
1996).  In the context of de facto and de jure segregation, the consumer citizen was 
inflected by race and class distinctions, mostly attributed to urban place. Therefore, 
“developers and store owners set out to make the shopping center a more perfect 
downtown” by “exclud(ing) from this public space unwanted urban groups such as 
vagrants, prostitutes, racial minorities, and poor people” (1996:1059).   
Post-war suburban planning centered on white economic security created the 
relationship between consumerism and suburban civic life.  Whiteness structured 
suburban planning through taxation structures that favored white residents by lowering 
residential property taxes and relying upon industrial, commercial, and retail for tax 
revenue.  As Robert Self has shown in his analysis of suburban development of Alameda 
County (the eastern side of the San Francisco Bay), pull factors such as the lowering of 
                                                
5 For more on post-war design of shopping malls and national identity, but within the context of the Cold 
War, see David Smiley. “Pedestrian Modern: Shopping, Modern Architecture and the American 
Metropolis, 1935-1955.” (PhD Diss. Princeton University, 2006) 
 
 74 
property taxes (for white homeowners and businesses) in addition to government 
subsidized loans for potential white homeowners were equally important to the gradual 
migration away from center cities (Self 2003).  Self conceptualizes post-war liberalism in 
the San Francisco Bay Area as a multivaried definition that was race and class inflected.6 
One particular definition of post-war liberalism that Self identifies in white 
suburbanization is the notion of white economic security, which the State would 
guarantee (14). With expanding post-war suburbs to the south of cities like Oakland, CA, 
white residents sought lower property taxes, which local jurisdictions enforced by placing 
the burden of public services on industrial, commercial, and retail tax-revenue. 
Self’s narration of post-war liberalism as productive of white economic security 
echoes throughout arguments created by disgruntled white residents of Cupertino of their 
loss of community.  Their attachment to shopping centers as geographically distinguished 
places of social interactions – within the realm of consumerism – reflects how whiteness 
and citizenship is seen and produced through the daily acts of shopping in suburbs.  But 
it’s not just the practice of white economic exchange, but also the visual economy of race 
and classed meanings attached to what shopping should look like.  Cohen and Self both 
suggest that the architectures of post-war shopping emphasized visually the white and 
middle to middle-upper class clientele that cities, urban-planners, and developers sought 
to create.  It is through the contained and regulated conduct of shopping that the 
relationship between consumerism, sale-tax, and white citizenship takes shape. 
                                                
6I focus on Robert Self’s identifying of post-war liberalism as an ideology of white, regardless of class, 
economic security that was to be supported by the government. Self notes that the suburbanization of 
Alameda County created a sentiment that racism was justified because accruing wealth through property 
value was a universal goal regardless of race. So discriminating African Americans from property 




The on-going attempts by Chinese investors and developers to revitalize 
VALLCO, however, show how the shift towards the Chinese-centric economic 
development in Silicon Valley has re-organized racial hegemonies.  Ironically, the 
various Asian developers of VALLCO never created the Asian lifestyle centers that they 
suggested or were rumored to have been saying in local press.  VALLCO Fashion Park 
still remains the emptied and aesthetically dated fortress that flanks both sides of De 
Anza Boulevard, one of the largest streets in and out of Cupertino.  The mall is reportedly 
at two-thirds capacity, but walking through it would say otherwise.  And at almost any 
time of the day and week, you could get front row parking to any of the parking lots.  But 
it is the story of VALLCO Fashion Park’s fifteen plus years of failed redevelopment that 
is particularly important to understanding how multiculturalism and consumerism is part 
and parcel to the race and class conduct of community.  
VALLCO doesn’t refer to any one person, but is an acronym based off the last 
names of several of the city’s wealthy landowners who pooled their land together in the 
early 1960s in favor of finding the most lucrative way to develop their land.  The 
principle developers were Varian Associates – an electronics company based in Palo 
Alto, CA – and the Leonard, Lester, Craft, and Orlando families.”7 Opening in 1973, the 
mall has been remembered by locals and recounted in news as being the largest if not the 
premier mall until the mid-1980s when other shopping malls were built or redeveloped.8   
                                                
7 This information is listed in the subsection “history” on the city of Cupertino’s official website. 
http://cupertino.org/index.aspx?page=622. 
8 Nearby malls such as Stanford Shopping Center in Palo Alto and Valley Fair in San Jose (the largest mall 
in the bay area) were both renovated in the late nineteen eighties and early nineteen nineties to adapt to 
changes in shopping patterns.  Santana Row, literally across the street from Valley Fair, exemplifies this 
shift towards ‘mixed-use’ with high-end retail and restaurants, bars and lounges, open courtyards and 
gardens, and upscale condominiums above.  Together, these three shopping centers all within 5-10 miles 
from Cupertino have drained not only shoppers but also possible retailers and tenants since they already 
have stores in other nearby locations or would rather open in an area with existing foot traffic.  These three 
 
 76 
But since it’s gradual demise in the mid-1980s extending into the nineties, the city has 
diagnosed the problem as a result of on-going social transformations to society, changing 
aesthetic design to shopping in addition to the mall redevelopment in neighboring cities. 
In the mid-nineteen nineties when larger chain stores began leaving VALLCO – either 
refusing to renew their leases or for lack of foot traffic – residents’ complaints of their 
lack of shopping options showed the specific race and class-based notion of community 
that their consumer habits had created.  In 1997, the closing of Emporium and its 
replacement, a Macy’s Clearance Center, was an immediate cause for alarm.  The 
“garage-sale” quality items, as reported by some local residents, were considering 
“degrading” not only to VALLCO, but also to Cupertino (Marino 1997c).  With 
household incomes topping $100,000 and median housing prices rising above $500,000 
in the mid-nineties, residents felt entitled to an upscale shopping center that reflected 
their class status.  The city and the State’s investigation of Macy’s deliberate choice to 
open a “clearance store,” rumored to prevent other department stores from opening, 
showed how much protecting class status mattered to the city’s reputation.  VALLCO’s 
failed bid at bringing in a Nordstrom Department Store, much to the dismay of some of 
its residents, further emphasized the particular kinds of upscale and racialized shopping 
environments that would dictate how residents created exclusionary boundaries around 
their community.  In order to ameliorate the situation, the city council sought to 
determine VALLCO to be an example of “economic blight,” which would mean that 
Santa Clara County would create a Redevelopment Agency to oversee the future of 
VALLCO mall.  This also means that a portion of county sales tax would be funneled 
                                                
malls are frequently cited as reason for VALLCO’s gradual decline since the early to mid nineties. See 
Kraatz, Cody. “Cupertino, Sunnyvale adapt mall areas to changing shopping patterns.” Cupertino Sun.  
January 28 2009. Accessed March 15, 2009. http://www.knowledgeplex.org/news/2966221.html  
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towards the efforts of this redevelopment agency (Marino 1997a).  Dennis Whittaker, a 
"community activist" and co-founder of Concerned Citizens of Cupertino – a local 
organization that has been dubbed racist by city council for their politics against the 
development of below market value condos, is quoted, "We want a shopping mall for 
everybody.  People don't come to Cupertino to shop in Taiwan.  We don't mind an Asian 
influence, but if there weren't rules, a lot of our restaurants wouldn't even have English 
signs."  He further adds, "We are tired of sending our sales tax to San Jose and Santa 
Clara...it would be nice to have an upper-level department store like Nordstrom as well as 
an Asian marketplace" (Simonson 2008 ).  
Whittaker’s appeal to the city to develop VALLCO with a Nordstrom chain in 
mind comes as a response to VALLCO’s revolving door of Asian ownership throughout 
21st century. Further, comments such as Whittaker’s emphasize the historical shifts to 
local and global economies which consumer culture and tax revenue reflect the racial 
hegemonies within Silicon Valley suburbs.  Local discourse of community emphasize the 
inclusion, if not idealization of a particular kind of Chinese developer of Silicon Valley 
with mysterious overseas networks to Chinese diplomats and other elite business people.  
In a 2003 San Jose Mercury feature on one of the recent co-majority owners of VALLCO 
Fashion Park, contributor Josh Susong describes Alan Wong as a man of extravagance, 
but an extravagance that is seemingly normal given how it is a part of his daily economic 
operations around the San Francisco Bay area. When asked by his 900 seat Chinese 
restaurant specializing in “fish, crab, and other seafood” across the street from his 
successful Asian shopping center development Grand Century in San Jose, CA, Wong 
replied, “I like to cook. Anything simple” (Susong 2003).  The vast size of the restaurant 
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and the high-end proteins are, simply, “simple” for Wong. Aside from his extravagant 
tastes, Wong, as described by Susong, seems to represent the normal Asian businessman 
that has the proper overseas capital and “western” cultural chops to succeed in the Valley:  
Wong, 52, would rather talk about lunch than about himself. He deflects questions 
about the store he owns in the heart of San Francisco's Chinatown and his string 
of shops and restaurants across the Bay Area. He won't talk about the jewelry 
business he learned in Hong Kong, or about becoming an American citizen . . . 
.When a fly buzzing against a windowpane distracts him at lunch, he rises swiftly 
to crush it. When he calls for more water, three staff members leap into action. 
When his ever-present cell phone jangles, it may be someone from the Chinese 
consulate calling to make dinner arrangements (2003). 
Susong seems to mitigate Wong’s Asian difference, highlighted by his ties to Chinese 
diplomats and his other secretive and strange behaviors at their lunch, with his awareness 
that he lives in a “diverse” region, which includes white people.  In explaining Wong’s 
bicultural awareness exemplified by his hiring of a white general manager for VALLCO, 
Susong quotes Wong, “If I only wanted one thing, I would hire a Chinese manager” 
(2003).  But Wong’s success at Asian development suggests that diverse consumer tastes 
are, or should be, the norm if Wong’s Grand Century shopping center, Dynasty 
restaurant, and other developments dotting the Bay Area physical and cultural landscape 
are any indication. Even though VALLCO was not slated to strictly be an Asian mall, the 
changing visual culture of consumerism shows how Asian diversity was becoming a 
necessary tactic for all people when considering the survival for a place like VALLCO 
and for cities like Cupertino with declining, undiversified tax-bases. 
Similar things were said about the new majority owner Phil Liao of “international 
turnover specialist” Orbit Resources Inc. and his recruitment of Chinese brokerage firm 
GD Commercial Real Estate.  After purchasing the majority stakes from Alan Wong, 
Emily Chen, and silent majority co-owner John Nguyen in 2007, Phil Liao claimed 
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VALLCO to be a “gold mine” (Simonson 2007).  The claim to Orbit Resource Inc. and 
GD Commercial Real Estate’s possible future success was explained in local press by the 
international reach of their development projects, with both firms having worked in 
developing projects between Silicon Valley and Chinese countries such as China, 
Taiwan, and Singapore.  John Luk, executive managing director of GD Commercial Real 
Estate, was interested in creating an “international entertainment and lifestyle center” 
much like the Aberdeen centre in British Columbia due to its ability to bill itself as a 
“multicultural retail experience…that caters to sophisticated…affluent…Asian and 
western shoppers” (Simonson 2008 ).  Luk also described that he could “tap into some of 
the Chinese tenants that really want to expand into United States” but lamented, “there is 
no bridge for them to come over.”  But Luk explains the desire to create a culturally 
hybrid shopping experience of white and Chinese retailers is because he believes that 
Chinese people are “part of the fabric of the city” because the city “is a dense, high-
income submarket of the San Francisco Peninsula with diverse ethnic demographics and 
a strong Asian community” (Simonson, 2008).  Luk’s comments encourage diversity by 
emphasizing Chinese people as integral members of the community for their spending 
power, which he simultaneously uses the language of white upper-middle class that 
residents like Whittaker of the CCC uttered previously to describe the city’s economic 
profile.   
Luk and Wong’s appeal to community through Chinese transnationalism and 
rights discourses of inclusion with respect to free-market logics echoes Inderpal Grewal’s 
notion of “transnational connectivities.”  In examining popular representations of south 
Asian diasporic identities, Grewal conceptualizes “transnational connectivities” to be the 
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existence of particular global networks with which subjects, technologies, and ethical 
practices circulate and emerge (Grewal 2005).  Grewal demonstrates that only specific 
race, class, and gendered subjects constituted by neoliberal discourses become privileged 
in these portrayals of late twentieth century south Asian diasporas.  VALLCO owners, 
similarly, utilized identity politics in the context of transnational development to assert 
themselves as Chinese, American, and members of the community.  These three subjects 
positions emerge through the language of rights, which simultaneously exist as practices 
of governmentality.  In the context of U.S. desires for securing global political and 
economic hegemony and India’s interests of utilizing its diaspora to integrate more within 
the global economy, corporations and the State appropriate rights discourses as a 
neoliberal governmentality for the sake of opening up new markets or expanding existing 
ones. 
Local residents describe VALLCO’s development as abstracted from its financial 
priorities to prevent Asian developers from creating a “Chinatown.”  Whittaker and 
others’ appear to cling to post-war liberal notions about community as consumer culture, 
which their possessiveness over where their tax dollars are going are centered on 
consolidating and protecting the circulation of white wealth.  But these arguments for 
whiteness are shrouded in the language of family-centric entertainments, ironically in 
some cases a Nordstrom department store.  Based on their ideas about tax-structures, 
Chinese business people, however, cannot be a part of the community.  On-going rhetoric 
by Chinese business people and even consultants brought in to diagnose the city’s 
economic depression has been to persuade these white dissidents that the economic 
profile of Asians is not only possibly beneficial for business but simultaneously great to 
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be associated with. In a Cupertino Courier article from 2004 regarding the struggles 
between those that want Cupertino to be a “retail mecca” and those that fear that retail 
would “destroy” the city’s “rural charm”, contributor I-Chun Che reports that city council 
held a study session where they invited “retail specialists” Mike Bruner and Randol 
Mackley of Retail Real Estate Group to offer some suggestions on how to strategize 
economic development. Mackley proposed that the city should embrace its class and 
Asian demographics and maximize this spending potential of this profile that on average 
per household earns $130K: 
Cupertino is not a tourist destination, not a historical, scenic or amusement 
attraction. Cupertino is a high-income community, a core location for the high-
tech industry and an example of the American melting pot with a significant 
Asian community (Che 2004a). 
 
While Mackley seems to critique the ideological claims by white residents of the need to 
historically preserve places of commerce like VALLCO as white (to the extent of 
detrimentally hurting their chances at generating revenue), the comment also reveals how 
market-forces – the race and class profile of high-tech workers – should guide how 
Cupertino retail development should proceed. Mackley’s reference to the “American 
melting pot with a significant Asian community” encourages concerned residents of 
Cupertino to embrace multiculturalism within the realm of culture as entertainment.  In 
this case, the kinds of Chinese cultures and identities permissible within Cupertino are 
that which enable neoliberal economic development to proliferate.  That is, embracing 
multiculturalism as an everyday practice, according to Mackley’s suggestion, is in part a 
form of financial survival for a city that has been strapped for tax revenue for quite some 




The city’s need for varied tax-revenue streams is a result of their overreliance on 
the taxation of high-tech industry giants Apple Computers, Hewlett-Packard, and the now 
defunct Tandem Computers.  As I will explain more in the following section, the city’s 
lack of alternative revenue streams, particularly when it comes to retail or even resident-
occupancy tax from hotels, has forced residents to concede to various development 
projects.  Ultimately, the city receives no sales tax from these corporations because there 
is not retail store in the city and taxes from online purchases go straight to the 
jurisdictions where consumers live.  As a result, these pressures have reinforced the 
discursive relationship between community and consumer culture.  Because of this reality 
of neighboring retail development and the growing regional consumerism of 
Asian/Chinese things, diversity operates as a market-driven calculation in Cupertino 
when it comes to the city’s economic solvency.  As a result, Asians/Chinese developers 
project themselves as the present and future of community.  But these developers aim to 
transnationalize the terms of community beyond the physical boundaries of the city and 
the nation.  By emphasizing the successful retailers abroad in Chinese countries that 
would like to open up shop here, developers interpret the future of Cupertino community 
through increased economic relations with Asia.  Multicultural consumerism becomes a 
mode of governing and Chinese developers exist as the “bridge.”9  
But to what extent has multiculturalism caught on as a neoliberal tactic in 
Cupertino?  To what extent have the Chinese developers succeeded in providing the 
upscale and diverse world that Cupertino residents aim to govern themselves and the 
exclusionary terms of their community?  I went to VALLCO Fashion Park myself to 
                                                
9 For more on Pacific Rim discourses and ideas of the Asian diaspora as “bridges” between the United 
States and Pacific Rim economies, see Arif Dirlik. What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific 
Region Idea. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).  
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witness firsthand these failed developments at transforming VALLCO into an east-meets-
west lifestyle center.  A friend who frequented the mall to watch first-run movies at the 
relatively recently opened AMC Movie Theater (2007) told me about the multicultural 
celebrations that the mall was holding at the food court every Saturday for the next 
month. Chinese New Year was coming up and a local Chinese-run martial arts studio was 
performing for two consecutive Saturdays.  I wanted to see how the mall owners tried to 
portray the mall and the city and whether Jon Luk’s image of a “sophisticated” and 
“affluent” shopping center ever came true.  
This was the first of several trips made to VALLCO Fashion Park for research 
and I was stunned by what had become of it since 2003, the last time I had stepped foot 
inside this mall when a close friend worked as a manager at Macy’s.  It was as local news 
had reported: the whole bottom floor of storefronts had been boarded up. Oddly, part of 
the bottom floor had been cut off completely and it gave off the illusion that the floor had 
never existed to begin with. The main floor looked almost the same as the bottom floor 
when it came to the amount of empty storefronts.  Besides the major department stores 
that anchored VALLCO, the only other chains were Victoria Secret and then Burger King 
and Popeye’s Chicken in the foot court. The rest of the stores were independently owned 
retailers that sold antiques and collectibles. On one end of the mall was a Chinese-owned 
furniture store that sold random interior decorations like life-sized stuffed/taxidermied 
lions and steel armor of a medieval soldier, each priced at $500 and above.  There were 
several small billboards placed every 10 yards, which advertised their on-going 
multicultural celebration in addition to the forthcoming multicultural food court starring 
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the Hof Braus Express – a fast food version of the German chain restaurant that the mall 
owners once proclaimed to be the major destination for the revamped mall.10 
The mall was relatively devoid of shoppers (and retailers). The most hustle and 
bustle was in the food court where the Chinese martial arts group was already 
performing. The food court, like the rest of the mall, was half empty.  By empty, I mean 
that there was plenty of ethnic food – Mexican, South Asian, Thai, and Chinese -- with 
huge signs against white-painted wood covering the storefront alerting customers of the 
forthcoming dining options. The options that were open included the Burger King, 
Popeye’s Fried Chicken, Hof Brau Express, and a no-name Japanese Teriyaki Bowl joint. 
The food court was packed with Chinese families who had come to witness their 
children’s choreographed martial arts performances.  Chinese high school students, 
dressed in their costumes, milled around the stage with sodas in hand, purchased from 
one of the vendors at the food court. Many families sat at tables, watching the 
performances, with trays of fast food wrappers and cups.  When I went to Burger King to 
get a cup of coffee, several parents lined up with their children, many of them 
participants in the display of Chinese culture.  The on-going bustle of commerce seemed 
to come directly from the Chinese families whose children were part of this martial arts 
studio.  I asked the cashier at Burger King whether it was always this busy and the young 
man responded that it was because of the cultural festivals that they had an upswing in 
business.  
                                                
10 The Hof Braus Express is actually a reflection of the city’s desire for German culture, which in the 
nineties had become symbolic of Cupertino’s purported authentic white history and culture. VALLCO 
Village once held the annual Oktoberfest, a fundraiser organized by the Chamber of Commerce. But with 
the low attendance beginning in the nineties and the popularity of Chinese cultural festivals due to the 
growing Chinese demographics, German culture – particularly Oktoberfest, for some white residents, has 




I took an open seat and the far left side of the stage and happened to make eye 
contact with an older Chinese man who was also watching the performance.  I asked if he 
had children performing and he said he did.  I asked him how they were invited to 
perform at the mall and he mentioned that this martial arts studio has been invited to 
introduce Chinese cultural performance to wider audiences at many different cultural 
festivals in Cupertino and in the greater Silicon Valley.  I responded generically, “Oh 
that’s great.” He quickly responded, “Do you really think so?” I asked, “You don’t think 
so?” The man ignored me for a minute then asked if I was a reporter.  After telling him 
“no,” he ignored me some more then walked away.  Perhaps he was suspicious why I was 
asking him questions, but he didn’t seem to care much that his child was participating in 
the mall performance of Chinese cultures.  Or maybe he had since this plenty of times 
already since he mentioned that the martial arts studio was a staple in Silicon Valley’s 
Chinese festival scene. 
I sat and watched the performances a little while longer as Chinese youth between 
the ages of 5-18 performed Wu Shu, but set to pop songs such as Celine Dion’s “My 
Heart Will Go On.” That particular performance was done by an 18 year old who had 
won an award at a regional Wu Shu competition. I took a seat towards the back but still 
within sight of the stage to observe the crowd that had begun to develop in the food court 
during this lunchtime performance.  A few White families sat interspersed among the 
predominantly Chinese crowd.  Many watched the performances as they ate their food 
and immediately left soon after. I noticed that one table consisting of a mom and her two 
children was actually there for the performance since their table, surprisingly, didn’t have 
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any food or trash on it. Though, the family did have several large bags full of items 
purchased from their trip to VALLCO.   
I walked to the information desk to get some information about how the idea for 
the cultural festival began in the first place. The elderly woman who worked at the 
information desk told me that it was the marketing director’s idea.  She told me to tell me 
how excited she was to watch the Chinese performances later during her break and that 
she was excited about the increased traffic that these cultural celebrations had generated. 
A short line had developed behind me and I let her help some of the other patrons. 
The comments by the woman at the information desk show how multiculturalism 
dovetails with economic development in the context of community.  The celebration of 
multiculturalism as an achievement of community tolerance and cultural understanding 
must be understood within the context of increasing mall foot traffic, particularly within 
the food court, which was noticed by the woman at the information desk.  My own 
observations of the food court also show similarly as many of the participants in the 
Chinese New Year celebration were also patrons.  In Cupertino, the consumption of 
racial difference, tightly contained to dance and martial arts and nothing more, facilitates 
the survival of the city’s social services.  With shrinking local budgets, multiculturalism – 
particularly the identification and consumption of Chinese culture – has taken precedence 
as a market-driven calculation that is understood locally as the only way to save the city.  
The success of private corporations and the assumption that the residents are wealthy and 
willing enough to support the city through consumerism reflects how neoliberalism has 
taken form in Cupertino.   
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Chinese immigrant inclusion within Silicon Valley, articulated through neoliberal 
governmentality, exacerbates the already polarized living and working conditions 
between the rich and the poor.  In the late 1990s, residents and cultural critics began 
publicly voicing their concerns of what seemed to be the relentless state investment in 
high-tech development and what environmental preservation policies could be put into 
place to prevent the infill of all green space.  Environmental racism, however, seemed to 
be less of a concern.  Though the documentary “Secrets of Silicon Valley” (2001), 
directed by Alan Snitow and Deborah Kaufman, raised awareness of the health hazards of 
the Valley’s industries that afflicted the poor immigrant women of color.  Further, the 
film exposed the problematic trickle-down notion of economic mobility of unimpeded 
high-tech expansion that CEOs and Presidents of major corporations espoused.  The 
film’s portrayal of the exploitable wage-laborers with little to no job security echoed 
what critics of Silicon Valley began to document, specifically the rise of highly educated 
tech-workers showing up at homeless shelters for residence in the wake of the dot.com 
bust.  In Cupertino, community as an economic rationality aims to protect its own wealth 
and its architectures of such mundane buildings as shopping malls operates as boundaries 
for exclusion and inclusion, which is resembles much of what has been experienced 
elsewhere in the Valley. 
Moreover, Chinese developers and entrepreneurs that tether their economic 
aspirations through rights discourses of visibility participate in the neoliberal economic 
policies that have created these huge class divides in Silicon Valley.  This is particularly 
problematic as these articulations of community through the idea of an upper-middle 
class shopping experience of Chinese cultures do not challenge white residents’ nativism.  
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As Arlene Davila points out in the revitalization plans of Harlem, NY, which the city is 
aimed to recreate the neighborhood as a heritage tourist destination, culture merely exists 
as entertainment.  The intended consequences of these plans are to displace collective 
memories and Latino communities in favor of a service-oriented economy that reduces 
culture and identities to consumable commodities of food, dance, and music framed 
entirely for tourism.  Davila’s criticisms of the culture as entertainment resonate in these 
on-going problems between white and Chinese communities.  In the past, Cupertino 
community forums to discuss racial tensions between white and Chinese residents never 
critique the historical productions of whiteness across the terrain of culture.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, cultural narratives of agriculture and place helped 
instantiate the visual culture of whiteness as the authoritative history of the region.  These 
sessions end up being moments where white residents have complete authority to 
publicly let off some steam for what they see as the unfit cultures of Chinese people that 
don’t align with the official historical white cultures that “founded” the city.  For this, the 
terrain of culture is an important site of critiquing white hegemony.  Clearly these 
Chinese developers are not concerned with questions of racism and nativism, but with the 
bottom line of generating profits.  But their approach to community through a rights 
discourse of visibility, articulated through Chinese class and cultural proximity to whites, 
means historic and contemporary forms of whiteness remains unchallenged.  
In turn, the ability to be culturally aware has become indicative of value that 
needs to be nurtured for the livelihood of Cupertino.  In the following section, I examine 
the relationship between civic and private partnerships in the proposed development of 
New Urbanism projects. I analyze the relationship between New Urbanism and neoliberal 
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discourses within the context of mixed-use development. I focus particularly on how 
these New Urbanism projects encourage neoliberal policies, such as the on-going 
privatization of public spaces and civic life. Also, I look at the particular kinds of Silicon 
Valley race and class-specific subjects that not only support mixed-used projects, but also 
allow for this neoliberal development to proliferate. 
The Heart of the City Plan and Neoliberal Alliances 
Multiculturalism and consumerism as expressions of Cupertino civic life reveal how 
neoliberal policies and discourses of privatization have made their imprint on the 
meanings of community.  Lifestyle choices, such as the rights discourse of 
multiculturalism that Chinese residents and Chinese developers have wielded in attempts 
to gain access into the city’s economic development, function as forms of governing that 
align with the priorities of local government and private developers.  While residents 
exert their right as residents to guide development in attempts at forcing government to 
meet their shopping needs, these notions of individual choice and collective action follow 
how market logics become determinative of how life choices should be rationalized.  
While residents, white and Asian, urge city council to create more tax-revenue generating 
shopping centers, their collective action is not solely about sustaining city services, but 
also about protecting their individual property values.  In this section, I examine 
residents’ contestation of the New Urbanist design schemes of The Heart of the City 
economic corridor.  In particular, I focus on the activism of two local organizations that 
succeeded in reducing the density of mixed-used developments planned in “The Heart of 
the City” designs.  This activism shows residents battling back against the corporate 
takeover of Cupertino public space, which they charged the city as siding with developers 
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rather than its own citizens. I, instead, show that residents’ cultural defense of their 
upper-middle class-based nuclear family values was just another example of neoliberal 
development and governmentality.  Residents were not against development as much as 
they did not want development to harm their “quality of life,” which, at times, was 
explained financially through the possible effects of overcrowded schools, traffic, and 
safety. This section examines together the similarities between the governmentality of 
seemingly disparate ideas of Cupertino present of detached single-family housing and its 
possible future of mixed-used development.  I also show the conditional behavior of 
nuclear family values that Chinese immigrants become accepted as part of the 
‘community.’ 
 
History of the Heart of the City Plan 
The initial stages of the Heart of the City planning first emerged towards the end of the 
nineteen eighties as residents began questioning the identity of the city as the city rapidly 
cleared away remnants of its agriculture history to make way for high-technology 
industries. During the 1980s, the city of Cupertino witnessed the gradual disappearance 
of “historical” landmarks – mainly older structures that represented the businesses that 
once supported the city.  The tearing down of the vacant Cali Mills building that sat at the 
intersection of De Anza and Steven Creek Boulevard commonly known as The 
Crossroads (also the official downtown of early Cupertino when Cupertino was just a 
service station between actual cities), marked what residents thought to be the end of an 
agricultural era as the visual culture of the city’s agricultural past was officially being de-
prioritized, if not forgotten completely by the demands of Silicon Valley high-tech 
expansion (Tran 1988, 1994).  In the late 1980s, the “Big Three” companies, Apple, 
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Hewlett-Packard, and Tandem Computers, had requested city permits to expand their 
operations by the hundreds of thousands of square-feet each.  By the end of the eighties, 
companies such as these around Silicon Valley went from leasing office space to owning 
real-estate in not only the city they established their headquarters, but in various others 
jurisdictions (Downey 1987; Barnum 1988b; Schwanhausser 1989b, 1989a; Mercury 
News Staff 1989; Oppenheimer-Pitthan 1991; Kraul 1985a; Downey 1986; Barnum 
1987; Barnum 1988a; Bauer 1990a; Schwanhausser 1990; Mercury News and Wire 1990; 
Bauer 1991b, 1991a; Schwanhausser 1991a).  The boom in high-tech corporate 
development, exemplified by the sheer physical size of new office spaces, was interpreted 
by the city as creating multiple streams of tax-revenue, spurring development of luxury 
hotels for high-tech business workers in hopes of creating residence-occupancy tax 
(Kraul 1985b, 1985c; Brignolo 1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b, 1987; Wykes 1987; Brown 
1989b, 1989a; Bauer 1990b). But the city – residents and city council included – was 
divided on the social and environmental affects that this development would have on the 
city.  Through the 1990s and early 2000s, the city negotiated with Apple, Hewlett-
Packard, and Tandem over development, cooperating with them so long as they helped 
alleviated housing and traffic with the increased jobs they created and cars coming in and 
out of the city.  The need for Cupertino to concede to development was in part due to the 
on-going threat that the big three would relocate to different areas that would welcome 
their unimpeded growth if Cupertino’s slow-growth residents wouldn’t.11  
                                                
11 In several formal and informal conversations, long-time residents and elected officials described the 
love-hate relationship between them and these globally recognized companies. Pressed for their tax dollars, 
city council has had to give in, particularly, to Apple’s demands for more office space. As it stands now, 
Apple owns close to 30% of the land in Cupertino, some of it undeveloped. These tensions between the city 
and it’s investment in corporations exploded in a the Cupertino Historical Society’s most recent exhibit on 




The sudden explosion of Asian, predominately Chinese, residents in Cupertino 
and the gradual closing of long-time retail stores was also part of this on-going sentiment 
among white residents that Cupertino was no longer a community as it struggled to piece 
together a coherent narrative of the past with remnants of it that they felt still existed or 
were worthy of remembering, specifically in terms of the built environment.  Trying to 
make sense of the city’s present and its future, however, was something that residents 
didn’t seem to want to deal with.  For these reasons, The Heart of the City planning 
document has been important to study as it guides the construction of the city’s present 
and future residential, retail, commercial, and industrial landscapes.  In addition, these 
kinds of landscapes symbolize what Cupertino’s collective identity should be based on 
and the kinds of behavior that this public space will facilitate.  
In responding to this growing sentiment for community, the city council decided 
to develop The Heart of the City economic development plan that would help establish a 
downtown retail center along a portion of Stevens Creek Boulevard based on urban 
density than suburban sprawl.  Although residents did not specify that a downtown 
shopping district would help meet their demands for community, preferring instead parks 
and other green space for increased social interactions, the city, instead, developed high-
density mixed-used development – retail and commercial on bottom floors and residential 
above – to create a centralized area for social exchanges articulated by economic 
exchanges.  With the seeming corporatization of time and public spaces coming from 
high-tech expansion, residents pined for something outside of capitalism as they mourned 
the loss of long-time corporate chains and small-business.  These early ideas for a 
centralized downtown, however, were rejected by residents and several members of city 
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council since it seemed financially challenging to completely reshape the main traffic 
artery in town, a 7 lane street with equally wide 7 lane streets cutting across it at major 
intersections of commerce in town.  Resident’s mostly feared traffic congestion, but also 
complained about on-going residential development either upward or extending into the 
hills, which would block their views of green space or wipeout green space all together.  
Maintaining or creating more green space was ultimately what residents initially wanted 
because it evoked for them what ‘small-town,’ suburban and ‘rural’ (often used 
interchangeably) living was all about and what drew them to the area in the first place.  
City council granted their wish in 1993 with a new proposal that would adorn Stevens 
Creek Boulevard with native trees and shrubbery to make it look more “park-like” 
(Cronk 1993).  Instead of emphasizing a continuous core downtown, the new 
development plan would unify shopping centers with “[T]rails and pedestrian facilities” 
allowing “people to move easily through each area” (Cronk 1993).  By each area, the city 
and residents identified both community and shopping centers. 
But eventually, when retail tax revenue began to dry up at VALLCO Fashion Park 
and elsewhere around town throughout the nineties, city council and concerned residents 
began to prioritize tax revenue from retail, light commercial, and light industrial as a 
necessity to the livelihood of valuable city service.  In attempts to balance the mandates 
of regional government to create more housing with the city’s need for retail 
sustainability and residents desire for a community, the city continued to encourage and 
proposed New Urbanist mixed-used projects as a solution to all three issues.12 
                                                
12 Regional government has pressured cities around the bay area to create more housing in an attempt to 
help workers live in the cities that they work. Regional government has enforced a mandate, which cities 
should ensure a certain ratio of jobs to residence. Many Cupertino residents have rejected creating new 
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Residents have continuously debated the terms of The Heart of the City plan that 
Cupertino city council put forth with and without resident input.  The 2005 version of the 
Heart of the City Specific Plan (the most revised version to date) provides, at its core, 
design aesthetics of the main Stevens Creek Boulevard corridor and the neighboring 
residential areas included that extend directly off of it.  In order to create a coherent sense 
of Cupertino’s identity, architecturally, the strip of Steven’s Creek Boulevard, 
approximately 250 acres, are the focus of these design guidelines. According to the plan, 
Stevens Creek Boulevard is “the image of Cupertino…most on display,” which is also 
“the central element of Cupertino’s public realm” (2008, 6).  Besides design guidelines 
that emphasize “visibility” and “compatibility” along Stevens Creek Boulevard, the 
design plan also stresses issues of pedestrian access, building logistics of setbacks and 
heights, and “economic development activities.”  But the goal of the “Policy Framework” 
section, which is to “create a positive and memorable image of Stevens Creek 
Boulevard,” identifies fives areas along Stevens Creek, “two major areas and three 
subareas,” that should “provide a variety of land use opportunities of mixed use 
development, enhanced activity nodes, and safe and efficient circulation and access for 
all modes of transportation between activity centers that help focus and support activity 
in the centers” (Cupertino Heart of the City Specific Plan  2008).  While “activity 
centers” can be an ambiguous idea that include leisure, aesthetics and development go 
hand-in-hand and consumerism has become the main goal of guiding these design 
blueprints.  The “circulation” of people between “activity centers” demonstrates how 
economic development has become a city priority, particularly framing the community by 
                                                
housing projects, particularly condos, because of the limited open land space but also because of their fears 
of the deterioration of quality of life that they expect with a younger non-nuclear family population. 
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the kinds of consumer habits that architectural design can facilitate and enforce.  For 
example, “Central Stevens Creek Boulevard” should only allow “residential mixed 
use…if the residential units provide an incentive to develop the retail use, financially 
beneficial to Cupertino…” (2008, 6). While residents’ vociferous rejection of residential 
is partially why mixed-used development including residential has been minimized in 
these plans, the plans reflect how civic life – social interactions – is connected by 
economic activities.  My critique of consumerism in Cupertino is not that corporations 
are creating plans that ultimately only financially benefit themselves, but rather that the 
city of Cupertino and some residents have come to rely on the private corporations to not 
only fund government projects, but to constitute the relationship between governing and 
consumerism.  With these plans centered on promoting tax revenue, which has become a 
crucial practice of citizenship in Cupertino, the city of Cupertino transformed public 
spaces into privatized spaces.  These privatized spaces and the everyday practices of 
shopping guide residents should act and do on a daily basis.  For the city, ensuring that 
residents purchase things locally is of utmost importance and producing governing 
relations between business and residents is how community and citizenship are being 
defined. 
But the notion of community, which the city promoted with the mixed-used 
development projects combining residential, retail, and commercial within the density of 
a high-rise, multi-story building, echoes New Urbanist discourses and design schemes 
that have been critiqued by urban-planners, geographers, and other cultural critics as 
racist, classist, and pro-business.  Critics of New Urbanism have complained that their 
discourses and methods of planning rely on creating aesthetically “meaningful 
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communities” by merely making “pretty” designs as opposed to challenging existing 
structures of power that denied particular neighborhoods and communities the resources 
to sustain themselves (Grant 2006). New Urbanism discourses and practitioners emerged 
from the growing discontent among suburbanites that the endless sprawl and the 
contingent decentralization of civic life – shopping, recreation, and commerce – has 
reduced the possibilities for meaningful moments of contact among other residents (Katz, 
Scully, and Bressi 1994; Leinberger and ebrary Inc. 2008).  The dominant car culture that 
shapes suburban experience, which suburban residents complain of now of with increased 
traffic, has destroyed any kind of civic life, often centered around the mythology of 
walkable small-town atmospheres.  Under the guise of such seemingly universal desires 
for “shared values,” “neighborliness” and “cooperation,” these “politics of propinquity,” 
according to New Urbanist critics such as Dean MacCannell, are “driven by economics” 
and by race and class solidarity (MacCannell 1999).  Critics of New Urbanism and its 
discourses hope to expose the exclusionary tenets of their ideological frameworks for 
building communities.  The kinds of social engineering that occurs through New Urbanist 
projects has been the nurturing and creation of particular kinds of subjects that also desire 
profits, which is what drives these kinds of projects to begin with. The focus of these 
mixed-use developments has been the expected chain reaction of economic growth of not 
just residents’ property value, but for the city through retail and property taxation that can 
come with the increases in residential housing. These kinds of projects not only reflects 
an economy of class status and boundary-making enabled through consumption of 
commodities and architecture, but also creates the kinds of subjects that are invested in 
achieving these kinds of goals for themselves through individual self-government. In 
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critiquing the New Urbanist tenets of community and the priorities of generating wealth 
than actual politics, David Harvey notes: 
The problem is then to enlist in the struggle to advance a more socially just, 
politically emancipatory, and ecologically sane mix of spatio-temporal production 
processes rather than to acquiesce to those imposed by uncontrolled capital 
accumulation, backed by class privilege and gross inequalities of political-
economic power (Harvey 1997). 
 
This architecture of community intends to create exclusionary places that aim to contain 
and exclude particular kinds of identities, particularly those that cannot reproduce the 
cyclical process of profits that these spaces are intended to generate for residents, 
storeowners, and developers.  New Urbanism also assumes that the built environment can 
naturally create safe lifestyles.  But more importantly, as New Urbanist supporter Peter 
Katz’s narration of the social benefits of urban living shows, these re-creations of urban 
density and the moral lessons learned from them must be abstracted from the racial and 
class segregationist politics of urban place that has shaped public perception and the 
actual material experiences of these places.13  New Urbanist designs, as Dean 
MacCannell notes, rely upon the same suburban ideals of race and class solidarity: “On 
the one hand there was the assumption that people living next to one another ought to be 
deeply like one another, and on the other hand there was an agreement not to test the 
assumption of propinquitous moral homogeneity.”  But, this moral homogeneity is “a 
solidarity of consumer and corporate interests” (MacCannell 1999).14  
Cupertino’s The Heart of the City plans follow New Urbanist themes of nostalgia 
by creating design guidelines for aesthetic consistency to recreate the small-town feel that 
                                                
13 Historical studies of suburbanization have shown that the reality of urban spaces as racial and class 
polyglot during prior, during, and after the civil rights were push factors for whites fleeing social and 
political unrest. That is, whites purposely chose not to flee urban living, such as tenement living, for its 
association with poor immigrants or black and Latino communities. 
14 For more, see (Kenney 2003) 
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residents yearned, particularly in their retelling of The Crossroads of the past.15  “The 
Mixed-Use Parkway” section of the plan, the city’s critique of Steven Creek Boulevard 
“corridor’s hodge-podge appearance” that “contributes little to the overall character of 
the community and is at odds with the orderly sub-urban characters of its neighborhoods 
and business parks” re-iterates New Urbanist emphasis of aesthetic standardization in, 
naturally, creating community.  These clear rules about design aesthetics of Stevens 
Creek Boulevard to create a homogenous-looking district that instructs residents and out-
of-towners that consumerism is how people can become part of the Cupertino 
community.  While parts of the Stevens Creek retail development project came to 
fruition, the on-going expansion of the built environment of high-tech development and 
the jobs created by high-tech sectors are what and who city council believes will shop in 
these zones.  The city’s on-going support of VALLCO owners’ demands for expansion in 
hopes of drawing nearby high-tech workers as consumers demonstrates that high-tech 
workers remain the ideal subject of Cupertino.  Although residents halted various 
development projects, the city council’s willingness to allow the free-market dictate 
development shows how this neoliberal economic rationality has defined community in 
exclusionary and inclusionary ways. 
In the following subsection, I look at one particular New Urbanist project that 
never developed (much like many of the projects in Cupertino). In this particular project, 
local residents, Asian and White, battled city council and the developers of VALLCO 
                                                
15 Large portions of “official” histories published by The Cupertino Historical Society revolve around early 
businesses owned by European Immigrants. The Crossroads has come to exist as “community” for 
residents because it was the only place that residents would congregate when they needed to go to the 
general store or post-office. In a somewhat heated conversation between myself and a part-time archivist at 
the Cupertino Historical Society about their limited portrayal of community to its agricultural history, she 
defended social interactions between shopkeepers and local residents, particularly the willingness of 
shopkeepers to allow patrons to purchase on credit during financially difficult times, as exemplary of what 
community is in Cupertino and why that is important as, she believed, it no longer existed.  
 
 99 
over the mixed-used project they proposed to help fund their redevelopment of the mall. 
But I don’t read residents’ resistance to the project necessarily as a critique of 
development or as the inclusion of Asians into the community as much as I see it as re-
instantiating the relationship between consumer cultures as a rationale for community.  
The activism by the unlikely alliance of white and Chinese residents against development 
under the banner of family values demonstrates the limited and particular cultural 
conditions by which Chinese people were included in the larger notion of community.  
 
Condotino 
At the turn of the 21st century, Cupertino residents nicknamed the city “Condotino” for 
the number of condo development projects that city council approved of and were 
sprouting up around the city.  At almost every major development was a proposed mixed-
use project, which condominiums were seen as absolutely necessary for providing a built-
in clientele.  The saga of condo developments in Cupertino began as early as the mid-
nineteen eighties when regional government began instituting long-term mandates for 
housing with projected job growth.  In Cupertino, however, two “grassroots” 
organizations consisting of white and Asian residents called “Cupertino Against Re-
zoning” (CARe) and another called the Concerned Citizens of Cupertino (CCC), 
attempted (and succeeded in some cases) to demolish any of these residential 
development plans included in these mixed-used projects, or at the very least to lessen the 
density.  This section examines the organizing efforts of the CARe, particularly their 
successful activism to halt the rescind the permit city council granted VALLCO owners 
who requested to build 137 condos to generate revenue to fund their on-going mall 
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revitalization efforts.  Residents feared what effect the increased volume of residents 
would have on already overextended city services, particularly their schools, and, more 
importantly, the re-zoning of sorely needed commercial and industrial land into 
residential.  While there appears to be an apparent conflict over development, this section 
shows that residents’ investments in community were individual enterprises about 
sustaining their own financial accumulation.  Cast in terms of suburban cultural values of 
family, residents’ expressed community through their self-interests of their property 
values and their children’s educational opportunities. 
Condotino became a reality when the tax-revenue that the city desperately needed 
from retail, commercial and industrial failed to materialize.  Because of taxation 
regulations of Proposition 13, which restricts property tax to 1% of a property’s worth 
when it is bought or sold, Cupertino’s ability to generate revenue from single-family 
homes in a stable community is extremely limited.  Condos, however, are seen by the city 
as an improvement as the turnover is much higher and, therefore, that 1% tax would 
generate much more tax-revenue in a property-rich city like Cupertino (Ersoy 2006).  
While generating any tax-revenue is of utmost importance, especially given the economic 
downturn of the dot.com bust at the turn of the twenty-first century with reported 20% 
lower tax revenue in Cupertino alone (Ersoy 2006), residents continued to protect the 
community profile by bundling their grass-roots organizing efforts around issues 
including protecting the quality of their schools, safety, family entertainment, and their 
“rural” and “suburban” atmosphere of single-family homes and automobile culture.  
With the CARe and the CCC, white and Asian residents formed a united front against 
condos, forcing the city to facilitate the development of retail, commercial, and industrial 
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businesses.  Both organizations had similar efforts. But CARe, based off their website, is 
more focused on creating economic development and stopping residential housing 
development, whereas the CCC were more focused, specifically, on maintaining what 
they thought to be the visual culture of suburban living, which meant discouraging 
projects involving density and detached single-family homes. What appears to distinguish 
the CCC from CARe, particularly, is that the CCC chooses to battle mixed-used 
development projects planned at the major economic development areas along Stevens 
Creek Boulevard.  The CCC pushed for three separate measures in 2004 that would 
change the height, density, and setbacks within the city’s existing general plan, which 
would then affect “The Heart of the City” plan.  The CCC failed to pass these three 
referendums, which received much scrutiny by local residents and contributors to The 
San Jose Mercury (Mercury News 2005; Cronk 2005b, 2005a). 
Residents of Cupertino have continuously balked at mixed-use projects that 
involve creating high-density housing because of how it would exacerbate existing 
problems in Cupertino, such as overcrowded schools and traffic.  One of the biggest 
dramatized mixed-used developments in recent past were the 137 additional condos that 
VALLCO’s owners wanted to create directly across the street from the shopping mall. 
After taking over the mall in late 2003, VALLCO owners were granted permission by 
city council to build 204 condos atop 60,000 square feet of planned retail space in the 
“Rose Bowl” area of VALLCO Fashion Park, an empty parking lot in the north end of 
the mall.  But soon after, the VALLCO owners claimed, in 2006, that they needed an 
additional 137 condo on a 5-acre parcel of land, which would generate money for them to 
complete the renovations they had promised residents.  While city officials and residents 
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universally agreed that redeveloping VALLCO was crucial in generating the elusive sales 
tax the city needed, city officials were willing to concede to the developers demands that 
the 204 additional condos would not only generate foot traffic into the mall and the retail 
planned space below it, but also generate revenue to renovate the mall’s dated and 
uninviting fortress-like exterior and interior (Che 2004b).16  But the biggest problem for 
residents was that the 5 acre space these condos were to be built upon was, at the time, 
zoned for retail and commercial.  The city had granted the VALLCO owners the permits 
for construction, but a citywide vote was needed to pass a measure that would allow for 
the rezoning from retail/commercial to residential.  Residents had been growing 
increasingly suspicious of the owners’ intentions given that they wanted to build more 
housing instead of delivering on the promises of big box stores and other national 
retailers. 
Although residents, the city, and VALLCO owners were far apart in what they 
wanted out of the redevelopment plans, the varying arguments for and against the 137 
condos were still informed by neoliberal economic policies and the cultural conditions 
that would allow for these policies to proliferate through local urban-planning.  City 
council’s conceding to VALLCO owners’ decisions for more residential development, 
with the alleged intention of redeveloping VALLCO, shows how market logics and 
private business were and are responsible for government in Cupertino.  City council 
rationalized their cooperation with VALLCO owners as having the community’s best 
interests in mind, which is creating the tax revenue the city desperately needed.  But 
when registered voters overwhelmingly voted NO against the rezoning measure, 
                                                




officially ending the 137 condo plan, city officials reframed the debates as the success of 
‘democracy’ in the hands of residents as opposed to addressing city council’s own 
complicity with free-market logics.  City council’s only act of governing throughout this 
debate was encouraging residents to allow VALLCO owners to direct how the civic life 
would be, which in this case meant reaffirming the local class dimensions of wealthy new 
residents who are willing to pay the high price of homeownership and expected increase 
in property value that comes with the Cupertino public school systems. 
Residents were against the development for the threat it would bring to the city’s 
identity and its current cultural values.  Residents regurgitated all the myths about 
affordable and high-density housing, ironically, from a brochure that the city put on its 
website, a report titled “Myths and Facts About Affordable & High Density Housing,” 
created by the collaborative efforts between California Planning Roundtable and the 
California Department of Housing and Community Development to mitigate racist fears 
associated with the physical form of these kinds of developments (Myths and Facts 
About Affordable Housing & High Density Housing  2002).  But residents’ complaints 
about high-density and rental properties reveal the relationship between moral value and 
economic value driven by existing neoliberal cultural conditions.  Residents’ complaints 
over condos reflected the same complaints they lobbed at city council in the eighties with 
proposed condo development to supplement the increase in jobs.  With condos and rental 
properties, some residents thought these kinds of dwellings would attract young 
professionals who would keep late hours either working or, worse yet for Cupertino 
residents, partying, which would contrast against the quiet family-oriented entertainments 
that defined Cupertino. Others suggested that renters and condo owners were transient 
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populations that didn’t fit with the stable, rooted ‘community’ of family life.  Some 
residents also drew from historical racial and class stereotypes of urban-density, claiming 
that renters would bring increased crime to the area.  Ironically, residents also accused 
residents for merely wanting the Cupertino address for the state and nationally ranked 
school systems, even though many long-time residents themselves (many having lived in 
Cupertino since the 1960s) claimed they moved to Cupertino because they had heard of 
their great schools. 
When the city of Cupertino retaliated to residents’ collective fears of what condo 
or below market value developments would bring by accusing them of racism, members 
of CARe responded by suggesting that they were a diverse organization made up of all 
racial and ethnic groups that made up the city’s demographics.  But the terms of 
community, articulated by CARe members, were constrained by race and class-based 
notions of family symbolized by the detached single-family home.  In fact, the woman 
that spearheaded CARe was Patty Chi, a Chinese woman who repeatedly attended city 
council meetings and other public forums to voice her displeasure with the lack of retail 
once promised by VALLCO or the overcrowding of schools, which the local school 
system had suggested would be able to accommodate any additional growth.  Family as 
an agreed upon community value gains it’s meanings and power against the stereotypical 
judgments of urban density residences such as condos and apartments.  When Chi and 
others battled condo development, they were also alluding to the economic value of their 
single-family detached homes.  Moreover, white residents seemed willing to include 
Chinese residents because they were not like the developers, whose goals of transnational 
business threatened the post-war liberal suburban tax structures that contained whiteness 
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to post-war suburban property value.  It was under these conditions which Chinese 
residents participating in were acknowledged as part of the community since they 
supported built environments that reinforced this racial hegemony.  
The preemptive move by Cupertino residents to defend their lifestyle against 
‘outsiders,’ however, was about protecting their own financial accumulation.  Although 
using the language of ‘community’ to suggest a united front of families with shared 
values, residents’ collective fears showed that they were more concerned with self-
preservation and what these affects would have on their property values and their 
children’s future life chances.  Residents often framed these common myths of the 
negative effects of new condo or rental-dwelling populations in personal financial terms.  
Members of CARe frequently wrote into the Cupertino Courier to complain about how 
high-density development, such as how “redistricting” of the school system would result 
with overcrowded schools.  Or they worried about privacy issues with taller mixed-use 
structures looking over into their yards.  And, of course, residents continued to remind 
city council of the unsavory characters that lacked the same economic profile as them.  
Combined, all these real-estate issues have been known to affect property values, 
informed by historical racist and classist policies centered on whiteness and urban-
planning (Lipsitz 1998).  As one resident warned the city of the effects of residential 
overdevelopment on Cupertino’s claim to fame: “Increased tax revenues? They won't 
alleviate additional strain on the system. Neither will donations from developers. Santana 
Row here in Cupertino? Our comparative advantage is education. Why would we 
jeopardize that?”(Littman-Ashkenazi 2006) 
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Comparing Santana Row, a mixed-use development of residences and high-end 
retailers and restaurants targeting young to middle-aged Silicon Valley professionals in 
the city of Santa Clara, to Cupertino’s public school education suggests how property 
value is accrued based on location.  City council’s desire for a Santana Row-like 
shopping district in Cupertino assumes that their existing community fits the same 
economic profile as the people that frequent that particular development.  If location to 
entertainment is what drives housing prices of Santa Row’s luxury condominiums 
upwards of close to $2 million dollars, then this resident is suggesting that schools 
operate in the same way for Cupertino. The assumption that crowded schools would hurt 
Cupertino residents’ current “competitive advantage” shows that lifestyle choices are 
deeply motivated by self-care of their wealth and their children’s educational 
“competitive advantage.”  Their moral obligation to themselves is shaped by these 
deliberations over personal costs and benefits to their family’s survival and the effects 
that has on their children’s education in high school and beyond.  
These fictions of ‘community’ couldn’t have been more evident than by the race 
and class boundaries that home-owning residents had for renters in the area.  In one 
particular meeting where the planning commission met with residents what changes they 
would like included or take out of 2001 revision of the General Plan, The Cupertino 
Courier contributor Kevin Fayle reports that there was “[a] room full of angry residents” 
that “berated representatives of the city’s planning commission” (Fayle 2001).  One of 
the central concerns was over the additional housing that the city was encouraged by 
regional government to create, which Fayle reports of residents desiring to return to the 
“small-town feel.”  But “small-town feel” ultimately meant and means, for these 
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Cupertino residents, restricting the amount of people that do not have the financial means 
to live among them.  Fayle further reports that residents were sympathetic to the struggles 
of teachers and other public servants, but refused to budge on the density to 
accommodate them (2001).  
In a similar story, developers Prometheus Real-Estate Group began transforming 
the few rentals at The Crossroads multi-story mixed use development, The Verona 
Apartments, into condominium properties for sale because demand for housing was so 
high (Che 2004c).  The Prometheus Real-Estate Group had promised the city that a 
portion of their development would be dedicated to below market value rentals, which 
would be managed by Below Market Rate Program created by the City of Cupertino.  
Prometheus Real-Estate Group Senior Vice President Jon Moss emphasized that what 
they were doing was purely legal and market-driven.  The Garrett family, a white couple 
with their young daughter living off a single $35,000 income of engineering technician 
work, were forced to leave within 6 months of renting their apartment at $1,000, 50% of 
the market value.  They had received their housing through the city’s Below Market Rate 
Program (BMRP), but could not get any information about their pending eviction from 
the agency or the city itself.  BMRP, however, stated that the converted rental properties 
would be sold at below market value and that they would assist in relocating them to 
other properties in the area. The city, however, could not relocate people at the time 
because of the limited availability of rentals in the first place (Che 2004).  
Just like that, the city’s commitment to below market housing and diversifying its 
community demographics vanished.  The city’s inability to help renters like the Garrett 
family demonstrate who – corporations and the wealthy – the city truly values and those 
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being high-tech workers and/or entrepreneurs that have particular skill sets, capital, and 
comparable salaries.  A engineering technician, making $35,000, sit at the lower rung of 
the high tech ladder as starting salaries for software engineers on average in Silicon 
Valley start at $80,000 (Miller 2011).  By pay scale alone, neoliberal ideology frames our 
understanding of the software engineer as having more value based on the value of 
his/her human capital of knowledge.  The engineering technician, however, is easily 
replaceable.  Within the context of neoliberalism, individual’s access to resources, in this 
case below market housing, are at the whim of corporations, who clearly are not invested 
in building better communities than profiting off market values.  The city’s siding with 
the Prometheus Real Estate Group shows how private corporations have come to define 
the terms of citizenship.  By explaining their rationale as solely on a seemingly abstracted 
notion of “market forces,” this forces residents to conform to this same rationality.  
Ironically, resident perpetuate the neoliberal conditions that they were critical of when 
the city automatically granted VALLCO’s owners the 137 condos. 
Moreover, the activism by CARe, lauded by the city as democracy in action and 
by CARe as representing cross-racial unit, demonstrates the pitfall of rights discourses 
through neoliberalism.  Within the context of condotino, white resident value its Chinese 
residents, such as Patti Chi, because of the way Chinese people are protecting the 
exchange value of not only their own homes, but the exchange value of white people’s 
homes, too.  Under the guise of defending Cupertino’s cultural characteristics of family 
values, white and Chinese residents’ fears of condos are how the effects of growth will 
have on factors determinative of their property values: safety, schools, traffic, and, 
mainly, racial and class demographic variation.  It is within these strict frameworks of 
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increasing white property exchange value that white residents have willingly formed an 
alliance with the Chinese, possibly the most despised residents of Cupertino in the last 
two decades. 
Conclusion 
In these two related development plans centered on creating a downtown-shopping 
district to unify the community, consumer culture and architecture operate as examples of 
neoliberal governmentality.  With declining sales tax revenues revenue available to fund 
city service, the city intended to find strategic ways to encourage consumerism, which 
defined the conduct of citizenship.  Collectively, residents, city, and the consultants 
framed economic rationale of creating sales tax revenue as a reason for inclusion and 
exclusion from the Cupertino community.  By inclusion and exclusion, debates, as it 
related to economic development, often centered on whether Chinese people – residents, 
businesses, and developers – could ever be part of the community.  And these debates 
reveal that so long as Chinese people maintain white economic security would white 
residents approve of them as community members.  Case in point, as consultants and 
Chinese developers tried to create a lucrative, high-class, yet Asian-themed shopping 
center, white residents balked, with one white resident saying that without a high-end 
mainstream department store at VALLCO he would have nowhere to shop in town and to 
contribute to the sales tax revenue.  Similarly with regards to condo development, when 
Chinese residents supported protecting suburban family values, also known as white 
property exchange value, did white residents form an alliance with them.  These two 
episodes show how culture and economic rationality dovetail in producing different types 
of racial power.  In both cases, white residents used community as an attempt at 
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protecting their own wealth.  In the case of Condotino, Chinese inclusion with 
community was based on their ability to economically rationalize family values as set of 
costs and benefits. 
 The development plans show how neoliberalism has been a pervasive ideology 
across Silicon Valley.  In the case of Cupertino, neoliberalism has connected seemingly 
unrelated phenomenon of urban planning, architectural design and the suburban family 
values.  And while culture was one of many pretenses for development in Cupertino, it 
required the space of mixed-used development to visualize and materialize these 
neoliberal economic polices, which the bottom line was generating sales tax.  But these 
two situations show how rights discourse as a neoliberal discourse provides very limited 
subjectivities.  These subjectivities participate in exacerbating existing social and 
economic inequalities structured into the high-tech economy.  These are the same 
equalities that white residents of Cupertino complained of but were unwilling to concede 
as it benefitted their own accumulation of wealth.  And while white prejudice of Chinese 
immigrants have unfairly targeted and blamed them for the loss of white-owned 
businesses, Chinese immigrants quest for recognition through neoliberalism merely 
instantiates the racial exclusions based off race and class that white residents aimed to 








CHAPTER 4  
“Monster in the Neighborhood”: Race, Domesticity, and Ranch Homes in 
Cupertino, California 
 
In this chapter, I examine the historical preservationist movement of the post-war tract 
ranch-style house1 by white residents in the city of Cupertino, California, also known as 
“The Heart of Silicon Valley.”  I trace the gradual unofficial “historic” status of the ranch 
house that follows the building of custom-built “monster homes”2 by Chinese immigrants 
of high-tech backgrounds beginning in the mid-nineteen nineties continuing into the 
present.  In particular, I focus on the relationship between the reoccurring themes of 
racialized and gendered leisure and domesticity often used by white residents in defense 
of a purportedly “authentic” history and culture gradually obliterated by the culture of 
high-tech industries created and dominated by Chinese immigrants.  I argue that the 
                                                
1 The tract ranch house originated in California and was different from previous “traditional American” 
homes in that architects sought a forward thinking design that promoted “informal outdoor living,” 
indicative of a historical “Californio Hacienda” southern California rural home of the late nineteenth, early 
twentieth century. Emerging in the aftermath of World War II, the modernist aesthetics and "modern" 
amenities of the ranch house such as new electric appliances and built-in cabinetry and shelving served to 
symbolize a modern feel. "Modern living" meant affordable yet sturdily built housing with the 
simultaneous aim of easing the challenges of domestic duties based around the concept of open interior 
spaces.  Promoting simplicity, functionality, and informality through design and ease of domestic 
responsibilities, “Western-ness…became something of a free-floating signifier of an idealized way of life,” 
argues historian John Mack Faragher. While the ranch house has its architectural roots in Californio 
ranching history, it’s post-war manifestation as a pre-fab or tract home wasn’t paying homage to a Mexican 
past but rather became a national desire and inspiration for an all-white future of progress.  In the longer 
portion of this chapter, I historicize the ranch house within both national and regional discourses of postwar 
liberalism.  
2 The monster home represents a residential housing style that emerges in the nineteen nineties. It deviates 
from the genealogy of American homes because of its size and aesthetics. Though they may have similar 
details, like gables or bay windows, of ‘traditional American’ homes, certain dimensions or conventions 
such as Corinthian pillars flanking a 20 foot tall front door, wrought iron fencing in the front, pastel paint, 
stucco, and unarticulated walls distinguish it from other ‘traditional’ styles. The monster home is also 
known for its pastiche of different architectural details from different traditional homes, which its lack of a 
coherent style also makes it seem non-“American.”  In California, the monster home also goes by the 
“faux-Mediterranean,” precisely for its attempt at echoing Spanish-style, Mediterranean, or Italian villas.   
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reiterated invented narratives of homogenized middle-class “white” past portrayed by the 
tract ranch house, in fact, reflects white middle-class anxieties over the saturation of 
neoliberal economic policies in Silicon Valley, portrayed by the “monster home.”3  That 
is, central to this neoliberalism of free-market rationality, deregulation, and privatization 
are the Chinese immigrants of high-tech economic productivity, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship whose ethnic cultural lifestyles have a discursive function in 
constituting Silicon Valley’s purported “diversity.”  This chapter emphasizes how these 
white anxieties reveal the gendering and class-based racial hegemonies of Silicon Valley 
that incorporates and privileges Chinese people. 
In Cupertino, the preservationist movement with regards to ranch houses began in 
the early beginning of the nineteen nineties when newer residents began adding second 
floor additions to ranch houses in neighborhoods that were among the first subdivisions 
in the city.  Originally, local debates regarding second floor additions centered on issues 
of privacy and lighting as anti-development residents complained that neighbors would 
constantly be privy to their private lives from their second story rooms or that the 
neighboring additions would block the sunlight from shining into their backyards.  
Gradually, however, as more Chinese immigrants moved into Cupertino and began 
remodeling, if not tearing down completely, ranch houses to construct their “dream 
home” during a time when the R-1 ordinance4 had not yet been updated to take into 
                                                
3 In newspapers and conversations among residents, residents framed the ranch house versus monster home 
as white locals against Asian immigrants.  In some city council meetings, however, Chinese and white 
residents and contractors both described the need for ordinances that allowed for construction of more 
space (not necessarily “monster homes”).  In fact, of all the homes of Chinese residents I visited, none of 
Chinese residents lived in what is locally known as a “monster home.” The point of this chapter is to 
examine the discourses that guide how these homes signify particular ideas about race, capital, and nation.  
4 The R-1 is a residential building ordinance that provides rules on the dimensions for construction as it 
relates to lot size and floor-area-ratio. Furthermore, this ordinance also encourages articulation strategies, 
such as brackets, shutters, building materials, and landscaping to offset the visual effect of a “monster 
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account preserving neighborhood character, the ranch house quickly became synonymous 
with local history and whiteness in public discourse around issues of “community” in the 
midst of increased Chinese immigration and Silicon Valley economic growth.  Asian and 
white neighbors took their battles over the aesthetic quality and functionality of 
residential architecture to city council meetings, newspaper editorials, and, literally, the 
streets.  White residents used these forums to defend their ranch homes, utilizing moral 
arguments of how these homes represent the historical life of leisure prior to Silicon 
Valley. 
I examine these narratives through a discourse analysis of memoirs and 
ethnographic fieldwork of white narratives of “leisure” to show how the sight of 
residential architecture normalizes racialized and gendered power relations.  But its is 
also the citation of leisure, domesticity, and rural discourses that dovetail in these 
narrations of “history.”  The visual phenomenon of the Silicon Valley home as indicative 
of Silicon Valley lifestyles operates as what Marxist theorist Guy Debord would describe 
as the “commodity as spectacle:” 
The spectacle is another facet of money, which is the abstract general equivalent 
of all commodities.  But whereas money in its familiar form has dominated 
society as the representations of universal equivalence, that is, of the 
exchangeability of diverse goods whose uses are not otherwise compatible, the 
spectacle in its full development is money’s modern aspect; in the spectacle the 
totality of the commodity world is visible in one piece, as the general equivalent 
of whatever society as a whole can do.  The spectacle of money for contemplation 
only, for here the totality of use has already been bartered for the totality of 
abstract representation.  The spectacle is not just the servant of pseudo-use – it is 
already, in itself, the pseudo-use of life (Debord 1977). 
 
                                                
home” size.  The city and residents have redeveloped the R-1 over the years and in its most recent 
manifestation, encourages residents to create different “traditional American designs”, such as the 
Victorian, Craftsmen, Tudor, cape cod, etc.  
 
 114 
Debord’s concept of the “commodity as spectacle” refers to various discourses of 
capitalism centered on economic exchange that lend themselves to notions of “equality” 
between people mediated by the circulation of money and objects.  As commodities, the 
value of objects is determined by seemingly abstracted denominations such as money. 
Money, as a standardization of how goods can be purchased and exchanged, alludes to 
the notion of “universal equivalence.”  For Debord, the “spectacle” of commodities 
presents a fantasy world of an imagined equivalence (“pseudo-use of life”) reproduced 
through consumerism. 
Dianne Harris, scholar of landscape architecture, offers what I see as a race, 
gender, and class critique of Debord’s theorization of commodities in her analysis of 
advertisements of post-war housing.  Harris’ concept of “habit of perception” suggests a 
discursive rendering of commodities that guide how we see and relate to homes. 
Referring to the reiteration of scenes of domesticity that normalize our perception of 
space as well as the particular power relations within that space, “habits of perception” 
reflect the racist material and discursive structures that impact the photographic and 
artistic conventions of advertisements that targeted white buyers, exclusively (Harris 
2007).  Through the absence of African Americans, the sight of the suburban single 
family detached home represents social and class equivalence among whites.  As scholars 
of cultural geography stressed with regards to the politics of vision, we must be attentive 
to how seeing and perception are significant to knowledge production (Rose 1993).  
Together, this combination of critical race studies and cultural geography guide my 
interpretation of the spectacular relationship Cupertino residents have with their homes 
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and the assumptions these homes yield of the ideal Silicon Valley resident and 
community as the area transformed from a white to Chinese hegemony.5  
This chapter is organized into three parts, which begins with my historical 
framing of the problem of ranch house conversion and monster home construction. Next, 
I follow with my close reading of a memoir printed in the New York Times written by a 
Silicon Valley born-and-raised journalist, who recounts a trip back to his family’s ranch 
house, now occupied by Chinese high-tech workers, during the time of the dot.com bust 
of early 2000.6  I follow this by discussing some interview and ethnographic materials 
collected from conversations with two local residents and their anxiety of Asian 
individuality against the populist leisure of white people.  Together, these two vignettes 
                                                
5	  Katharyne Mitchell’s analysis of monster home conflicts in Vancouver, Canada guides my analysis of 
Cupertino monster homes as symbols of transnational financial mobility. Mitchell shows that the bungalow 
and Tudor style home visually represent the relationship between race, market values, and spatial practices 
of domesticity intrinsic to British Colonialism and white Canadian hegemony.  With the teardown of 
bungalows and Tudors, white Canadian women’s complaints over the loss of Canadian domesticity, argues 
Mitchell, really speak to the perceived loss of British colonial and white Canadian hegemony instantiated 
by landscapes.  The monster home portrays an inversion of British colonial society, wherein previous 
power relationships between white homeowners and Chinese servants typified race and gender hierarchies 
within the context of domesticity.  I, too, see the monster home as the free-circulation of capital and people 
across borders enabled by neoliberal economic practices.  Domesticity is part of my analysis. But I situated 
contemporary themes of leisure  and domesticity within historical portrayals of California Living.  For 
more on monster homes in Vancouver, Canada, see. Katharyne Mitchell. Crossing The Neoliberal Line: 
Pacific Rim Migrations And The Metropolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004)	  
6 The dot.com bust refers to the novelty and proliferation of internet-based companies roughly beginning in 
the mid nineteen nineties and ending in the beginning of the millennium.  The reason why the dot.com 
trend was so documented in media near the turn of the 21st century was the exponential increase in venture 
capitalist investment (in the multimillions), increased jobs and salaries, free-spending, over-development 
that transformed not only the physical landscape of the region but the race and class composition.  The 
dot.com explosion banked on the notion that commerce and industry would be completely online based 
with the gradual wiring of high-speed Internet. The problem with the boom and bust in Silicon Valley was 
that many dot.com companies merely tried to cash in on the trend without a clear business plan or product 
to sell.  Venture capitalist firms operated similarly dumping millions of dollars into various proposals, 
hoping to bank on the next big thing.  But the typical lifespan of a dot.com company consisted of a 
promising company offering “initial public offerings” (IPO) of its stock, which lured many investors, thus 
raising the worth of the company.  Overspending on lavish worker fringe benefits in addition or 
overdevelopment in terms of expanding the company size – without generating enough revenue – quickly 
transformed these darling companies from overnight millionaires to overnight bankruptcy.  As many 
companies folded within a short period of time, the sudden lavish lifestyles that people enjoyed left them 
unemployed and, at time, subsequently, in debt or homeless. 
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describe the cultural discourses of the everyday that matter to the implementation of 
neoliberalism within Silicon Valley life and labor.   
Tract Ranch Houses as Cupertino’s Rural History 
In Cupertino, the preservationist movement with regards to ranch houses began as early 
as the beginning of the nineteen nineties when newer residents began adding second floor 
additions to ranch houses in neighborhoods that were among the first subdivisions in the 
city.  Originally, local debates regarding second floor additions centered on issues of 
privacy and lighting as anti-development residents complained that neighbors would 
constantly be privy to their private lives from their second story rooms.  Either that or the 
neighboring additions would block the sunlight from shining into their backyards gardens 
and other landscaping (Drudis 1998; Marino 1998b; Enders 1998a).  Gradually, however, 
as more Chinese immigrants moved into Cupertino and began remodeling, if not tearing 
down completely, ranch houses to construct their “dream home,” the ranch house quickly 
became synonymous with local “rural” history in public discourse around issues of 
“community.”  
The bulk of the homes in Cupertino are subdivisions of ranch houses.  With the 
boom in post-World War II high-tech economic development resulting from the military 
defense contracts, much of Cupertino’s housing stock filled in existing incorporated areas 
of Cupertino between the 1950s to the 1970s.  In specific neighborhoods such as Monta 
Vista, Fairgrove, Garden Gate, and Linwood, some residents of said neighborhoods 
deemed their ranch houses as historic given how they were the original subdivisions in 
the city that arrived around the time directly before and after incorporation, one of a few 
temporal markers of Cupertino’s history (Zhang 2003; Che 2003d; Che 2003b).  In what 
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has traditionally been known as a bedroom community given its historic rapid building of 
detached single-family tract housing, the gradual disappearance of elaborately detailed 
custom built Victorian and Arts and Crafts homes in addition to commercial and retail 
buildings all either loss to fires or neglected beyond repair have made the ranch house a 
visual icon of Cupertino’s historical hegemonic whiteness. 
 
Figure 4-1: An older tract ranch home (Cupertino, CA).  
Photo by the author. 
 
Cupertinian perceptions of the racial and national difference of the monster home 
often came not only from the sheer size and scale of it that dwarfed the ranch house, but 
also the mish-mash of American residential vernacular conventions.  Commonly painted 
pink or orange pastel against it’s stucco-siding, the monster home was two to three times 
the size of ranch house, typically anywhere from 800 to 1700 square feet depending on 
the year it was built.  That is, the word “monster” most likely derives not just from the 
size but the Frankenstein-like usage of columns, bay windows, window shutters, 
bracketing and gabling that draws from “traditional” and regional American residential 
vernacular architecture such as the colonial, the Victorian, Arts and Crafts, and the ranch 
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house.  While these features are distinctly “American,” Cupertino residents seem to think 
that these homes lack a national coherency, as they have also been nicknamed locally and 
regionally such as “faux-Mediterranean,” “pink palaces,” “pink elephants,” and 
“McMansions.”   Chinese immigrants also seemed to prefer bordering their property with 
a black iron-wrought fence.  This fortress-like like appearance was magnified by how the 
monster home was built out to all edges of the property, leaving little to no yard space.   
For white ranch house owners, the visual appearance of the monster home 
explained the cultural conduct of Chinese people that purportedly had no respect for 
white American cultural values.  By cultural values, white neighbors often framed the 
Chinese residents who buy or build these homes are as not invested in the community, 
but only in the exchange value of their homes.  By community, residents described 
heterosexual gender norms centered on families socializing together.  John, a Chinese 
land developer specializing in luxury single-family homes throughout Alameda County 
and Santa Clara County, shared with me that the logic of building homes that maximized 
the lot size was so Chinese buyers could get the most money out the price of the land.  
That is, because the land in Silicon Valley was so expensive, it made financial sense to 
build a larger monster home instead of a small bungalow or ranch house because you it 
added more value and allowed buyers to recoup their investment and much more (John 
2010).  For these reasons, these monster homes are often, though not always, equipped 
with dens, game rooms, home theaters, multi-car garages, at least 5 bedrooms, and, 
sometimes, twice as many bathrooms as there are bedrooms.  But the common local 
perception that Chinese immigrants introduced a foreign culture of extravagance and 
consumption was far from the truth.  In an interview with two of Cupertino’s planning 
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commissioners who oversee the development of local building ordinances and review 
residential and commercial building construction, Leslie Gross and Gary Chao both 
confirmed that showing off was sometimes the case.  But they both added that Chinese 
immigrant homebuyers wanted larger homes, sometimes with two master bedrooms, so  
 
Figure 4-2: A monster home (Cupertino, CA). Photo by the author. 
they could live with their in-laws and additional extended family members (Chao 2010).  
Moreover, Gross and Chao added that Chinese immigrants, having grown up in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and China, most likely lived in small and cramped apartments growing up 
given that land was scarce in their home countries and, therefore, much more expensive 
than Silicon Valley and other parts of the United States. 
Cupertino residents pressured the planning commission and city council to pass 
amendments to the R-1 ordinance – the residential building ordinance that 
institutionalized the strict guidelines of building height, setbacks, and floor to area ratio 
(FAR) – in hopes of putting an end to monster home construction.  Local frustration with 
“monster homes” was as much about aesthetics as it was about the obsessive aspiration of 
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wealth accumulation that these homes purportedly produced in the residents that live in it.  
Since the early 1990s, residents pushed for new building guidelines that would provide 
visual relief to the building density of these monster homes and help restore the visual 
cues of the “rural” that they felt their neighborhood once possessed: the ranch house 
surrounded by well manicured lawns and landscaping that offered some sense of a not-
so-distant Cupertino and Santa Clara County past of agriculture and family-time.  
Creating wider setbacks, the distance from the house to the property line, ensured that 
residents had to have landscaping.  White residents protected their “privacy” by forcing 
strict building heights so their Chinese neighbors couldn’t spy on them.  And lastly, the 
FAR, the ratio of the square footage of second story addition to the total square footage 
of the first floor, would not exceed 35%, which meant that the visual density would be 
reduced from street level.   
But with these stringent building codes, came the ugly “wedding cake” house, a 
small second story box upon a larger first floor box, which began popping up all over 
town.  By the mid-2000s, residents, white and Chinese, collectively, complained to the 
planning commission and city council about the city’s ugly “wedding cake” homes, how 
these homes are damaging the reputation of a world-class city, and the inability for 
resident’s to build their “dream home.”  The planning commission, after years of 
listening to residents’ complaints, made a compromise with the recent amendments to the 
R-1 ordinance.  The new R-1 ordinance allowed residents to exceed the FAR, but only if 
they constructed their home with “traditional” American residential vernacular in mind, 
such as the Tudor, the bungalow, or the colonial.  More predominately white cities such 
as Saratoga and Los Gatos to the west of Cupertino feature strict R-1 ordinances that aim 
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to preserve the historical residential vernacular “diversity” with their mix of traditionally 
American homes of arts and crafts, Victorians, bungalows, and more.7  If residents 
wanted to build a brand new two-story house or create a larger second story addition 
beyond the existing FAR, the planning commission had to, first, approve their design 
standards.  If it didn’t, the planning commission would make suggestions on how to add 
articulation – materials, paint, brackets, etc. – to make a more aesthetically pleasing 
house and neighborhood (Chao 2010).  The contemporary manifestation of the R-1 
ordinance reflects Chao, Gross, and the rest of the Planning Commission’s attempts at 
placating the demands and desires of its white and Chinese residents.  But if just wanted 
your wedding cake-like monster home, you could as long as you restricted yourself to the 
new FAR listed in the amended R-1.   
For years, the residents pressured the Planning Commission to deter the building 
of monster homes and, now, wedding cakes.   The Planning Commission appeared to 
appease white residents by encouraging traditionally “American forms” if residents 
wanted to expand their existing square footage.  Under the guise of residential vernacular 
diversity and neighborhood and city beautification, however, the city’s new R-1 
ordinance seems to encourage a return to a racialized “American” space.  By 
“American,” the city’s encouragement of varied residential vernacular forms was meant 
to promote more community character.  But even after much deliberation over how to 
improve on the diversity of neighborhood character, the Planning Commission’s notion 
                                                
7 I downloaded a copy of the R-1 ordinance that was being reviewed by the city, Planning Commission, and 
residents.  In this copy included examples of R-1 ordinances in Saratoga and Los Gatos, which direct text 
and photos of homes, such as Arts and Crafts or Victorians (rare if not non-existent in Cupertino), from 
their R-1 ordinances was lifted and used in Cupertino’s most recent draft of its R-1 ordinance.  Chao 
disagreed with me during the interview when I asked whether these beautification plans were meant to 
transform Cupertino into a city like Saratoga.  He replied that it was actually the other way around.  In the 
final draft of the revised Cupertino R-1 ordinance, only homes within Cupertino’s housing stock, farm 
house-style or two-story ranches, were used. 
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of beautification seemed merely to respond to the white constituency that discourages the 
construction of ethnicized residential geographies.  The encouragement of “American” 
residential vernacular architecture appeared to be the planning commissions attempts at 
assuaging white residents’ desire to restore the visual economy of Americanness in the 
residential spaces of suburbs.  
The particular re-iterated theme of the “rural” that white Cupertino residents 
desired and vociferously defended reflected how post-World War II suburban expansion 
wove together gendered ideas about whiteness and nation.  The tract ranch house 
originated in California and was different from previous “traditional American” homes in 
that architects sought a forward thinking design that promoted “informal outdoor living,” 
indicative of a historical “Californio Hacienda” southern California rural and ranching 
home of the late nineteenth, early twentieth century.  The modernist aesthetics and 
"modern" amenities of the ranch house such as the low pitched roof, open floor plan, 
large windows, new electric appliances, and built-in cabinetry and shelving served to 
symbolize the modern “America” of on-going progress in the post-War period.  "Modern 
living" meant affordable yet sturdily built housing with the simultaneous aim of easing 
the challenges of domestic duties based around the concept of open interior spaces.  The 
post-war “miracle house” was a romanticized notion of the “dream house” associated 
with homeownership at the turn of the twentieth-century, but articulated through 
technological advancements (Mennel 2005).  Promoting simplicity, functionality, and 
informality through design and ease of domestic responsibilities, “Western-
ness…became something of a free-floating signifier of an idealized way of life,” argues 
historian John Mack Faragher (Faragher 2001).  But these notions of progress, 
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technologically savvy women using new consumer goods to ease their domestic 
responsibilities, re-instantiated heterosexual gender conduct that the ranch house layout 
was meant to facilitate.  While the ranch house has its architectural roots in Californio 
ranching history, it’s post-war manifestation as a pre-fabricated or tract home wasn’t 
paying homage to a Mexican past but rather became a national desire and inspiration for 
an all-white future of progress. 
Within the context of emerging civil rights and labor movements of center cities 
during the 1950s, the ranch house and what it symbolized visually became a temporal 
retreat for its white residents from the civil and racial unrest of the present.  The ranch-
style house, according to Barbara L. Allen, was part of a larger post-war cultural 
framework aimed at restoring national myths of white dominance over the frontiers of the 
American West.  The ranch house, itself, was meant to symbolize the nation’s “Western” 
past. But the surrounding “nature” of the ranch house – landscaping – and the larger 
picture windows and sliding glass doors allowing residents to see “nature” was part of the 
visual culture of post-war whiteness.  As an escape to from complexities of center cities 
and their mind-numbing corporate lives, the experience for the white owners of the ranch 
house and their visual sight of it served as an “escape mechanisms from the frustrations 
from daily life” (Allen 1996).    The nostalgia for the colonist past, experienced through 
the visual and material cultures of the ranch house, creates what Allen claims as the 
“complicitous relationship between cultural and environmental hegemony in the United 
States” (1996, 163).  
While not all manifestations of ranch house development in the San Francisco 
Bay Area evoked these meanings, many Cupertinians seemed to echo these dominant 
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cultural themes of racial exclusion in their attachments to ranch house living and the 
leisurely way of life it was meant to produce.8  In 2003, the Cupertino Courier, the local 
newspaper, ran a three-part series on racial conflicts in the older subdivisions in 
Cupertino, which the white residents in each instance were quoted as defending the 
“rural” atmosphere.  In the article titled “Revisiting the Monta Vista Neighborhood,” 
contributor Jennifer Zhang talks to long-time resident Jim Giudotti who, in response to 
the Asian migration and monster home construction of his part of town, reminisces 
nostalgically of his childhood leisure and labor that was centered around his engagement 
with nature: “For the first four years, we were the only kids here.  We played in the creek, 
hiked the mountains and worked at my uncle’s horse ranch down the street.  We had the 
run of the area” (Zhang 2003).  Guidotti references families, leisure, and nature to re-
iterate the notion that whiteness constitutes this environmental hegemony.  In “Living a 
good life can be enough,” Lee Kucera, op-ed contributor to the Cupertino Courier, writes 
of the destructive lifestyles of labor that “monster homes” breed, particularly its effects 
on families: 
 “My own observation is that there can be a lot of pain behind the six-figure 
income jobs in Silicon Valley, and unhappiness in many of the million-dollar 
homes. We're so busy working that we've lost sight of the obvious: What good is 
professional success to a person who's on his third divorce? What's the point of a 
monster home if the people living in it are lost and alienated from one another?” 
(Kucera 2000) 
 
                                                
8 Joseph Eichler, a merchant builder, seemed to differ from his contemporaries Cliff May and William 
Levitt.  Unlike Levitt and May, both builders of post-war ranch-style homes, Eichler wanted the 
progressive nature of his modernist “Eichler Home” neighborhoods to extend beyond the amenities to 
include social justice agendas of racial integration.  For more on Eichler, see www.eichlernetwork.com.  
Also for more accounts of residential segregation in Santa Clara County, including stories of Joseph Eichler 
standing by his policy of racial integration in spite of pressure from angry white residents, see Herbert G. 
Ruffin II. “Uninvited Neighbors: Black Life and the Racial Quest for Freedom in the Santa Clara Valley, 
1777-1968.” (PhD. Claremont University, 2007).   
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Like Guidotti, Kucera assumes that “monster homes” create a culture of financial 
obligation, responsibility, and expectation.  Both of them seem to suggest that the high-
tech industry not only creates institutions like the “monster home,” but the monster home 
also reproduces the high-tech industry.  While Guidotti and Kucera, among others, are 
correct in critiquing the cultures of high-tech industries, their framing of the problem as a 
loss of white heterosexual family life and leisure seems more of a longing of a lost white 
hegemony than a real critique of the exacerbated class divisions and environmental 
racism that high-tech industries create.   
The relationship between the “rural” and ranch houses in Cupertino requires 
situating it within the concatenation of discourses including homeownership, family, and 
domesticity.  In Cupertino, the preservation of ranch houses only became an issue with 
Chinese immigration and a new racial hegemony produced through the local residential 
vernacular architecture of “monster homes” and high-tech campuses.  In the next section, 
I explore in more depth the relationship between the ranch house preservation, family 
leisure, and white anxieties over neoliberal economic policies in Silicon Valley.    
Tract Ranch House as the Spatialization of Postwar Liberalism 
In the wake of the Internet dot.com bust of early 2000, the New York Times printed an 
article by journalist Jeff Goodell, a contributing editor to Rolling Stone at the time, titled 
“Venture Capitalist in My Bedroom.”  In the article, Goodell discusses what he sees as 
the problematic demographic and subsequent cultural shifts to the area he grew up in, 
now commonly known as “Silicon Valley.”  Focusing on the site of his parents tract 
ranch house along the border of Cupertino and Sunnyvale (cities within the region known 
as Silicon Valley), Goodell captures what he sees as the destructive forces Silicon 
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Valley’s “Darwinian quality of success and failure” (von Busack 2000) in how Chinese 
“real estate speculators” transformed his former home from a place of familial love and 
support to a cold “flophouse” of disgruntled Chinese immigrants of high-tech industry 
(von Busack 2000; Goodell 2000).  The opening to his article describes his former home 
as the “shabbiest” on the street with its “dingy” paint job, sagging fence, and fortress-like 
reclusiveness.  
Of all the houses on Meadowlark Lane, this one is the shabbiest: it is a dingy 
mustard color with brown shutters; there is a Toyota Camry parked on what used 
to be the lawn; the backyard fence is sagging; the window shades are drawn. As I 
walk up the driveway, I am greeted by a cheap gold ''No Soliciting'' sign on the 
front door, as well as a smaller sign, handwritten in Mandarin, that I cannot read 
but that, I imagine, says, ‘You are not welcome here' (Goodell 2000). 
 
At the time, Goodell covered the Silicon Valley, commuting from his upstate New York 
residence.  He explains his reasoning for this as being unable to have the “space or peace 
of mind” had he chose to live in the place of his work since he thinks people assume that 
he is just bitter about the area by the way he writes about it.  Prior to “Venture Capitalist 
in My Bedroom,” Goodell wrote an article that was printed a year prior, “Down and Out 
in Silicon Valley,” which chronicled the lives of the people living in homeless shelters, 
marginalized by the attention to new moneyed dot.com millionaires.  The article was 
syndicated by various news sources and was recognized by the editors of BusinessWeek 
as one of the best business stories of the year.9 The contradictions and extremes of Silicon 
Valley’s rich and poor, Goodell notes in “Down and Out,” highlights who and how one 
exemplifies humanity in Silicon Valley and who lives at the edge of it: “It’s clear that the 
Silicon Valley is developing into a two-tier society: those who have caught the 
                                                
9 “Down and Out in Silicon Valley” has since been reprinted in the 2001 edition of the annual volume 
called Best Business Stories of the Year 2001. 
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technological wave and those who are being left behind.  This is not simply a 
phenomenon of class or race or age or the distribution of wealth – although those are all 
important. It’s really about the nature of unfettered capitalism when it’s operating at warp 
speed” (Goodell 1999). 
Unlike many celebratory stories of Silicon Valley’s nouveau riche, Goodell 
deliberately chose to portray a sobering view of what life was like “on the ground.” And 
Goodell’s articles came at the right time as he transformed ethical questions about the 
sustainability of the dot.com industry – reckless spending, overdevelopment, and 
subsequent bankruptcy – into moral ones of how people should be living.  In “Down and 
Out,” Goodell nostalgically remembers the seventies growing up in a tract-neighborhood 
among his neighbors when high-tech meant government funded high-tech defense 
industries.  But his neighbors also included service workers, which in Goodell’s memory 
of his neighborhood meant, “no one was appreciably richer” (1999).10  In this section, I 
examine the racialized and gendered visual and spatial discourses of post-war liberalism, 
which frames Goodell’s understanding of the social and economic homogeneity of 
homeownership in Silicon Valley.  I explore Goodell’s invented nostalgic perceptions of 
“universal equivalence,” situated within historic exclusionary performances of race, 
gender, and labor in the context of homeownership and domesticity.  
                                                
10 Contrary to Goodell’s belief that everyone was “equal” in their financial situations prior to the shift away 
from defense industries funded high tech towards privatized consumer production high tech industries, 
racial covenants and other discriminatory practices by white residents, developers, and real estate agents 
and brokers prevented African Americans from purchasing homes in various Santa Clara county cities.  If it 
wasn’t denying African Americans loans, then white neighbors used intimidation.  De-skilling of African 
American professionals was also a regular practice at many white-collar jobs, such as high tech and 
teaching.  For more details, see Ruffin, Herbert. Uninvited neighbors: Black life and the racial quest for 
freedom in the Santa Clara Valley, 1777-1968. Diss. Claremont Graduate University, 2007. Claremont.  
Also, to examine how Silicon Valley’s white hegemony developed through the discursive and material 
exclusion, and genocide, of indigenous and Mexican peoples, see Pitti, Stephen J. The Devil in Silicon 
Valley: Northern California, Race, and Mexican Americans.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
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The particularity of “Venture Capitalist in My Bedroom” was how Goodell 
introduced to a national audience the phenomenon of monster homes and the notion that 
Asian high tech migration was obliterating local history.  Up until then, reporting on 
“monster homes” in Silicon Valley could only be found in local press, such as the eight 
newspapers of the Silicon Valley Community Newspapers group – local papers from 
various communities and cities of Silicon Valley – or Metro, a weekly, free, regional 
 
Figure 4-3: Recently torn down ranch home in preparation for a monster  
home (Cupertino, CA). Photo by the author. 
 
magazine. While monster homes remain an issue debated in municipal meetings in 
Cupertino to this day, the height of the monster home reporting occurred between the 
mid-1990s to 2003.  As newspapers reported, neighborhoods across Silicon Valley 
experienced similar tensions between older, retired couples living in original subdivisions 
of smaller homes (anywhere from 800-1200 square feet) and young dot.com families 
moving in, tearing down these homes, and building new homes two to three times the 
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original size.  Regularly documented in the newspapers were angry neighbors forcing city 
hearings about a residential development project that encroached on the property rights of 
residents, typically over second story additions that threatened residents’ privacy.  Cities 
across Santa Clara County were forced to revise their residential building ordinances to 
mediate complaints by older residents and at the same time lure wealthy residents into 
their jurisdictions. While monster homes were continually discussed in city meetings and 
newspapers, it was only in Cupertino that white residents portrayed “monster homes” as a 
reflection of an essentialized Chinese culture centered on displaying class-status. Unlike 
other cities in Santa Clara county, Cupertino’s Asian “majority” made them an easy 
culprit whereas in other areas like the predominately white Willow Glen neighborhood of 
San Jose or the city of Los Gatos, the excuse for larger homes were either reflections of a 
new, non-racialized, high-tech wealth or the timeless American mantra of “bigger is 
better” (Hukill 1999; Kearns and Enders 1999; Enders and Kearns 1999).11  
But “Venture Capitalist in My Bedroom” diverged slightly from the rest of 
Goodell’s writing.  This time around his portrayal of Silicon Valley culture made Chinese 
culture and high-tech culture synonymous in his telling of Silicon Valley’s rollercoaster 
ride of success and failures, and his conclusion that “love” – heterosexual families – is 
more important than money.  In “Venture Capitalist in My Bedroom,” however, the only 
characters in Silicon Valley that Goodell sees and gives voice to are Chinese immigrants.  
Goodell writes of his return to the house he grew up in and is startled by the changes the 
current Chinese landlord and its occupants transformed it into: A ‘flophouse’ for six 
                                                
11 “Monster home” have grown to become a national issue, particularly in the last 5 years.  As subdivision 
developments extend into exurbs, older residents of developing rural areas have also complained about the 
size of the homes starkly contrasted against the smaller surrounding homes.  Unlike California, however, 
the homes are understood as “neo-traditional American,” as opposed to “faux-Mediterranean,” utilizing 
building materials and other conventions that aim to ‘blend in’ with regional housing styles. 
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seemingly miserable adult Chinese high-tech workers from Taiwan, China, and Hong 
Kong.  What Goodell finds most problematic about these Chinese immigrants is that they 
no longer value the home as a place for nuclear familial bonding but merely as another 
investment in a chain of investments.  Goodell frames this problematic as a bookend to 
local history: “One of the self-perpetuating virtues of a fast-changing culture like the 
valley is that there are fewer and fewer people around who remember what was lost.  The 
past is not only uninteresting; it has been obliterated.  The price of progress is memory” 
(“Venture Capitalist”). The culprits for this are clearly emphasized in the final sentence 
of Goodell’s story where Frank Lin, a mid-twenties venture capitalist, describes his 
current living situation in Goodell’s former home: “This place is just such a dump.  
There’s not much you can do but tear it down” (2000).   
More specifically, the “wreckage of the American Dream circa 1963” which 
Goodell finds in his home in the late nineties are how the Chinese immigrants don’t 
conform to “American” heterosexual units of nuclear families, judging by the way they 
use his family’s post-war home (2000).  Everything that Goodell sees in the interior and 
exterior of his childhood home disturbs him as it has become devoid of the familiar 
“familial” activities resulting from the demands of Silicon Valley capitalism directed by 
Chinese immigrants.  That is, unlike his mom, the Chinese high-tech workers don’t cook 
or “gather” in the kitchen “every night at 6:30 for our family meal of beef stroganoff or 
tuna casserole” (Goodell 1999).  The empty cupboards, “save for the large bottle of soy 
sauce and a few containers of SlimFast” remind him of a “communal kitchen in a 
freshmen dorm” (Goodell 1999).  And unlike his father, the Chinese landlord and 
occupants are not creating more family gathering spaces like the fireplace in the family 
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room and the converted garage – emblems of his father’s “deep feeling for his family and 
the world he lived in” – but instead destroying them to create additional rooms to rent 
(Goodell 1999). Goodell equates the destruction of the familial interior of the home by 
what he seems to perceive as a Chinese asexuality culturally and spatially unfit for what 
the region once was.  Goodell notes that the ranch house design-wise was “nothing 
special” (1999).  But, the crisis of his own family, which we can assume as Goodell’s 
argument about the crises of local history culminates with his retelling of the dysfunction 
that befell his parents in the late 1970s when his father’s landscaping business “was on 
the wrong side of the economics bell curve” (1999).  In one fell swoop, Goodell equates 
his father’s inability to find work and his mother’s desire for a divorce and to start a new 
life and family with another man after beginning work at the fledgling Apple Computers.  
Goodell’s critique of Silicon Valley life may appear to be a critique of capitalism 
in his lamentations over his home and the evacuation of family bonding.  But what I 
would like to focus on in Goodell’s narration of what was good and is currently bad of 
Silicon Valley, as told through the effects of high-tech on his family, is how Goodell 
articulates normative spaces of capital by race and gender.  Goodell reminds the reader 
that the destructiveness of high-tech industry lies in the juxtaposition of his father and 
mother’s earning power. But the visual presence of how the home should look, indicative 
of what is “normal” to Goodell, became threatened by the disappearance of his mother’s 
accountability to her family once she found work.  In privileging his father’s labor as the 
visual representation of the home, Goodell appears to reference post-war nationalism 
centered on gendered consumerism.  As scholars of Cold War, suburbanization, and 
architectural histories have shown, these notions of social equivalence based on the 
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nuclear family forgets how the federal government underwrote the racist and sexist 
practices of postwar domesticity. In attempting to mediate gender and class upheaval, the 
federally subsidized postwar home “was one that obliterated class distinctions and 
accentuated gender distinctions” (May 1999).  Gendered consumerism as a Cold War 
discourse of nationalism was meant to “believe in the potential for individualism and 
upward mobility” (May 1999, 145).  These visions or spectacles of the ideal postwar 
home filled with consumer goods represented the postwar liberalism that portrayed white 
Americans’ class mobility as achievable through notions of equality in access articulated 
through individualist effort.  These spectacles also naturalized racial exclusion from 
homeownership, treating minorities and immigrants as culturally unfit for consumerism 
(Harris 2007).  His father’s circulating capital in the, not his mother’s, in the context of 
homeownership is representative of “sameness” in Silicon Valley, determining Goodell’s 
“habit of perception” when interpreting the meanings of this home. 
But it is not just Goodell’s mother’s spatialized gender outside of the home, which 
leads Goodell to interpret what led to his father’s and Silicon Valley’s demise. It is also 
the spatialization of Chinese capital as it circulates as property (and strip malls, which he 
accounts for in his narrative) that disrupts Goodell’s “habit of perception”:   
My brother and sister and I sold the house a few months later to a Taiwanese 
engineer and his pregnant wife for $289,000. (My parents paid $19,950 for it in 
1963).  As far as I knew, they were the first nonwhite family to move onto 
Meadowlark Lane.  I was happy to pass the house onto them, thinking that they 
were about to start a family of their own and that they would find as much hope 
and happiness in it as we had.  Whatever they found, it didn’t last long.  In 1993, 
they sold it to a Hong Kong businessman named Zhengfei Ren, who used it 
primarily as a flophouse for himself and his employees when they visited the area.  
Last June, Ren sold the house to its current owner, a software engineer and real 




Chao who immigrated to the bay area from Taiwan 26 years ago, bought the 
house for one reason.  “I think it is an excellent investment, even better than the 
stock market,” he says.  And like any good investor he set out to maximize his 
profits, cramming in as many tenants as he could get away with.  The house was 
no longer a family income but a repository of hopes and dreams; it was now a 
wooden structure whose sole purpose was to keep rain off its occupants heads and 
to generate cash flow” (emphasis mine)(Goodell 2000). 
 
I emphasize particular words in these two paragraphs because they highlight the mobility 
and movement of Chinese capital that defines how Silicon Valley place has been 
understood. Goodell’s framing of his home as the inability for white and Chinese capital 
to co-exist echoes the historical spatialization of race and capital in urban-planning and 
the making of California. As historical studies of San Francisco have shown, Chinatown 
was not only a place, but also a discourse of racial and national difference.  The physical 
and legal containment of Chinatown economies, as art historian Anthony Lee proposes, 
reflects the desire by white investors, elites, and merchants in developing San Francisco 
as a white, west coast financial center (Lee 2001).  Further, the redevelopment of 
Chinatown after the 1906 earthquake as a tourist site with stereotypical architectural 
conventions of pagodas atop buildings reflects the spatial rendering of racialized capital 
set a part from the rest of the city (Gonzales, “Rebuilding Chinatown,” NPR.org).  The 
value of Chinese people was measured economically, yet visually and spatially, the 
places of white and Chinese capital needed to be segregated in the making of “white 
American” San Francisco. 
The unrecognizable ranch house that could possibly be torn down and replaced by 
a monster home reflects this reorganization of racial hegemonies that in part depends on 
the incorporation of Chinese immigrants of high-tech.  The lives of Chinese high-tech 
workers that populate Goodell’s story are completely fixated upon their investments in 
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stocks and property.  The meanings of the ranch house, constituted by the entanglement 
of racialized discourses of leisure and domesticity, reflect the post-war liberalism that 
Goodell’s family appeared to be the beneficiaries of.  Notions of a white classlessness 
based on his father’s physical labor situated within postwar rhetorics of self-reliancy and 
“equal” opportunity, guide how Goodell prefers to see the Valley.  The visual politics of 
whiteness embedded within the discursive framing of ranch houses assumes a “universal 
equivalence” that never quite existed across a variety of intersecting identity categories.  
Perhaps it is these post-war discourses of whiteness that shape Goodell’s nostalgia of 
place. 
My critique of Goodell’s rendering of his family’s tract ranch house is not to 
privilege Chinese immigrants of high-tech and their particular work ethic.  But I highlight 
Goodell’s narrations because they follow similarly to local residents’ anxieties over the 
changing regional and national economic policies that encourage flexible capital and 
flexible accumulation.  In the following section, I look more closely at local residents’ 
reactions to the ranch home destruction and monster home construction, particularly as it 
relates to notions of leisure and ruralness.  In the next section, I juxtapose white leisure 
and ruralness against the “individuality” of Asian immigrants to show how white 
residents defense of the ranch house speaks to the emergence and dominations of 
neoliberalism within Silicon Valley. 
Racialized Leisure as Unspoken Truth of Silicon Valley Neoliberalism 
One of the reoccurring themes that continually came up in reference to the changing 
culture of Cupertino symbolized by the monster home was the assumption that Chinese 
people were “too individual.”  By “individual” residents complained that their new 
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neighbors did not have any sense of “community,” which repeatedly in local press meant 
friendly exchanges among neighbors in the front yard either landscaping or taking a stroll 
to the mailbox.  For some white residents, the ranch house symbolized how daily habits 
should be lived, as if these structures innately allowed for a stronger sense of 
“community.”  These same white residents often complained that the monster home was 
clearly representative of a Chinese culture of “individuality” spreading across the valley 
that was to the detrimental to the way life used to be, where neighbors purportedly spent 
a lot of time socializing in and around each other’s ranch homes. 
But these white residents repeatedly articulated the social destruction of 
“individuality” through cultural discourses of neoliberalism.  The “individuality” of 
Chinese neighbors of high tech was often portrayed as insular Chinese families that 
focused all their attention on their children’s education and long-term success at the 
expense of a healthier lifestyle of sports or leisure.  Because Chinese people desired to 
get a Cupertino address so they could send their children to the nationally ranked schools, 
accusations by white residents complaining that multiple Chinese families living in one 
residence, some white residents mockingly called the monster home a “dorm.”12  In other 
words, white residents complained about the totalizing lifestyle of high tech and Chinese 
culture where Chinese parents managed their children solely in the interest of preparing 
them for class mobility.  In this section, I conduct a discursive analysis of the relationship 
                                                
12 In various interviews with both white and Chinese residents, they mention how Chinese newspapers such 
as the globally distributed World Journal regularly features articles about ideal cities to relocate to in the 
United States for their schools.  Residents note that the World Journal of Taipei has a section that regularly 
recognizes and promotes nationally ranked Monta Vista High School as the ideal place to send their 
children.  The increased Chinese and Asian presence at Monta Vista High School, in particular, has sparked 
much angst among White residents who complain that 1) Chinese students are too competitive 2) Chinese 
scholastic achievement unfairly portray the white students as ‘dumb’ 3) Chinese tribalism on campus and 
4) white as the minority, often excluded from social circles. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese residents have 
been portrayed as obsessed with education.  In one city council meeting, a woman against the changes to 
the R-1 ordinance that would have allowed bigger second stories described “monster homes” as “dorms.”     
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between “individuality” and the high-tech capitalism of the region within the context of 
my ethnographic fieldwork among white Cupertino residents and their homeownership. 
As mentioned earlier, I frame the notion of “individuality” with neoliberal discourses of 
efficiency as market-drive rationalities to argue that the monster home visualizes and 
spatializes Chinese racial hegemony in Silicon Valley.  That is, the monster home 
symbolizes what Aihwa Ong has termed “latitudinal citizenship,” which refers to the 
ways that globalization and the priorities of market rights constitute spaces and the 
contingent ethnic and racial hierarchies (Ong 2006).  The “leisure” versus “individuality” 
dyad reflects these ideological shifts rupturing the whiteness embedded within the visual 
and material culture of Cupertino. 
The local anxiety over the aesthetics of homes in Cupertino is perhaps, in part, 
tied to the fact that homeownership of detached single-family homes is central to the 
identity of a Cupertino resident.  When talking to different white residents, many whom I 
interviewed for different reasons, a large number of them instinctively referenced their 
homes and the domestic life of their homes when asked about the changing culture of 
Cupertino. The presence of “monster homes” clearly affected their sense of their own 
identities as racialized homeowners of “modest” or “quaint” ranch houses. 
But Cupertino residents have defined their single-family homeownership, 
however, through racial and class connotations to how Cupertino residents would prefer 
to keep their city.  As of 2008, detached single-family homes made up 61% of the 
housing stock and attached single-family homes 11%.  Multi-family dwellings (5+ units) 
and smaller multi-family housing (2-4) units stayed steady at roughly 20% and 8%, 
respectively (City of Cupertino Housing Element Updates 2007-2014  2010).  These 
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numbers are about the same ratio with the rest of Santa Clara County. Nearly 60% of 
households in Cupertino as of 2008 earned a median income of at least $100,000 and 
higher.  The rest of Santa Clara County was not far behind, hovering close to 50% (2010, 
14).   
The race and class profile of its residents played out in local debates over the push 
by regional government to balance the job to housing ratio.  With regional government 
encouraging Cupertino to build more below market housing and general housing to ease 
the job to housing ratio difference, the city and developers proposed several plans for 
high-rise condominiums that have been shot down by activist groups promoting slow-
growth.13  Residents for slow-growth, Chinese residents included, argued that the schools 
could not accommodate more students.  Another popular argument against the building of 
condos was that the perception of that kind of density meant a more transient and 
younger population moving in, which would disrupt safety of its family-centered 
community that Cupertino wants to maintain.   
Detached single-family housing discourses and suburbanization discourses have 
long since dovetailed in constituting white hegemony.  As historical studies of 
suburbanization have shown, crowded tenement housing of center cities has commonly 
been associated with low-income and racially undesirable populations, including racial 
minorities and, until World War II, white-ethnic immigrants.  In the case of post-war 
housing, Dianne Harris argues that mid-century notions of privacy, particularly “owning 
                                                
13 Various high-density housing projects, particularly condominiums, have never come to fruition because 
residents have continued to vote against the building of low-income or below-market-value residences.  
One particular example stands out: one condominium project on the grounds of the VALLCO mall was 
proposed various times, which the revenue generated from the sales could fund the renovation and updating 
of the mall, which has gone through multiple failed ownerships since 1996 to the present.  The impetus for 
this, also, was that the condominiums would provide a built-in clientele that could easily walk to the mall.  
Over 7 years later, the project still has not passed.    
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a single-family detached house with its own private, fenced garden symbolized not just 
security from outsiders who might threaten home and family but also the security of 
confirmed membership in the white, middle-class, American majority” (Harris 2006).  In 
analyzing do-it-yourself post-war design aesthetics of mid-century home improvement 
magazines, Dianne Harris notes that privacy and homeownership articulated through 
consumersism was a means for white immigrants to shed their ethnic difference and 
obscure their blue-collar class-status (2006, 129).  
The same could be said of some current white residents’ interpretations of their 
own homeownership, which has become a contemporary practice of race and class 
identity.  The desire of white residents today to maintain their detached ranch home, the 
visible sight of it, portrays the vestiges a post-war liberalism manifested today as 
individualism, but under the guise of collectivism.  In analyzing the nostalgia of self-
sufficiency, Stephanie Coontz writes that these notions of white individualism as the 
achievement of the “American Dream” of homeownership, was largely underwritten by 
the federal government (Coontz 1992).  Whiteness as a practice entrenched in 
homeownership matters as an expression of middle-class status threatened by the visible 
presence of “monster homes” and neoliberal economic policies, which Chinese 
immigrants of high tech are central to its reproduction.  
When I asked Jane, a volunteer with the Cupertino Historical Society, if she could 
describe what and when she thought the “shift” in the local culture of Cupertino 
happened, Jane quickly talked about the lack of parents volunteering to chaperone her 
daughters’ school field trips in the late-seventies, early eighties.  I met Jane through a 
docent at the Cupertino Historical Society when I originally was interested in asking her 
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and other members their thoughts of what was most important to know about Cupertino 
history.  In 1972, Jane, the wife of a computer engineer, settled in Cupertino with her 
husband and two daughters because her husband received a job opportunity in an 
emerging consumer-oriented high tech field.  She mentioned social gatherings at their 
house among her husband’s co-workers and the energy they all had for innovation, such 
as calculators.  She mentioned the Asian-owned “monster homes” popping up around the 
city and quickly moved to talking about Asian domesticity and its effects on local culture: 
They concentrate on reading, writing, and arithmetic, the academics first, 
everything else comes second big time, they have a huge Asian population at that 
school (Monta Vista High School) and that's what the Asian population wants.  
They value that.  It’s good to value that, but in balance with everything else.  I'm 
not saying you should be footloose and fancy free and not give a hoot and go out 
and play ball, you should be doing homework every night.  But there's a balance.  
But my best friend was a teacher, first grade, mostly first grade.  She was fending 
off parents, who would come in and say, "I want my kid to have homework.  
Where's the homework, my kids need homework."  And she'll go "Oh they'll 
learn, they'll learn.  They'll learn this and that."  And she could not persuade these 
Asian parents that the kid did not have to have homework.  Sometimes I just give 
them some minor thing to do to just send them on their way.  But it does change 
the flavor of the way education happens.  It makes it much more academic, less a 
life lesson (Jane 2009).  
 
For Jane, the monster home automatically conjured up ideas of Asian families and what 
Jane finds to be a problematic approach to child rearing, particularly as it pertains to 
balancing study habits with leisure.  The discursive equivalence of cultural changes, 
monster homes, and domesticity blend together in the reorganization of the everyday in 
Silicon Valley.  Although Asian families have long tried to dispel stereotypes of Asian 
children as devoid of extra-curricular activities, Jane’s comment about Asian academic 
achievement through self-management articulated by economic success portrayed 
through the symbol of the monster home shows how neoliberalism infiltrates and 
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connects public and private lives in the management of the productive self in the interests 
of sustaining Silicon Valley’s robust high tech economy.  
I garnered a similar response from a Cupertino resident one afternoon when I 
went to the Garden Gate neighborhood to get a sense of the visual politics that has been 
at the center of so many of Cupertino’s racial tensions.  I went to take some photos of the  
 
Figure 4-4: A monster home (Cupertino, CA).  Photo by the author.  
area that was once a subdivision of flat-roofed ranches constructed in 1951.  Now, 
however, nearly identical “monster homes” sat next to each other all in a row.  I stood at 
the curb taking a picture of a ranch house, which had no landscaping at all in the front 
yard.  As I reviewed the photos that I had taken on my camera, a young white male with a 




I introduced myself as a researcher studying the development of Silicon Valley 
and the cultural changes to the area.  He introduced himself as Adam and proceeded to 
tell me his opinions about how things had changed without me even asking: 
Let me guess, you’re here to write about all these monster homes, huh?  This 
place has really changed. It is nuts.  I lived in this home all my life and I swear, 
things have changed.  A house at the end of the street just went for three million! 
This little house right over there (points around the corner) went for 1.3 million. 
That one right there (points ambiguously at a house down the street again), 2.6 
million.  My grandfather bought this land and built this home for 9 thousand 
dollars and look at what it is now.  This used to be considered the poor part of 
town.  Who can actually live here now? (Adam 2010). 
 
Adam complained about everything and anything that had happened in the city, but he 
returned on several occasion during our conversation to his inability to find work as a 
white man in what he described as a “diverse” “immigrant” majority.  He mentioned on 
several occasions in the first few minutes of chatting how bad things had gotten that four 
Chinese families were living in the monster home across the street: “How can any one 
family afford a home like that?  That’s why they have four families in there.  I’ve never 
talked to them once.  They don’t speak English.”   
In talking about the tech craze and the millionaires that work in Cupertino, he 
mentioned that he followed in the footsteps of his father who had a trade and earned 
$80,000 per year.  He lamented that that was an honest living that you couldn’t find 
anymore.  Adam then added how he tried to go to school to develop skills to do tech 
work, but that just didn’t work out for him.  We stood on his front steps chatting for a 
while, he had offered me some coffee and he began to tell me how he was glad that he 
had the day off to recover after a weekend of playing video games.  Peppered throughout 
the conversation was talk of what the place used to be like growing up, the orchards that 
stretched in all directions during the nineteen eighties now completely occupied by Apple 
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or built over for residential development.  Adam wasn’t regularly working but spoke 
about his friends, Mexican and Asian, that managed to secure high paying work through 
the sacrifice of leisure.  I expected Adam to be happy for his friends who are now 
financially successful after “coming from nothing.”  But he followed by complaining that 
his friends of color never once tried to get him a job where they worked.  He went on to 
describe instances where him and his friends, white men, were discriminated against by 
immigrants, who always end up hooking up other immigrants like them for jobs. 
After chatting for a while about a range of things regarding life in the valley, he 
asked me to give him a ring sometime, maybe go hang out at the local Starbucks, light a 
joint, and just “shoot the shit” as he described it.  He left me with a few more disjointed 
comments about the state of life in Cupertino: 
There are not many folks like you will kick back and hang out anymore.  You 
know, the Asians, the Chinese and Indians mostly, just drive into their garages 
and you never see them anymore.  They’re so…individual…I just want that 
small-town feel, you know? Where people know each other.  You know, there’s a 
local dive bar where there’s that weird guy who says weird things, but nobody’s 
afraid of him.  Things nowadays are just so crazy.  You hear about people 
[Chinese immigrants in engineering or programming] shooting up their 
companies after getting fired.  Companies now, too, have no integrity. Things are 
just crazy, just crazy.  Maybe people should just relax more, hang out, chill, and 
smoke some weed or something . . . . 
 
Adam exhibited a strong sense of his race and class identity, which he seemed to develop 
through and against his difference from the “individual” cultures of Chinese and Indian 
immigrants of high tech.  For Adam, leisure structured into his everyday life mediated his 
feelings of white male displacement, specifically around his labor, which Asians were 
seen as the culprits.  But as much as Adam disavowed the intensity of Silicon Valley life 
and labor, he seemed to desire the achievement of “middle-class” status as he followed in 
the footsteps of his father by learning a “trade.”  But what I want to focus on, in 
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particular, is how the displacement of white homeownership, in the context of leisure, 
discursively weaved together the themes of Chinese and Indian “individuality,” 
transpacific high tech labor, and “monster homes.” The monster home defined by the 
“individuality” of Chinese and Indian neighbors who enter their homes through their 
garages, “never see(n)…anymore,” reflects the spatial logics of neoliberal governing 
strategies.  The crisis of Adam’s whiteness appears to be situated at the changing spatial 
arrangements of government, which the private, like the public, have become connected 
discursively in the production of the ideal Silicon Valley subject.  Chinese and Indian 
“individuality” – a symbol of Silicon Valley work-ethic against Adam’s racially white 
leisure – reflect what James Hay describes as the “neoliberal domestic sphere” of the 
nineteen eighties.  This shifting discourse of domesticity of the nineteen eighties focused 
upon the theme of efficiency through the usage of improved technologies in household 
goods, such as computers and other appliances (Hay 2003).  Although the postwar home 
and it’s new gadgetry of appliances were meant to improve the domestic lives of women, 
the activities of the home were still framed as spatially distinct from the public life of 
male work.  That is, the postwar home as a symbol of leisure contained its own spatial 
arrangement in the aid of managing bodies through rest and relaxation to maintain 
productive subjects of capitalism.  In the context of resident’s complaints of the monster 
home and Asian “individuality,” the spatial and cultural re-arrangement of the home as a 
site of work (even for children) represents the rupture to a post-war whiteness visualized 
by the homeownership of ranch homes.  As Dianne Harris describes in her research on 




Michelle, a volunteer at the Cupertino Historical Society and long-time resident of 
Cupertino, shared with me the “outward facing culture” of her neighborhood of ranch 
homes.  Michelle is an interesting figure to examine given the contradictory feelings she 
has towards the changing culture of Silicon Valley arriving in the 1980s that 
simultaneously created intense amounts of job opportunities and wealth, but destroyed 
the leisurely culture that she grew up with in her neighborhood of post-war ranch homes.  
A stay-at-home mom for most her life, Michelle, recently, began doing clerical work 
part-time at a Korean-run venture capitalist firm specializing in development in China.  
She spoke fondly of being in the midst of the processes at the center of Silicon Valley 
entrepreneurship.  Though she found her work “boring,” Michelle expressed that these  
 
Figure 4-5: A monster home erected next to an ranch house (Cupertino, CA). 
Photo by author. 
types of global investments were not possible 20 to 30 years ago.  And while she valued 
the kind of middle to middle-upper class lifestyle that the global economy of high-tech 
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has provided for her, her husband (an engineer) and her family (she lets me know she 
doesn’t have to work), she worried about the cultural changes brought on by Asian 
immigrants and their study habits.  Interestingly, Michelle contrasts the new culture 
against the leisure of the ranch home she grew up: 
So some people might say, the way the demographics have changed might be a 
negative.  I might see it as a positive.  But what I see as a negative is the shift.  I'm 
just comparing my experience.  Because I live in the same court now with my 
kids growing up in that court that I grew up in.  So when I was a kid there, I 
talked about how we all hang out in the court and play together and hangout in 
each other's houses.  That's what we did.  We were very outward facing into the 
street and gathered together on the holidays.  Like the 4th of July.  Gosh, like 
having stage shows, we'd go into someone's backyard.  All the neighbors came 
(Jane 2009). 
 
Again, the place of the ranch home and the activities of leisure constituted how post-War 
white families interpreted their subjectivities in Silicon Valley.  Michelle, her family 
transplants from the east coast when her father got a job at Lockheed, laments of the loss 
of childhood leisure, as the intensity of individual development of human capital has 
become a requirement in an era when college admissions have become increasingly 
competitive.  For her daughters, extracurricular activities such as work, sports, and 
service organizations are forms of cultural capital that they use to leverage their college 
admissions against the grade-obsessive Asians that solely focus on academic 
achievement.  But Jane and Michelle’s acceptance of economic growth, yet longing for 
“outward facing communities,” reflect the contradiction of neoliberal development in 
Silicon Valley.  Michelle welcomes cultural difference, alluding to the property value that 
her family gains from having Asian neighbors of the same class status and educational 
background.  But her “negative” impressions of change defined by the loss of 
neighborhood socialization and ranch home leisure, perhaps, demonstrates the 
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spatialization of whiteness structured into the aesthetics and conduct of post-World War 
II suburban spaces.  The feelings that Michelle, Jane, Adam and others have towards their 
ranch homes as historical reflect the legacy of these racialized geographies.   
 Discourses and practices of homeownership operate as forms of governing, 
particularly the making of ideal subjects.  White residents’ narration of the differences 
between the tract ranch house and the “monster home,” particularly around domesticity, 
reflects the neoliberal reorganization of conduct that follows aligns with market-driven 
rationalities.  These portrayals of Chinese cultural “individuality” framed by the 
totalizing effect of Silicon Valley around personal achievement reveals how the 
globalization of commerce, such as high tech industries, transforms spaces of governing.  
Conclusion 
As Chinese immigrants of high tech backgrounds immigrate to Silicon Valley for job 
opportunities, they often try to settle in Cupertino for its nationally ranked schools.  As a 
result of this transpacific flow of Chinese workers, many with advanced degrees, 
Cupertino’s race and class profile transformed, resulting in higher median income per 
household and median home prices than the rest of Santa Clara County.  I grew up in the 
city of Fremont, CA, roughly 25 miles to the northeast, which depending on who you talk 
to is considered to be much like Cupertino for the same reasons.  But, many Chinese 
immigrants that I casually spoke with and interviewed reminded me of Cupertino’s 
superiority compared to other cities in terms of property values, educational standards, 
and, alleged, lack of racism.  The monster home represents the normalized conduct of 
Silicon Valley centered on calculated moves by Chinese immigrants, which privileged 
flexible accumulation.   
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But the sight of “monster homes” contradicts how older white residents have 
understood what it means to be a resident of Cupertino.  What I wanted to show in this 
chapter was that these local white anxieties about their inability to see themselves 
reflected in the residential architecture requires an analysis of the economic rendering of 
these spaces by these white residents in their narrations of their homes and 
neighborhoods.  What is at stake in these public debates over residential architecture 
spilling into newspapers, city council meetings, and city-sponsored public forums are 
how history and knowledge is produced and reproduced.  In particular, the ranch house 
represented a postwar liberalism that fostered cultural beliefs that white people of varying 
class backgrounds could achieve middle class status.  As white residents attempt to save 
their ranch houses by using themes of “leisure” and “domesticity” as behaviors of 
Cupertino history, it becomes clear that these operate as confessions to the particular 
white racial hegemony that they were once empowered by.   
The monster home encroaching on the property lines of white residents and 
towering over their ranch houses visualizes and spatializes for white residents neoliberal 
economic policies articulated by notions of ethnic diversity.  Some white residents shared 
with me that they considered it a blessing that their children had this many cultures 
around them to learn from.  Sometimes, these residents used economic determinations of 
the global market to describe this notion of blessing and the significance of diversity in 
the futures of their children’s careers.   Silicon Valley’s diversity cannot be abstracted 
from the realities of its high tech industries.  As Aihwa Ong argues, “[e]thnic Chinese 
command of the transnationalized electronics industry has placed them at the top of the 
ethnic hierarchy in California as ideal border-crossing and enterprising citizens vital to 
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American business” (2006, 7).  With increasing spaces connected by market-driven 
forces, these spaces require particular forms of governing and managing of people into 
idealized subjects.  But it is not just the everyday conduct that matters, but also the visual 







CHAPTER 5  




Brian:  How did you decide to enroll your children in Chinese school? 
 
Susie: Oh, you gotta learn Chinese.  I always tell my kids.  They’re what, 20% of 
the world population is Chinese.  
 
Brian: (laugh) Oh that’s it? 
 
Susie: Maybe 25%?  I always tell them, we’re not the minority.  We’re the 
majority, ok?  And you look Chinese, you don’t speak Chinese.  Shame on you.  
You speak Chinese right? 
 
Brian: (in Mandarin) A little bit. 
 
Susie: (in Mandarin) A little bit?  Can you really?  You have to learn Chinese 
right now.  If you can’t speak Chinese now, you’ll be in trouble in the future.   
 
Brian: (in Mandarin) Why? 
 
Susie: (In Mandarin) Why?  Think about it, China is so powerful.  All things in 
the world… turn around, turn around (points at the electronics in her home as well 
as a few random computer parts and cards laying freely on the couch, kitchen 
table, and coffee table), all made in China.  (In English)  You gotta recognize this 
is the future, that’s where the growth is, ok?  There’s no recession right now in 
China, they already recovered (Susie 2010).  
 
 
This short interaction between Susie, a middle-aged Chinese immigrant mother of two, 
and I about how Chinese language education matters to her life reflects how her career of 
high-tech business in Silicon Valley, which depends upon the business her and her 
husband conduct between Silicon Valley and Greater China, has had a totalizing effect on 
her life.  The interior of Susie’s ranch house looked like a Best Buy electronics store 
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given the electronic clutter – printers, computer cards, and boxes -- that seemed to drape 
the wall and cover every piece of furniture.  Like most of the other Chinese homes I’ve 
visited, her home also has Chinese trinkets and figurines made of glass and jade.  Susie’s 
home, however, looked as if her and her husband purposely decorated their home with 
computer parts.  But Susie’s prediction of a future where Chinese immigrants rule global 
capitalism shows how Silicon Valley is a place of transpacific economic development 
requiring the social reproduction of Chinese culture (language). 
This narrative arc which Susie finds social legibility and value as a U.S. citizen 
occurs through the possibility of a future where Chinese people have authority over the 
direction of global capitalism between the places of Greater China and Silicon Valley.  
Susie’s personal narrative of how she went from national outsider to insider is filled with 
everyday activities that blur the distinctions between Chinese culture (language study) 
and the high-tech economy (high-tech production).  The natural presence of Chinese 
people and culture in Silicon Valley, which Susie sees in the form of Chinese language 
schools and the consumption of technology, reveals the interweaving of spaces and 
relations – family, co-workers, home and workplace – that give rise to the perception of 
Silicon Valley as a unique place where Chinese immigrants and culture seamlessly blend 
into local culture.  
 In this chapter, I examine the narratives that Chinese immigrants living in 
Cupertino, California create and tell themselves and others with the aim of claiming 
social citizenship and reaffirming the notion of Silicon Valley as an exceptional place of 
racial equality.  I focus on how Chinese immigrants describe the future promises of social 
citizenship by how they talk about the normalization of Chinese culture in everyday life.  
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But what stands out in these narrations of everyday life is how Chinese immigrants 
deliberately cite Silicon Valley spaces to locate their identities.  I argue that it is through 
these reiterated narratives that Chinese immigrants map themselves onto a future history 
of Silicon Valley.  These narratives show the significance of Silicon Valley among a host 
of transpacific economic hubs that shape how they interpret their value as citizens.  This 
chapter relies upon ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews to examine the 
intricacies of global capitalism, the seemingly unrelated phenomenon of the everyday, 
which Chinese immigrants experience, interpret, and navigate their practice of social 
citizenship. 
By the everyday, I focus on the performative enunciations within these narratives 
of Silicon Valley that Chinese immigrants talk about.1  More specifically, I examine the 
particular sensual activities such as learning Chinese language and practicing Chinese 
traditional dances and ceremonies that Chinese immigrants participate in and talk about 
that create meanings and constitute how Silicon Valley discursively exists and materially 
emerges.  I read how these personal narratives, guided by the intersecting discourses and 
places of economic development and community, spatially operate to normalize Chinese 
hegemony in Silicon Valley.  
I analyze these questions in the context of how Chinese immigrants talk about the 
(now defunct) annual Silicon Valley Moon Festival (SVMF) hosted in Cupertino’s 
central park, Memorial Park, in addition to the weekly local Chinese language and culture 
education schools.  I focus on these two particular events because of how Chinese 
                                                
1 I draw from JL Austin’s “speech act theory” that frames “performatives” as language that performs the act 
by which it refers to.  Performatives are not “true” or “false” statements that describe the state of affairs.  
Instead, performatives are contracts that establish meanings and relations within an existing discursive 
framework that is socially agreed upon. Jonathan Culler. Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin. 
New Literary History 13 (1981): 15-30, Accessed June 21, 2007, http://www.jstor.org/stable/468640 
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immigrants and white residents identify them as representative of how Chinese 
immigrants interpret their cultural activities as participating in civic life.  I focus on the 
aspects of Chinese culture that Chinese immigrants habitually practice and consume in 
their everyday life and the discursive conditions by which they justify those symbols of 
Chinese culture as legitimating their “value” as community members.  But also, these two 
events are where two distinct and competing narratives of Silicon Valley life become 
reiterated.  These narratives about what “normal” Cupertino civic life should be like 
reveal the shifting racial hegemonies constituted by the demands of the global economy.  
In other words, these various narrations of permittable Chinese culture circulating in 
Cupertino reflect what Richard Schechner would describe as “restoration of behavior” 
and what Michel De Certeau calls “travel stories.”  Both concepts generally refer to the 
authorization of an economy of meanings by the actions and movements of people that 
‘cite’ particular physical places or existing spatial narratives (Certeau 1984; Schechner 
1985).   
In describing the relationship between anthropology and theater, Schechner’s 
concept of restored behavior refers to how social identities are enacted by socially agreed 
upon behaviors, daily processes that operate like “strips.”  Schechner suggests that the 
notion of playing roles in theater is a useful metaphor for how performance in everyday 
life can expose the social systems that exist and constitute us.  Schechner’s emphasis, 
however, is on deconstruction/reconstruction of actualities: “the process of framing and 
rehearsing; the making and manipulating of strips of behavior” (1985, 33).  Restorative 
behavior is not identifying an authentic strip but, rather, to show that how we view and 
make history is “distorted by myth and tradition” (1985, 33).  In the context of Silicon 
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Valley, the identities of Chinese people as ideal “community” members reveal the 
competing “strips of behavior” that narrate race, culture, and market forces in Silicon 
Valley everyday life.  I read Schechner’s concept of restored behavior with De Certeau’s 
travel stories to follow what De Certeau suggests, which is that “narrative structures have 
the status of spatial syntaxes” (De Certeau 1984, 117).  The recombination of strips, 
which I see Chinese residents doing in their narrations of Silicon Valley Chinese social 
citizenship, necessarily involves describing activities that create and are deliberately 
informed by Silicon Valley space. For De Certeau, space is continually remade and 
recontextualized by an “ensemble of movement” that “orient it, situate it, temporalize it, 
and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual 
proximities” (1984, 117).  In other words, space is performative as travel stories exist as 
“a system of signs” enacted by people, which enable the meanings and relations of a 
geographic place to exist.  The ways that Chinese residents talk about themselves and 
their attachments to Cupertino and Silicon Valley revolve around particular set of 
behaviors shaped by the particularities of the Silicon Valley high tech industry. 
Existing ethnographic studies of Silicon Valley emphasize the totalizing effect 
that high-tech culture has on all areas of social life, but rarely do they touch upon the 
transpacific priorities of the industry.  J.A. English-Lueck uses the term “technological 
saturation” to describe how high-speed telecommunication – laptops, cell phones, email, 
fax machines, and more – have become absolutely necessary for workers in Silicon 
Valley to adapt flexibly to market forces.  English-Lueck, however, finds that these 
technologies are absolutely crucial to connecting the worlds of “paid” high-tech labor and 
“non-paid” work of domesticity of their spouses, which “technological saturation” allows 
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workers and their families to coordinate their lives around demanding high-tech 
schedules (English-Lueck 2002).  In examining youth cultures of Silicon Valley, Elsa 
Davidson shows how high-school education in Silicon Valley is constituted by neoliberal 
governmentality, which regional economic rationality guides how educational institutions 
nurture a learning culture where students become entrepreneurs of themselves.  With the 
overwhelming high-tech industry as a discursive and material presence in the classroom 
for success, schools and instructors instill a notion of individuality and work ethic in 
students for the sake of helping them to develop human capital.  Davidson describes these 
trajectories framed by the labor discipline of Silicon Valley to be “strategies of aspiration 
management” (Davidson 2006).  Similarly, Shalini Shankar’s analysis of South Asian 
American youth identity formations shows how visibility of Silicon Valley wealth and 
success within South Asian communities shapes the relationship between consumption 
patterns and expressions of class identity in varied social contexts (Shankar 2008).  
 My research contributes to these studies by adding that the transpacific 
discourses of Chineseness matter to the spatial imaginary of Silicon Valley’s future.  
Narratives of Silicon Valley rely upon iconic places, such as Bill Hewlett and Dave 
Packard’s garage or globally recognized companies such as the Google campus, to 
instantiate not only the regional mythology of meritocracy, but also to instantiate labor 
discipline.  In this chapter, I show how Chinese residents mobilize Chineseness as a set of 
everyday cultural practices aligned with market forces as a way to reinvent the future 
history of Silicon Valley.  
The rest of the chapter is broken up into two parts.  In the following section, I 
examine politics of Chinese culture at Cupertino Mandarin School, one of several 
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Chinese language schools in the city.  Through my ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth 
interviews, I look at how Chinese immigrant parents make sense of the importance of 
Chinese cultural practice, such as language study, through the particular labor cultures of 
Silicon Valley economic development.  More specifically, I investigate how Chinese 
immigrant parents aim to rewrite the future histories of Silicon Valley by their habitual 
rehearsing of particular kinds of behaviors and mythologies of familiar Silicon Valley 
places, but imbuing them with Chinese culture.  In the next section, I argue that the 
SVFM shows how Chinese immigrants hope to position themselves within the future of 
Silicon Valley by purposely evacuating their identities of economic accumulation. 
Through my in-depth interviews with two directors that oversaw the development and 
coordination of the SVMF as a charitable event over its nine-year span, I show that even 
in spite of Chinese immigrants strategies at visualizing Chinese culture as community-
oriented, on-going resistance by white Cupertino residents to these spatialized portrayals 
of Chinese immigrants and culture show how Chinese immigrants still navigate the 
challenging terrains of global capitalism even as they are discursively rendered as the 
ideal subject of Silicon Valley economic development. 
Chinese Schools and the Future of Silicon Valley 
Chinese language schools are important institutions in Silicon Valley and the broader San 
Francisco Bay Area as they serve as hubs where local Chinese communities come 
together as THE Chinese community, providing not only a social outlet, but also, 
potentially, a political base for which Chinese immigrants can organize around issues 
pertinent to them if necessary. Year-to-year, Chinese schools are places where the 
meanings of Chinese culture in the lives of Chinese families are discussed, agreed upon, 
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and taught to Chinese youth and their families.  Teaching Chinese language through the 
use of the familiar or the everyday in the lives of Chinese American youth is an important 
concept in Chinese language pedagogy as parents and teachers are concerned whether 
students can make sense of it in their lives.  But the everyday does not exist as an abstract 
concept, but is a collective agreement over the particular behaviors and conduct that 
should represent what Chinese culture is and is not in their community.  As Chinese 
schools are made up of parent volunteers, many of them CEOs of high-tech corporations, 
mythologies about Silicon Valley’s racial meritocracy and also exceptional labor culture 
of innovation infiltrate into these lessons of the everyday. Narrations of everyday culture 
in weekly lesson plans aim to seamlessly normalize an idea of a Chinese dominated high-
tech world of Silicon Valley as the future history that these Chinese youth will eventually 
populate.  
Chinese language schools have existed in Cupertino for over 30 years and since 
the early nineteen nineties have expanded to over 5 different campuses (run by different 
people) due to demand and the growing Chinese population in the region.  Most of the 
schools are run by Chinese people from Taiwan, the predominant Chinese group to settle 
in the area during the high-tech growth of the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties.  In 
talking to Richard, a former principal of Cupertino Mandarin School, he was proud to tell 
me that many CEOs of well-known start-up companies brought their children to his 
Chinese schools.  Richard, originally, used this tidbit as a sample of who makes up the 
general profile of his Chinese School’s participants, volunteers, and staff.  He described 
the CEOs as ordinary, unassuming people: “There is one thing I learn is that for any 
random person, you learn to respect people.  You never know how good he is when you 
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walk on the street.  He looks so ordinary.  Those CEOs don’t dress like high society 
people.  They dress the same way as I do (wearing a Cupertino Mandarin School sweater-
vest, a polo shirt, and khaki pants).  You see no difference.  Incredible! It’s extremely, 
low-key, humble, polite.  And what can you say, first-class people” (Richard 2010).  In 
describing CMS, CEOs and the financial success that comes with them is very much part 
of the ordinary lifestyle that makes up what Richard sees as part of the Chinese 
community.  Chinese schools represent a site which Chinese residents in Cupertino 
decide what symbols (such as dress) of Chinese culture matter in their lives and how 
these practices of Chinese culture will help prepare their children and their futures.  The 
casual dress code of Silicon Valley has long been a part of the mystique of Silicon 
Valley’s culture of success and innovation (Saxenian 1994).  The ordinary nature of 
CEOs dress is part of the Silicon Valley meritocracy narrative of Silicon Valley where 
anybody can succeed and how one dresses performs these discourses of Silicon Valley 
neoliberalism.  Dress as a distinction of space reveals the new strips of behavior that 
entangle high-tech workplaces, everyday conduct, and Chinese people and culture. 
For the most part, most parents and administrators I spoke with agreed that 
Chinese language schools served as a social function for recent transplants to the area.  
Many Chinese parents corroborated with each other that Chinese schools were great 
places to meet other Chinese people like themselves who were of the similar 
occupational, educational, and, subsequently, class backgrounds.  Most if not all parents 
agreed that one of the priorities for encouraging their children to study Mandarin was so 
that their children could speak with their grandparents.  But for some parents and Chinese 
school administrators, China’s rapid economic development and their significance to the 
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United States as a trading partner made them feel that Chinese people, their families, and 
their culture were now extremely valuable to the United States.  Several parents I 
interviewed mentioned that economists reporting that China will be the economic 
superpower of the world by 2030.  The reasons influenced why these Chinese parents 
pushed language education not only in their lives, but also in the local school systems.  In 
a personal interview with Dan – a computer engineer by day and a board member of 
CMS in his spare time – shared with me how, locally, the increasing global business 
Greater China has Cupertino and West Valley school districts trying to figure out how to 
implement and offer more Chinese language-study in schools (Dan 2010).  This possible 
future narrative of the United States economy as dependent upon China has also changed 
how education and learning should exist in the lives of residents living in Cupertino, non-
Chinese included. 
Implementing Chinese language education, however, draws together conflicting 
notions of what visibility means for different members of the Chinese community.  
Greater China’s role in the global economy has a strong presence in how Chinese parents 
interpret the usage and demand of Chinese in the lives of their communities and their 
children’s futures.  A historical analysis of Chinese community participation in the 
Cupertino school system shows how the Chinese community’s demand for Chinese 
language functions as political responses to the exclusionary practices of white Cupertino 
residents at the level of educational policy and curriculum.  Since the mid-1990s, the fate 
of Cupertino educational culture has been a topic of debate among its residents.  With 
high-achieving Asian American students, predominately of Chinese heritage, many local 
white parents and some students publically complained in school board meetings, local 
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press, and other community forums that Asian students were self-segregating to the social 
exclusion of the white students.  An on-going debate in the late 1990s and the early 2000s 
about language emersion programs fueled these existing white attitudes that Chinese 
students failed to “assimilate” and refused to socialize with white residents (Benson and 
Michelle 1998; Marino 1997b; Ku and Marino 1998).  Further complaints included 
alleged Asian cultures of educational achievement as creating unfair academic 
expectations for white youth.  White parents critiqued the intensity by which Asian 
students study, accusing Asian parents for creating an environment that does not value 
well-rounded (white) students who may not excel in the same way as their Asian 
counterparts, academically (Hwang 2005).  When some white parents argued that their 
children were “well-rounded” because of their interests in extra-curricular activities, 
these conflicting notions of human capital shows what kinds of education is valued in 
Silicon Valley.  As Chinese parents succeed in Silicon Valley industries, this perhaps 
reflects how the regional economy privileges Chinese student interest in science and 
engineering versus other topics of study or activities. 
Later, White parents used these portrayals of Asian study habits as racial 
difference to accuse Asian parents for failing to participate in “community” affairs.  
Questions about Asian study habits became another way for White residents to instantiate 
the relationship of whiteness with Cupertino through the racial othering of the growing 
Asian community.  White parents began complaining that Asian parents never 
participated in local academic affairs such as the school board or the Parent Teacher 
Association (PTA).  Hung-Wei, a member of the school board, recalled the tension in the 
1990s as a difference in white and Chinese cultures.  Chinese culture, according to Hung-
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Wei, never questioned the authority of teachers.  But after more community-oriented 
Chinese parents convinced other Chinese parents that parent-teacher relationships were 
quite normal in the United States, the numbers of Chinese moms, Hung-Wei mentions, 
have steadily increased to the point that an Asian American parents association now 
exists.   The attendance of Chinese dads, Hung-Wei adds, are still low given their long 
work hours in high-tech industries (Hung-Wei 2009).  I read white residents pressuring of 
Asian parents to attend school board and PTA meetings, however, as an attempt by white 
residents to regulate what they saw to be the obsessive study habits of Asian families.  As 
mentioned in the chapter on monster homes, white parents complained that Asian 
families spent too much time either at work or at home.  With both places seen as 
instrumental to the Silicon Valley high-tech economy, white parents thought getting 
Asian parents away from these places could halt the changing expectations of academic 
achievement that unfairly pegged their children as “dumb.”2    
The responses by Asian parents to these pressures by their white counterparts to 
be more community-oriented, however, revealed the ideological divisions among the 
Chinese community.  In the introduction, I explain that the Chinese community is made 
up of people and families from different nations, including Hong Kong, China, and 
                                                
2 Suein Hwang upset Cupertino residents, white and Chinese, over her depiction of the racial conflicts 
within the public school system.  Residents, quoted in Hwang’s article, felt their thoughts were taken out of 
context, further instantiating existing stereotypes that Asian students are automatons that obsess over 
studying.  Hwang portrays White residents are racists incapable of tolerating the cultures of immigrants that 
they would rather move away from Cupertino than learn to live with their Asian neighbors.  Residents 
responded to Hwang’s piece in the Cupertino Courier. Ms. Gatley, a member of Monta Vista High School’s 
parent-teacher association, is one of the main subjects of Hwang’s article who is quoted by Hwang as 
dissuading white residents from moving to Cupertino and saying that she wouldn’t not have moved to 
Cupertino if she knew so many Asians were going to move in.  Ms. Gatley responded by suggesting that 
her quotes were not targeting Asians but merely describing a general transformation of local youth culture 
centered on obsessive study habits as opposed to a more well rounded lifestyle of sports and other leisurely 
activities.  Gatley’s comments, however, are inherently racialized as several interviewees (as I discuss in 
chapter 4) mentioned that they noticed a “shift” in study habits that came with Asian immigration to the 
area.  For more information on Gatley’s response, see: "Wall Street Journal article: Gatley and Rowley." 
2005. Cupertino Courier, The (CA). 
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Taiwan.  In spite of the homogenizing notion of Greater China as a discourse of 
belonging in Silicon Valley, these different migrations histories and backgrounds, at 
times, matter to their expressions of Chineseness.  Most Chinese parents were apathetic 
to these complaints, often citing their children’s individual success as to why the local 
schools were nationally ranked and not the other way around.   But with pressures 
mounting from various institutional spaces accusing Chinese people purposely choosing 
not to be community oriented, different Chinese parents decided to engage with the 
“community” differently.  Some parents were like recently elected city council member 
Barry Chang, who recognized how Asian culture was deliberately excluded from ideas of 
Cupertino’s “community.”  Hung-Wei, an elected member of the school board, describes 
herself ideologically different from Barry Chang, whose more “aggressive” approach was 
not necessarily her style for community building.  Hung-Wei remembers that Chang 
mobilized different Chinese parents, including her, to strategize on how to play a larger 
role in their children’s education.  According to Hung-Wei, Chang wanted to transform 
their children’s educational curriculum that centered Chinese immigrant experiences in 
the United States within local history, social studies, and language curriculum.  Some 
parents like Chang wanted schools to engage with Chinese history in the United States as 
a way to transform Cupertino’s public culture to be more inclusive of different 
community members.  Hung-Wei diverged from Chang’s approaches.  Chang, according 
to Hung-Wei, did not necessarily know how to collaborate with white parents.  Chang’s 
outbursts in various public forums, Hung-Wei said, did not necessarily help the 
community come together.  Although she deeply respected Chang’s goals, Hung-Wei 
explained that she wasn’t necessarily interested in Chang’s platforms at the time, 
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choosing instead to do what she did best: fundraising for school programs that addressed 
the needs of all children (Hung-Wei 2009). 
Raymond, a former parent volunteer at a local Chinese language school who 
helped spearhead early attempts in the 1990s at implementing Chinese language 
education in Cupertino public schools, affirmed some of Chang’s ideas.  Chow pressured 
the local school system to teach Chinese languages because of the transformation to the 
global economy.  But he was also intent on pressuring local public schools to teach 
Chinese language and history to highlight both Chinese contributions to “America” and 
the experiences of racism they experienced.  Although an immigrant from Taiwan with 
no historical connection to early Chinese immigrants to California in the late 19th 
century, early 20th century, Raymond linked the prejudice his Chinese friend’s daughter 
faced at school living in a majority white city of Pleasanton with experiences of anti-
Chinese racism of early Chinese immigrants.  His friend’s daughter’s white classmates 
regularly picked on her for being Chinese, said Raymond, which made it difficult for her 
to succeed at school (Raymond 2009).   
For Raymond and some other Chinese parents, making Chinese history a part of 
local curriculum was important for transforming local perceptions of Chinese people and 
communities.  Like the ideological divisions, Chinese parents approaches to visibility 
when it came to curriculum also differed.  Some parents like Chow utilized the language 
and practices of neoliberalism as an everyday response to histories of discrimination and 
local prejudice views of Chinese non-inclusion within Silicon Valley.  It is this focus of 
Greater China’s economic importance and their effect on the future of Silicon Valley that 
shapes how Chinese people see themselves and how non-Chinese members of Cupertino 
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see Chinese immigrants and Chinese culture as part of the civic life.  With the high 
school Advanced Placement (AP) Mandarin language test becoming available in 2006, 
Richard felt that the test became the perfect benchmark for how Chinese language and 
culture should be taught to their children.  The AP Chinese test, Richard noted, became 
the unifying force that brought different parents with disparate ideas of what Chinese 
culture was important to learn and how best to teach it.3  With the AP Chinese test 
standardizing how Chinese should be learned in public school and Chinese language 
school education, “practicality” became the slogan by which Richard transformed how 
CMS taught Chinese language and culture.4  But Richard and several of his colleagues 
(some administrators from different Chinese schools in Cupertino) emphasized how the 
U.S. State Department prioritized Chinese language (Mandarin) as important to the 
national economy and the national security of the United States in the 21st century, with 
the CIA, FBI, NSA, and Foreign Service all seeking Mandarin-speaking applicants for 
various job positions in national defense.  Richard adds that the potential threat of a 
hostile takeover of the United States by China prefigures the prioritization of learning 
Chinese language.  Along with the shifts in global business, various institutions of the 
state – education and national defense – guide how different administrators of Chinese 
schools strategize of how best to teach Chinese language and culture week-to-week in the 
                                                
3 Shu-Mei Shih describes how since the Chinese civil war, competing notions of “Chineseness” between 
Taiwan and China’s governments have led to tensions between the two states.  As the two states jostle over 
Taiwan’s unification or independence from China, representations of “authentic” Chinese culture are often 
at stake or construed as political statements about Taiwan independence.  Shih documents how political or 
cultural discourses of Taiwan independence have led to China’s militaristic threats of attack.  Shih further 
documents that as Taiwan’s economy gradually became dependent on China’s growth, the “ambiguity” 
experienced by the Chinese in Taiwan over these relations has led to varied representations of “Chinese-
ness” that both references a desire and repulsion of “China.”  Shin-Ming describes how these events guide 
how some Chinese parents are so adamant about changing what representations of Chinese culture and 
language their children are exposed to.  See Shumei Shi. Visuality And Identity: Sinophone Articulations 
Across The Pacific, Asia Pacific Modern (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 




classrooms. The representations of Chinese culture circulating in Silicon Valley are more 
than just abstract cultural practices; they come to represent various desires for different 
people that come together at the confluence of national and regional economic, political 
and social priorities.  Chinese parents bind federal and local state power to Chinese 
language schools and attempt to institutionalize them within the operations of state 
governance as it pertains to the national and regional political economy.  For Chinese 
parents, Chinese schools can guide youth towards education in hopes of accumulating 
human capital to leverage towards their citizenship in Silicon Valley, a place that 
economically values Chinese transnational subjects.  These weekly Friday evening 
gatherings of Chinese parents and their children naturalizes in their lives the role and 
meanings of Chinese language and culture as it pertains to their sense of belonging in 
Silicon Valley and how they make Chinese Silicon Valley.   
A particular example of how Chineseness is written into the city’s collective 
memory through spatial narratives of high-tech practice is the Measure B presentation 
presented by the superintendant of the Cupertino school district to CMS.  I had been 
observing CMS classes and events for several months at this point, having interviewed 
several volunteers and administrators about how they saw Chinese language as important 
to their lives and their children’s futures.  The former president of CMS, James, had 
invited me to attend this presentation as he thought it would be a good event to see what 
the Chinese community looked like. 
Measure B was the renewal of the parcel tax that asked all Cupertino homeowners 
under the age 65 to pay $98 per year to subsidize high school education.  With budget 
cuts to education at the state-level, the $98 from each homeowner is more crucial than 
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ever as it would help off-set Fremont Union High School District’s $10 million dollar 
shortfall by half for the upcoming school year.  I sat in the third row of the Lynbrook 
High School library and noticed when I turned around to see that the 200 seats were 
almost filled with Chinese parents.  Current CMS president Steven quickly introduced the 
superintendant, giving her a very warm welcome by describing her as a very important 
and significant politician in the community – even if she isn’t a politician.  I don’t think 
the superintendant quite understood how he was explaining her presence at their Chinese 
school that evening as she opened by saying “I’m sorry but I cannot give my presentation 
in Mandarin.”  This elicited laughter from the audience. 
The superintendant opened by thanking the Chinese school for inviting her to 
speak on an important topic.  She followed that up by telling the parents and staff present 
at the presentation how she recognized Chinese schools as an integral part of the Chinese 
and “mainstream” (read=white) community.  She then told the audience how she 
respected the diversity of their community, as evidenced by the various Chinese schools 
presently in the area. 
She quickly began her PowerPoint presentation to describe how education was a 
“great investment,” quickly moving to the theme of their students as “citizens of the 
world.”  The first slide described graduation rates and the percentage of students that 
would go on to four-year universities, relative to neighboring cities.  The next few slides 
showed their student’s global approach to the world as they highlighted the Cupertino 
High School’s class of 2010’s fundraising project titled, “Kenya Dream?,” which refers 
to their class’s goal of raising enough money to repair and update one school in Kenya 
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with a learning center outfitted with new computer technology.5  The superintendant 
described the origins of this project from then-high school freshman Justin Li, a Chinese 
American student, who one day felt inspired to give to others after realizing he was 
blessed with so many educational opportunities within his local school system.  Dell 
Computers, the corporate sponsor, would donate a $100,000 to go towards a “super-
prom,” the prize for the winning class’s humanitarian efforts at helping people across the 
world (Wilson and Sandra Gonzales 2010).  Cupertino High School’s class of 2010 
decided to donate all their annual fundraising money, money that goes towards offsetting 
the costs of junior and senior prom dances, towards helping Nthimbiri Secondary School.   
Several pictures from the superintendant’s PowerPoint presentation showed the 
now-high school senior, Lin, taking photos with Kenyan high school students, holding up 
an oversized check in addition to photos of before and after shots of the school in Kenya 
post-donations.  Since 2008, the class of 2010 has raised over $25,000 dollars with the 
Cupertino Rotary Club matching with $25,000.  The images showed Kenyan youth 
hanging around outside their schools in uniforms, sitting on chopped logs of wood, 
seemingly loitering instead of learning.  The superintendant commented that this “before” 
image showed the struggles of the Kenyan educational system in comparison to the tech-
ready library we all sat in.  The “after” shots, however, showed completely different 
images as it showed students indoors and attentively working on their new Dell 
Computers.   
                                                
5 “Kenya Dream?” is a play on words, which also could be “Can ya dream?” In the presentation, the 
superintendant shows a promotional video that the students made.  The promotional video doesn’t describe 
what the money would be used for specifically.  But on the official website, Kenya Dream includes more 
than just the technological improvements – the only thing the superintendant had described – such as 
sewage systems, additional classroom space, and a lunchroom.  The superintendant did not describe these 
additional services, focusing primarily on the fundraising efforts of students and the challenge/competition 
created by Dell Computers. 
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The next slide showed two high school students, Chinese and Indian classmates, 
as the two winners of Intel’s talent search, both coming from Lynbrook High School.  
This was a first of its kind.  The superintendant described the winning projects as based 
on innovating new technologies through internship opportunities with globally 
recognized companies, which only students living in Silicon Valley could have so much 
direct access at a young age.  The superintendant only mentioned the project of the 
winning Chinese student, whose project had to do with facial recognition technologies.  
She then moved to another slide, which showed more award-winning Chinese and 
Indians students for collaborative projects with NASA.  
Following the discussion about student achievement, the superintendant began to 
describe what the parcel tax actually is, what the money would be used for, and how 
Cupertino’s parcel tax compared to neighboring affluent cities of Silicon Valley and the 
Peninsula region with similar education, class, and employment profiles.  The 
superintendant emphasizes how their school district has braced itself for this budget 
shortfall, predicting it would manifest a few years prior.  In order to ensure that their 
students maintained top-notch tools for learning, the Fremont Union High School District 
froze compensation for administrators, which included an end to raises as well as cutting 
back staff and, of course, hiring freezes.  The superintendant adds, “We have great 
relations with our unions … and they understand that all this is for the future of our 
children.”  I glance across the crowd and Chinese heads nod in agreement. 
The superintendant made note that she was unable to endorse a position given her 
job as the superintendant.  But, she then introduced members of the school board, Homer 
Tong, a Chinese resident in his 60s, and Bill Wilson, a white man in his 40s, who could 
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and would.  Homer Tong briefly mentioned how this was an important tax that needed to 
be passed to ensure that the legacy of Cupertino schools stay strong.  Bill Wilson, also 
spoke very briefly, merely saying that this investment in education “creates the workers 
to keep this place prosperous.”   
Following the presentation was a question and answer session directed towards 
Tong and Wilson, which several Chinese parents raised their hands to ask questions about 
how the city planned on spending the money:   
“Will this be spent on teacher pay raises?” 
 
“You said this money would not be spent on teachers. Why is money used for 
teachers and classroom support staff?”   
 
“If you used the facilities bond money on solar panels to save energy, did you get 
it done in time to get the rebates?  I read that there were rebates if you installed 
them by a specific time….”6 
 
The Measure B presentation brought together different cultural and economic discourses 
that shape how Silicon Valley as a place is understood.  Also, this particular narration of 
contemporary Cupertino educational success showed how Chinese immigrants were the 
proper citizens of Cupertino and the Silicon Valley as they contribute, at a young age no 
less, to globally recognized companies and are socially and culturally conditioned by 
these companies.  Whereas the presentation was as much about exercising Chinese 
immigrants’ voting rights as concerned citizens of Santa Clara County, the priority of 
passing Measure B was presented by the superintendant and school board members as a 
question of sustaining a cosmopolitan lifestyle and cultures of material achievement 
centered on technology, which Chinese people are portrayed as central to its successful 
social and economic reproduction.  This Silicon Valley narrative of youth achievement in 
                                                
6 Participant Observation.  Silicon Valley Chinese School. 20 March 2010. 
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philanthropy, education, and technology discursively bind who will make up the present 
and the future of Silicon Valley, which school board member Bill Wilson refers to as “the 
workers to keep this place prosperous.”  Moreover, within this narration, Chinese 
immigrants remap Cupertino and Silicon Valley space in a coherent narrative pieced 
together by multiple places, which Chineseness is central to these connections.  Also, this 
narrative reinvents Silicon Valley as an international region, which the PowerPoint 
presentation shows South Asian and Chinese American youth performing these regional 
strips of behavior, articulated through the high-tech industry giant of Dell Computers, in 
their everyday activities.7  The idea of Cupertino’s “citizens of the world” makes sense 
through the language of technology as pictures of Kenyan students learning with 
computers like students in Silicon Valley, with global high-tech industry’s imprint on this 
African school.  But it is not just Dell Computers but other globally recognized high-tech 
institutions including Intel and NASA. 
Embedded within the superintendant’s presentation of the crises of Cupertino’s 
high schools, however, is the existing narrative or myth-making of the region’s 
exceptional lifestyle:  maintaining great property values and sustaining their city’s 
competitiveness as an exclusive upper-middle class city relative to neighboring cities like 
Palo Alto, Los Altos, Saratoga, and Los Gatos (known to be the homes of high-tech 
executives that live in the secluded hillsides that border the western portion of the bay 
area also known as the “Peninsula”).  The presentation places Chinese immigrants and 
their children neatly within Silicon Valley imaginary.  Their everyday individual 
achievement visibly normalized across the cultural geography reproduces ideas of the 
                                                
7 Dell Computers is headquartered in Round Rock, Texas, but does not have any facilities in California.  
But my point in bringing up Dell Computers, however, is to show how technology is still part of the 
narration and backdrop of youth achievement in Silicon Valley. 
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region’s technological innovation and economic success.  The Chinese community, 
through this presentation presented by the superintendant, also represents the Valley’s 
purported diversity as an advanced degree holding, upper-middle-class Chinese (and 
broadly Asian) immigrant and their families.  The questions by Chinese parents about 
how the tax money will be used along with the need by the superintendant to emphasize 
to parents that the money will not be used for compensation for teachers suggests who 
and what should be prioritized when it comes to maintaining educational excellence and a 
robust economy in Silicon Valley.  
This presentation demonstrates how Chinese immigrants write themselves and are 
written by others into this popular narrative of Silicon Valley’s exceptional quality of life.  
The white superintendant’s citation of Chinese language and cultural education schools 
as significant institutions of Cupertino’s “diversity” operates as a performative utterance 
that naturalizes like any other Silicon Valley institutions, such as high-tech companies. 
But the Chinese school language instructors themselves discursively enable these 
connections between race, culture, and modes of production in Silicon Valley within their 
re-narrations of the everyday in Silicon Valley past, present, and the future.  While 
observing an 8th grade Chinese language class at CMS, the teacher, Mrs. Lee, the 
instructor, was teaching a vocabulary lesson from the textbook, which used the history of 
California’s Gold Rush as an example of Chinese experiences in California.  But the 
lesson was framed as a transnational Chinese immigrant experience, particularly around 
the labor of railroad construction and gold mining.  Mrs. Lee would ask the class if they 
were familiar with these stories of railroad construction or gold mining, which everyone 
nodded in agreement.  The students learned words like “sifting” (referencing how people 
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found gold), “steel,” or “immigrant,” which she added at the end, “you are all 
immigrants.”  The next sentence that Mrs. Lee read from the textbook seemed to capture 
the main point of the lesson: 
(In Mandarin) Chinese immigrants came to Gold Mountain to search for a better 
life.  All the money they would make, they would send it back to China, to 
support their families. (Looking up from the text)  Do you see how this is just like 
you and your families?  Your parents also came to this area for work and job 
opportunities.  Does your family keep in touch with their relatives, too?  Do a lot 
of you go back to Taiwan? 
The portrayal of Chinese immigrant life as defined by labor and transpacific circulation 
of people and money by both the textbook and Mrs. Lee suggest how Chinese culture, in 
part, emerges in the lives of Chinese youth here in the Silicon Valley.  The early Chinese 
migration to the San Francisco Bay Area and California, portrayed as abstracted of 
institutionalized racism, was reduced to flexible employment.  Mrs. Lee’s interpretation 
of this continuous history of the everyday in the lives of Chinese immigrants portrays the 
region as a place that has always prioritized the labor of Chinese people.  In the same 
breath, the portrayals of the region’s cosmopolitan status and its economic 
transnationalism similarly become a continuous history.  I wondered if the choice of not 
describing racism in the lives of early Chinese laborers within the textbook was a 
deliberate choice by Mrs. Lee, possibly shattering the colorblind meritocracy that Silicon 
Valley Chinese residents I interviewed imagined it to be.   I was shocked by Mrs. Lee’s 
narration of Chinese American history, the recombination of historical Silicon Valley 
place sutured together by notions of a strong, persevering work ethic of flexible 
employment bound by transnational Chinese familial responsibility.  In this lesson, 
Chinese people became naturally included within the Bay Area’s cultural and economic 
geography as workers and representative of the region’s purported diversity. 
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Glancing across the class, I wondered if Mrs. Lee’s lesson got through to the 
students.  At various moments throughout the class, students moved in and out of 
attention.  From punching each other in the arm to giggling and having private 
conversations, the students looked like they had their minds set on other things that 
Friday night.  But, Mrs. Lee’s description of place, specifically through labor and a 
particular notion of conduct (hard work), creates a historical narrative of Silicon Valley 
Chinese immigrant presence as completely shaped by economic opportunities.  Mrs. Lee 
creates a continuous, unchanging narrative of Chinese labor in the region, a “travel 
story,” connecting the places of Silicon Valley and Chinese countries through 
coordinated economic development.  More specifically, the narrative of the region 
comprised of movements of Chinese people and culture transnationally across the Pacific 
follows the paths of global capitalism and empire, which literary critic Caroline Yang 
argues as “the persistent erasure of racialized labor in the dominant historiography and 
literature and the ‘disappearing act’ of empire in multiculturalism” (Yang 2010).  This 
narrative portrays this global movement as part and parcel to the meaning making of 
Silicon Valley and the incorporation of Chinese immigrants and their families into the 
nation-state forgets how they were made into participants of U.S. political and economic 
hegemonic expansion.  In the space of the Chinese school, history lessons revolve around 
describing, explaining, and naturalizing concepts of the everyday to teach language and 
culture.  Lessons like this one regarding Chinese immigration and labor seem to operate 
as modes of surveillance that aim to regulate how youth should approach labor, 
education, and their futures as circumscribed by the places and business of Silicon 
Valley.  The lesson describes the spatially specific notions of surveillance and discipline 
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of Silicon Valley in their lives, shaped by the particular discourses of economic 
development between Silicon Valley and Greater China.  
The classroom environment of children goofing off, however, suggested to me 
that fractures existing in how dominant regional ideas about Chinese culture and global 
economies were implemented at the local level.  Several parents told me that they 
recognized their children would make their own career decisions.  As of now, several 
parents noted, their children were not interested in working in Greater China.  But, so 
long as they were their children, these parents wanted to prepare their children with the 
proper human capital to be competitive when Greater China begins controlling the 
direction of the global economy.  The attention span of Chinese students in other 
classrooms I visited was similar to Mrs. Lee’s classroom.  The children goofing off, 
playing on their telephones and passing notes, was reason why parent volunteers were 
needed to help instructors monitor classroom behavior.  But even then, parents and 
instructors were sympathetic to the students and just hoped that some of the Chinese 
language, culture, and history lessons stuck.  But these fractures across generations, 
however, do not lessen in any way how neoliberalism was part of decision making at 
CMS. 
 The concept of the everyday has been of pedagogical significance as to why CMS 
and other Cupertino Chinese language schools have decided to change their curriculum 
from the free textbooks from Taiwan to the textbooks written by Chinese language 
instructors in the United States.  Almost all administrators complained that the everyday 
culture of textbooks from Taiwan contained themes that students in the United States 
could not relate to.  Aside from the units of measure that did not exist in the United 
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States, such as the New Taiwan dollar or bottles of milk as opposed to gallons, 
administrators were also concerned that the ancient Chinese legends that they as children 
learned was out of touch with how Chinese youth should understand the morals of 
Chinese legends in their own lives.  Instead of transnational community formations based 
on national identity, Chineseness is spatialized by the neoliberal conditions creating these 
coordinated places of economic development and “brain circulation” between Silicon 
Valley and Greater China.8 
But beyond the everyday habits listed in their textbooks of eating and shopping 
that reference junk food commonly seen in grocery stores and retail seen at most malls in 
the United States, Confucian “value-systems” as an ideology of work are what some 
parents find to be necessary aspects of Chinese culture which should be taught at Chinese 
schools and preserved and adapted to their children’s lives in the United States.  For 
several parents, Confucian teachings provided what they saw as instilling the proper 
conduct towards being a successful Silicon Valley worker, using their own success and 
behavior as exemplary of how necessary it is in their children’s lives and Silicon Valley’s 
on-going success.  In discussing how they wanted their children to act in the future, they 
commonly reference their work attitude of ‘humbleness’ as part and parcel to the 
successful culture of collaboration that has led to many groundbreaking innovations. 
 In their imagination of the future, the Silicon Valley present – the work place 
itself and the ideal conduct of business – is how Chinese immigrant parents resignify 
existing mythologies of Silicon Valley, but with Chinese people central to its social 
                                                
8 AnnaLee Saxenian refutes the notion of “brain drain” in contemporary high-tech industries, which refers 
to educated graduates studying or working abroad, given that education or job opportunities are available in 
their homelands.  “Brain circulation,” Saxenian argues, better describes in the trans-Pacific circulation of 
people and ideas as Chinese and Indians have returned home to develop high-tech industries, but 
collaborate with their colleagues at high-tech firms in Silicon Valley.  
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reproduction.  In describing what it means to be “humble,” Richard mentions it is an 
important Chinese cultural trait, which could be seen in the cultural attitudes of people in 
the Silicon Valley.  Richard described the very ordinary lifestyle and characteristics of 
CEOs in Silicon Valley that he attributed to the upbringing of what he saw as Confucian 
values: 
I think fundamentally this is the area that provides elite environment for 
children…those CEOs, they care about education.  They send kids to Chinese 
schools.  So it’s providing a unique opportunity for the kids to grow here.  It’s 
incredible.  Many years ago I was chatting with someone, my colleague in my 
previous company that grew up in the New England area.  He said he attended 
high school, a private high school. And he said in his vacation time, he usually 
stay in Scottsdale.  Play golf.  That’s the lifestyle.  And I said, I kind of ask, what 
is the main objective?  And the main benefit of sending kids to attend that 
prestigious private school.  He said, ‘You know, everybody you meet in those 
days are potential CEOs because their parents have so much money.’  They will 
give them the money to become CEOs.  So you feel tremendous opportunity to 
make the connection.  And we have a bunch of CEOs here, they all come from 
nobodies.  They are much…you can say they are a class higher than those CEOs, 
those future CEOs they met.  So it’s a real opportunity for the kids growing up 
here, lots of their friends, their childhood friends maybe their lifelong business 
partners, you never know.  So this is the huge incredible value for people to live 
here.  Not only themselves, but also their kids. 
I quoted Richard at-length here because it exemplifies what I see as Chinese people both 
aligning and re-interpreting the expected conduct and expectations for success when 
living in the Silicon Valley.  Within the existing economies of meaning around Silicon 
Valley’s exceptionalism versus the East Coast, Richard creates his notion of “humble” 
against the privilege and opportunities of his friend that comes from wealth passed on 
from family members generation to generation.  Richard maps Confucian value of 
“humbleness” as related to the specific culture of Silicon Valley success.  Education and 
Silicon Valley places of work are two institutions of importance to Chinese parents and 
their children’s lives, bound together by global economic development.   
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Moreover, Shing-Ming’s narration of the Chinese cultural practices of the work 
place rely on Silicon Valley’s “garage myth” to explain how Chinese people naturally fit 
into, yet reinvent Silicon Valley space.  For Chinese parents like Richard who are 
concerned about U.S.-China economic development and what that means as far as their 
children’s career and national recognition, the practice of Chinese culture in Silicon 
Valley as a meritocracy narrative maintains the myth of colorblind achievement that 
defines the region.  In Silicon Valley historical lore of it’s regional high-tech giants, such 
as Apple, Hewlett-Packard, and Google, to some degree, the “garage” figures largely as 
representative of a culture of collaboration, where competition can still occur among 
friends.  Or even the idea that competition can help friendships.  Richard reiterates this 
narrative in describing how “childhood friends may be their lifelong business partners,” 
which traces the well-worn narrative paths of rags-to-riches.9   
Lessons focused on the everyday function as regular disciplinary techniques that 
are informed by instructors and parents place-specific ideologies centered on trans-
Pacific economic development.  The stories of “humbleness” imagine Chinese culture 
within the varied meanings of Silicon Valley’s exceptionalism.  The retelling of these 
similar stories of Chinese presence in the area – labor and culture – mutually help create 
the physical and cultural boundaries of Silicon Valley, enabling of the Chinese 
hegemony.  Chinese schools are another local institution in Cupertino that discipline 
students with the totalizing logic of Silicon Valley labor.  Yet, with the achievement of 
Chinese immigrants and their children, Chinese people become one dominant and 
                                                
9 A commercial created by candidate for a local government position used the idea of innovation and the 
garage motif to show how he was part of the “innovative” Silicon Valley tradition which he hoped to 
represent.  Companies like Apple and Hewlett-Packard use these ideas of nobody-to-somebody as 
explanations of their historical roots.  This has taken off as part of the narrative of Silicon Valley.  The 
commercial showed the candidate campaigning out of his garage.   
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prevailing narrative of maintaining Silicon Valley’s exceptionalism as guided by its 
global economic structures which Chinese people have been instrumental to its 
proliferation.   
Silicon Valley Moon Festival and The Disciplinary Force of Barbecue 
An annual event for almost a decade, the Silicon Valley Moon Festival (SVMF) became 
a widely attended local event with the aim of integrating Chinese immigrants into the 
community.  Held at Memorial Park, Cupertino’s central park located along one of the 
major thoroughfares that cuts through downtown, the event aim was to bring Chinese 
culture “to the mainstream” by holding it in a common communal location in the city.  In 
this section, I focus on the strategic usage of Memorial Park, a place of community public 
services (senior citizens center and youth programming) and other free community 
events, by Chinese immigrants and their attempts to re-narrate the city’s current and 
future history to include Chinese immigrants through their annual performance of 
Chinese culture within this public space.  But unlike the Chinese immigrants at Chinese 
language schools, the SVMF organizers purposely spatialized and symbolized their social 
citizenship within Memorial Park in order to evacuate themselves of any personal 
financial interest.  Upset by the lack of English signs in the inaugural year of the SVMF, 
white residents (and some Chinese residents) complained publicly in the local newspaper, 
the Cupertino Courier, that this was a racially exclusive event.  Further, they continued to 
complain that the event was just Chinese vendors trying to make money in spite of the 
free Chinese cultural performances.  In local press, SVMF organizers claimed that they 
created this festival in response to the national perception that Chinese leaders in the Bay 
Area attempted to buy influence through soft money donations to the Clinton 
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administration.10  Lucia Wu, a festival organizer, said they wanted “to show that the 
Chinese people are eager to give back to the community” (Che 2002, 2003c).  But this 
section shows the on-going resistance by some white residents in sharing the festival 
organizers’ travel stories of a Chinese and White harmonious future symbolized by their 
mutual coexistence on Cupertino community space. 
 
Figure 5-1: One of the City of Cupertino emblems,  
the gazebo sits at the center of Cupertino’s Memorial Park.   
Photo by the author. 
 
Maggie, a Chinese immigrant from Hong Kong who was one of the organizers, 
said that the aim of the festival was to introduce and describe Chinese culture in a way 
that promoted cultural tolerance and sharing between mainstream and Chinese residents 
in Cupertino. The Cupertino Courier quoted organizers and volunteers as describing the 
festival as the Chinese equivalent to Thanksgiving in the United States, an annual 
gathering of family and friends.  Every year, Moon Festival organizers sought different 
                                                
10 In Maggie’s home hung a photo of her and Bill Clinton shaking hands.  When I asked how that 
happened, she muttered, “That’s nothing.”  When she showed me her archives of SVMF materials she kept 
over the years, she broke in tears telling me that she never felt accepted in the different societies – British 
and American – she lived in as an adult.  She described instances where she was culturally excluded from 
both, mentioning the SVMF as a clear example of how she is made into an outsider in spite of her attempts 
at becoming an insider. 
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traditional Chinese cultural performances, inviting performance troupes from Los 
Angeles, Taiwan, and China.  At its height between 2001-2004, the two-day festival, 
SVMF reportedly drew upwards of up to 100,000 people.  People from across the greater  
 
Figure 5-2: The Silicon Valley Moon Festival no longer exists, but Chinese 
cultural festivals such as the World Journal’s “Mother’s Day Festival” are  
still held at Memorial Park.  The gazebo sits in the background. Photo by  
the author. 
 
San Francisco Bay Area, from as far south as Monterrey Bay11 to as far north as 
Sacramento,12 would drive in to experience Chinese culture.  One group of Chinese 
people from Monterrey Bay, according to Mei-Li, one of the organizers from 2005-2008, 
mentioned that they chartered a bus for 60 people to drive up to Cupertino because being 
“isolated” from larger Chinese communities they missed all the culture that they used to 
experience “at home” (Mei-Li 2010).13  Pictured in the Cupertino Courier, elected city 
                                                
11 Approximately 70 miles south of Cupertino 
12 Approximately 140 miles north-east of Cupertino 
13 I conducted my interview with Mei-Li at the Quinlan community center.  We sat in a corner of the 
community center next to the main hall where the Rotary International Club, one of the “old boys clubs” as 
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officials were pictured in local press dressed in traditional Chinese clothes or 
participating in tea and wedding ceremonies.  Through the mutual experience of 
practicing and learning about Chinese culture, the event organizers hoped to give back to 
the city of Cupertino by fostering greater understanding between Chinese and White 
people and cultures.  To show their faith in the City of Cupertino as members of their 
community, the Moon Festival donated a percentage of their earnings to local service 
organizations and city building projects (Scott 1999). 
As mentioned earlier, the organizers’ choice to hold the event at Memorial Park 
was strategic in renarrating the city and resignifying Chinese cultural practices as 
“community-oriented,” in light of on-going feelings by local white residents that Chinese 
immigrants only cared about money.  Memorial Park is located right in the middle of the 
strip of Stevens Creek Boulevard that cuts through the “downtown” portion of Cupertino, 
sitting across and next to a mix of residential, commercial, educational, and governmental 
buildings.  It could be considered the epicenter of the city not just for its location next to 
the commercial and retail buildings around it, but for the city-hosted community-based 
events and the various community recreation centers located on the park itself that are 
open and free to the public.  Several annual festivals are held in Memorial Park, such as 
Shakespeare in the Park, the Cherry Blossom Festival, the Diwali Festival of the Lights, 
and the annual summer movie and concert series (all free).  The Quinlan Community 
Center on the east side of the park houses the city’s park and recreation office as well as 
several large meeting halls where recreation courses such as yoga and children’s arts and 
                                                
told to me by Chinese people and white women in Cupertino, holds its weekly meetings.  In the middle of 
my interview, 2 men emerged from the hall as the meeting was letting out and one of the men who I had 
never met before yelled out “I wonder what those two people are talking about.”  When I didn’t respond, 
the gentleman came closer, peered over, and joked to his colleagues, “Obviously some very important 
business.”  His comments were disrupting to the interview.  Him and his friends walked off laughing.   
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crafts take place.  Guaranteed at any time of the morning and afternoon, you will find 
Chinese and south Asian parents milling around the Quinlan Center with their children, 
either sitting along a couch watching their children do homework or waiting for their 
child’s recreation class to begin or let out.  The Cupertino Historical Society has an office 
at the Quinlan Community Center and the Rotary International Club of Cupertino holds 
its weekly meetings in one of the conference halls.  Other notable park facilities include 
the Senior Center and the Veterans Memorial of Cupertino Residents, with bronze statues 
of soldiers crouched back to back with their guns pointed, a scene symbolizing combat 
and the country.   
The various local institutions at the park along with the annual events and 
activities provide on-going snapshots of the city’s identity.  Seemingly multicultural and 
inclusive, the park, as city property, and its events portray how the usage of the space 
continually creates new representations of the city’s past, present, and future.  And while 
the city’s present and future are continuously being contested and remade, the past to be 
remembered at “Memorial Park” remains constant with a Gazebo in the middle of the 
park as one of the two emblems that the City of Cupertino uses, which can be seen on 
Rotary Club pins, newsletters, newspapers, city website, etc.  The gazebo has a 
significant place in Cupertino historical narratives as the roof contains lattice-wood 
working, “gingerbread,” taken straight from the home of Enoch Parrish, considered to be 
one of several important “original families” who helped establish Cupertino’s local 
economy and social life at the turn of the 20th century.  The park contains various 
symbols of Cupertino’s history and possible future.  The SVMF, however, is the one 
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event that the visual and cues of Chinese ethnicity seems to disrupt the existing 
hegemonic economies of meanings. 
In spite of the event’s growing popularity and the visual evidence of white and 
Chinese harmony through cultural sharing, the organizers of SVMF had a challenging  
 
Figure 5-3: During the “Mother’s Day Festival,” the World  
Journal Newspaper held college application seminars at the  
Cupertino Senior Center. Photo by the author. 
 
relationship with the city of Cupertino.  Whether it was sabotage or attempted hostile 
takeover by public elected officials or formal complaints made by residents to city 
council for sound, traffic, or odor issues, the SVMF ran into several road blocks from 
different residents when it came to putting on the event.  White residents and white 
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publicly elected officials of Cupertino have been wary over the usage of public space by 
festival organizers.  The temporary clustering of Chinese culture and people in 
Cupertino’s Memorial Park proved to be, at times, an unacceptable representation of who 
could be part of the community and what the community should look like based on the 
Chinese activities held at the central meeting place in Cupertino.  Some white residents 
tried to contain the SVMF’s size, smell, and sounds through various complaints about 
traffic, odorous foods, and sounds escalating above city ordinance levels.  Mei-Li 
mentioned how city officials came out during the weekend of the Moon Festival to ensure 
that the sound did not exceeded 70 decibels, the maximum allotted levels during the 
daytime.  After checking the levels hourly, the collective sound of people and performers 
never came close to clearing the maximum decibels level.  Mei-Li mentions that one 
particular year, 10 local residents (8 “Caucasians” and 2 South Asians) approached the 
city council to complain that that “the food was too smelly for them” and that there were 
too many cars coming in, which increased traffic in the neighborhoods.  Mei-Li and 
others worked asked the police if they could block off streets for the festival, which the 
police responded “no” since these were public roads.  “There was nothing I could do,” 
Mei-Li concludes (2010).  Mei-Li further elaborates on the contradiction between the 
Moon Festival being a public community festival, needing to contain the seeming 
overflow of Chinese culture and people that day, and their fundraising tactics: 
Another thing that they did was they said there was far too many people coming, 
which makes it too noisy.  But what happened was I cannot advertise say “Look 
we have a Moon Festival, you are not allowed to come, you are not welcome.”  If 
I wanted to be successful, I have to encourage more people to come.  So, I do not 
know how to please people by discouraging people to come (Mei-Li 2010).   
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In addition, rumors circulated that these same public officials and civic service nonprofits 
balked at their support of the festival, intending to derail the festival altogether.14  Maggie 
described the “old boys club” mentality throughout the Rotary Club and City Council.  
Maggie said that then mayor at the time of the festival’s inaugural year, Richard 
Lowenthal, was particularly prejudiced against her.  I asked how she thought he was 
prejudice and what she thought he had anything to be prejudice about.  Maggie added that 
she felt Lowenthal thought she was just some “Chinese nobody” and that he was 
suspicious of what she was trying to do in his city.  She said this enmity was enhanced by 
the low attendance at the annual events that the city, itself, puts on such as the Rotary 
Club’s now-defunct Oktoberfest.  She describes how the first year of the Moon Festival, 
everyone – residents (Chinese and White), city council, and the local press – was overtly 
critical of how exclusive the festival was to non-Chinese since no signs were in English.  
Lowenthal and his Rotary Club colleagues, Maggie recalls, arrived and laughed at the 
SVMF low attendance the first year, leaving immediately.  She then mentioned a time 
when Lowenthal and the Rotary Club tried to sabotage the SMVF by planning their 
annual fundraising barbeque on the same day and at the same place (Quinlan community 
center) as the SVMF even though she had booked the space months in advance and 
having it placed on the Cupertino city calendar of events equally ahead of time.  
Lowenthal asked Maggie to purchase 100 tickets since she could not attend.  She bought 
two tickets, which she made her two children attend in her absence.  “You know, Chinese 
                                                
14 The Rotary Club International chapter of Cupertino, like the Cupertino Chamber of Commerce, operates 
as an arm of the local government.  As one of my interviewees described it, the Rotary Club is where all the 
‘movers and shakers’ of the city are at.  By that, my interviewee meant that anyone interested in public 
office should join the Rotary Club first to know the right people for networking purposes.  This includes 
school board members, city council, parks commissions, etc.  Because of this, the Rotary Club becomes 
synonymous with the “City of Cupertino.”  Even though it is not managed by the city of Cupertino, Rotary 
Club is still an influential local service organization, which represents, officially and unofficially, the city at 
various events as a cosponsor. 
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people just don’t eat a lot of meat,” was another one of Maggie’s reasons for why she 
refused, or rather, could not purchase 100 tickets for people in the Chinese community.  
But, she adds that once Lowenthal realized how hard she worked and how popular SVMF 
had become, he became a staunch supporter later along with other city council members 
because their visible presence at SVMF was great publicity for re-election campaigns: 
Everyone has an agenda.  Everyone comes in because they want something.   
Because we're so successful, all these politicians want to put down that they were 
a part of the Moon Festival.  You know, oh they're so ‘multicultural’. They do this 
for the city.  That's fine with me.  They just need to do their jobs when they 
volunteer (Maggie 2009). 
Maggie and Mei-Li’s run-ins with city council members reflect the particular stakes of 
Cupertino public spaces in the affirmation of who represents Cupertino’s community.  
Diversity matters for some locally elected officials when it is convenient for their 
personal gain.  Not all white residents were against the festival.  But Maggie and Mei-Li 
recalled their several run-ins with local white residents and elected officials whom 
resented the Moon Festival, often describing the sensual experiences of Chinese culture 
in the city of Cupertino as incongruent with the types of activities that should be taking 
place on Cupertino public space.  What types of foods should be cooked and eaten – 
barbeque versus “smelly” Chinese food – and attempts at managing traffic and outsiders 
entering the city reveal the local resistance to the rewriting of Cupertino’s present and 
future with these spatialized strips of Chinese behavior.  Even as Maggie and Mei-Li 
cited Memorial Park as opposed to the local high-tech industry in their performance of 
social citizenship, locals balked at the possible juxtaposition of “American” and Chinese 
culture within the regional cultural geography. 
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 The particular policing of how Chinese people utilize Memorial Park reveals how 
space (and how it is imagined) has historically mattered in the spatial production of 
whiteness in the making of Cupertino, and, by extension, Silicon Valley.  Some residents’ 
pleas to city council about the SVMF’s sights, sounds, and smells in addition to local 
public officials’ attempts at sabotage suggest how Memorial Park became a place of 
disciplining Chinese immigrants through everyday behaviors such as cooking and eating.  
As a place of remembering through the re-iteration of annual festivals that aim to 
represent and benefit the community, the Rotary Clubs’ barbeque fundraiser was in 
cultural opposition to Maggie’s Moon Festival.  As white residents felt that Chinese food 
was inappropriate for the park and the nearby neighborhoods, barbecue appeared to be 
Lowenthal’s secret weapon against the Moon Festival.  The forceful way by which 
Lowenthal demanded that Maggie purchase one hundred tickets to his Rotary Club 
fundraiser suggests how restorative behavior operates in Cupertino as competing 
narrations of the city’s cultural history and cultural geography are at stake.  No matter the 
recombination of strips of behavior by Chinese residents to rid themselves of their 
seemingly non-community oriented conduct, white residents used public space in 
Cupertino to further manage Chinese residents’ behaviors to maintain the equivalence of 
whiteness with Silicon Valley.  
 The economic capital in the form of fundraising that Chinese immigrants have 
successfully accrued and mobilized in organizing the SVMF simultaneously represents 
for white residents’ the erasure of American cultural festivals, particularly the once 
popular Oktoberfest hosted by the Rotary Club.  When asking some Chinese public 
servants about the disappearance of Oktoberfest, they jokingly responded that “Chinese 
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people just don’t drink!”  Jokes asides, these public servants felt that part of the local 
white perception regarding the loss of Oktoberfest is attributed to their idea that Chinese 
immigrants – residents and business people – forced the Rotary Club to retire and revamp 
the festival in its current state as a health and safety fair, also known as “Fall Fest.”  With 
reference to Lowenthal and the members of the “old boys club,” unofficially known as 
Rotary, Maggie adds that she thinks their fears are related to the loss of white economic 
power:  
Maggie: “They were scared.  You know, they think we’re a threat.” 
 
Brian: “Who’s a threat?” 
 
Maggie: “Chinese people.  Like they’re going to come in and take over 
everything.  Their stores…everything.” 
 
The complaints against the Moon Festival capture the anxieties over the visual economies 
of meanings embedded within places that enable hegemonic formations to persist.  
Another example would be the complaints over the lack of English signage, which many 
residents equate with Chinese immigrants deliberately refusing to assimilate.  Mei-Li 
recalls that in 2005, an older woman in her late forties complained to city council that she 
walked through the festival and felt that it was uninviting because of the lack of English 
signs.  Mei-Li rebutted: 
Some of the things that people complained… they feel so intimidated because it’s 
all Chinese.  There wasn’t a single Chinese sign.  But (pause) I object to that 
because up until the last year, I actually did 50 more signs to have in Chinese and 
English.  And when those people who complained when they came in, they did not 
want to accept, so they couldn’t SEE (her emphasis).  And they said they came 
from the Quinlan center all the way to the stage by the center, they couldn’t find 
anyone to help her.  The thing was, I did have the right information that’s right 
here (points out the door).  I cannot see how they could miss.  Then to me is they 
have their predetermined or pre-set mind they are against us.  So we have to do 
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even more.  So if she had come to me or any of us, we would have given her a 
tour.  If she had come to us rather than going to the city council saying we’re too 
noisy. 
What struck me in Mei-Li’s interpretation of the event was her emphasis of this one 
woman’s deliberate inability to visualize Chinese and English languages within Memorial 
Park.  The woman’s perception of what Memorial Park should look like, temporarily 
cluttered with Chinese culture, blocked her from seeing the English signage.  Even as 
people like Maggie and Mei-Li tried to accommodate local residents, this particular 
example suggests that any symbols of Chinese culture cannot disrupt the spatial practices 
of whiteness that has been such a part of Cupertino’s history. 
 Maggie and Mei-Li both recognize how inter-racial conflicts between white and 
Chinese residents, particularly the white stereotypes of Chinese business cultures and the 
subsequent misunderstandings of Chinese people, have meant that Chinese people cannot 
be accepted as part of the “community” by white residents.  To combat these stereotypes 
and these perceptions of Chinese people as consumed by money, Maggie and Mei-Li 
both emphasized the voluntary nature of the festival and their labor for how they believe 
Chinese people can become respected as members of the community.  More specifically, 
the relationship between volunteering and Chinese community acceptance is sutured 
together by what seems to be the deliberate evacuation of Chinese people and culture 
with any connection to market forces.  As the various members of the city have criticized 
Chinese residents and business owners for being consumed by money, Maggie and Mei-
Li organized this festival at Memorial Park with the aim of encouraging Chinese people 




The SVMF shows how competing travel stories with different strips of behavior’ between 
Chinese and white residents created differing normative subjects and power relations 
within Silicon Valley place.  Recognizing that white residents found them economically 
threatening, festival organizers used Memorial Park as the host site to show local white 
residents that this was a deliberate move to incorporate themselves as part of the 
community by evacuating themselves of any discourses of economic development.  In the 
case of Cupertino Mandarin School, Chinese parents cited familiar places of Silicon 
Valley, such as the work place or the humble place of the neighborhood, the restorative 
behavior of Chinese language practice affirmed Silicon Valley mythologies of 
meritocracy, yet rewrites Silicon Valley’s future history with Chinese immigrants and 
culture as central to its reproduction.  Together, these two major events in Cupertino 
show how Chinese immigrants make sense of their social citizenship by the particular 
coordinated spaces of global capital and the contingent ideologies.  Moreover, these 
narrations show the exceptional space that Silicon Valley holds for Chinese and white 
residents as economic discourses of place greatly shape their notions of identity and their 






CHAPTER 6  
Epilogue 
 
Raymond is a middle-aged Taiwanese naturalized U.S. citizen who created his own start-
up company selling biomedical equipment to hospitals around the world.  He invited me 
over to his home to chat. Raymond and his family live in a two-story ranch house in one 
of the older subdivisions in the city, made up entirely of single story and two-story ranch 
houses.  I had just begun interviewing parent volunteers at a local Chinese language 
school in Cupertino, California and a few parents highly recommended Raymond since 
he helped spearhead early effort by the local Chinese community in the 1990s to 
implement Mandarin language instruction in Cupertino’s public schools.1  When I asked 
him about how and why he got involved with Chinese language schools, Raymond’s 
account of the importance of Chinese language education turned into a larger narrative of 
Silicon Valley’s exceptional standard of living, which allowed for the economic 
achievement and activities of Chinese immigrants on a regional and global scale.  That is, 
Raymond re-iterated commonly held beliefs that Silicon Valley is cultural frontier of 
democratized cool where nerds and geeks were the local celebrities.   
                                                
1 Different Chinese language schools teach different Chinese dialects.  More often than not, different 
Chinese language schools cater to the different streams of Chinese immigration from different regions of 
“Greater China.”  For the most part, all Chinese language schools teach the “national language” of 
Mandarin, also known among many Cupertino parents as the official business language of the future along 
with English.  With the exception of one Chinese language school that teaches the dialect of Cantonese, 
servicing Chinese people predominately from Hong Kong, Chinese people either from China or Taiwan 
created Chinese language school that teach Mandarin. 
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Like many other Chinese immigrants I interviewed, Raymond argued that the 
technological industry valued innovation over racial preference.  Therefore, to his mind, 
Silicon Valley transcended the racisms that the rest of the country has been mired in. 
Raymond claimed that Silicon Valley was truly “The American Dream,” and he cited as 
proof the acceptance of Chinese culture across the economic and cultural geography the 
success of the companies YouTube and Yahoo! in addition to Chinese language schools.  
For Raymond, these places symbolic of Chinese cultural presence also communicate the 
appropriate kinds of everyday behavior need to survive and participate in Silicon Valley 
and its transpacific industries.  For Raymond and many others, attention to Chinese 
culture, such as language study of the Chinese language, constitutes an investment in 
human capital, which would be useful as the possibility increases of a future global 
economy dominated by Greater China (Raymond 2009).  With Chinese language 
speaking and writing abilities, Chinese youth would be prepared for increased U.S.-China 
economic partnerships in what has been called “The China Century.”2  Places of 
transpacific commerce, such as high-tech firms and Chinese language schools, enable the 
everyday conduct of Chinese culture.  At the same time, the only Chinese identities 
publicly valorized are the ones that possess the proper human capital productive to 
Silicon Valley global business.  Regional and global economic rationalities determine the 
meanings and demand for Chinese language and cultural instruction in the lives of 
residents in Silicon Valley.   Different Chinese immigrants I interviewed work for 
                                                
2 Several parents I spoke to closely followed news dedicated to economic trends and policies with regards 
to “Greater China.”  Many media outlets – newspapers and magazines – discussing China’s booming 
economy as “The China Century” often frame this 21st century phenomenon as a hostile takeover of the 
world.  Although they did not use the term “The China Century,” explicitly, in any interviews, most of 
these Chinese parents concerned with the economic ramifications of Chinese language study described 
China’s economic growth as to why China and not the United States will be the premier super power of the 
21st century.   
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companies with offices in Silicon Valley and Greater China, such as Shanghai, China and 
Hsinchu, Taiwan.  The on-going coordination between these places for business purposes 
structures the meanings of foreign language study and other forms of Chinese cultural 
practices in Silicon Valley.  These everyday cultural practices reflect how these 
coordinate spaces constitute neoliberal governmentality within Silicon Valley life and 
labor.  
 Transnational Chinese people and culture facilitate the coordination between 
these high-tech hubs, but it is not universally accepted at the local level.  Most notably, a 
sizeable amount of post-World War II white transplants employed by companies funded 
by military defense budgets were able to secure their “American Dream” in Silicon 
Valley.  They resisted the presence of Chinese people and culture in their neighborhoods, 
schools, and shopping centers.3  In Cupertino, California, many white residents and 
business people managed the city’s celebration of multiculturalism.  One particular 
example was the establishment of the Asian American Council, created by Cupertino’s 
Chamber of Commerce in 1998.  When Chinese retailers began opening their doors for 
business, white residents complained about the lack of English on storefronts, menus, and 
foodstuff labels.  In addition, white residents and business people complained of what 
they thought to be the inappropriate cultural behaviors of Chinese people in the context of 
economic exchanges.  Whether it was the service of the wait staff or the attempts at 
bargaining by consumers, local white residents and business owners felt that these 
                                                
3 As I discussed in Chapter 3, the Cold War military defense research around high-tech industries was 
overwhelmingly white.  Urban planners, boosters, and administrators at Stanford University strategically 
planned around recruiting educated white people in large part through the aesthetics of the suburban built 
environment.   
 
 193 
Chinese economic spaces were exemplary of a tactless foreign Chinese culture at odds 
with how “American” business should be conducted.   
In response to the growing unease among white residents and business owners, 
the predominately white Cupertino Chamber of Commerce created an advisory board, the 
Asian American Council (AAC), made up almost exclusively of Chinese small business 
owners in Cupertino.  The AAC was originally designed to educate Asian business 
owners of the city ordinances that governed language signage and the appropriate 
“culture” of business.  Rather than operate as a collaborative space to support retail in the 
city, create fundraising opportunities, and conduct community outreach, the AAC existed 
merely under the stewardship of the Cupertino Chamber of Commerce.  As the AAC 
numbers grew, the Cupertino Chamber of Commerce incased their micromanaging 
practices over the AAC with threats to disband them or absorb them into the larger 
Cupertino Chamber of Commerce.  Don, a member of the AAC, shared with me that the 
Cupertino Chamber of Commerce had, at one point, felt threatened by the AAC’s 
growing popularity, resources, and ability to successfully fundraise in Asian Americans 
communities.  Even though he knew that AAC could exist independent of the Chamber 
of Commerce, Don was committed to increasing revenue streams for the whole business 
community and building community across racial lines (Don 2009).  When I asked 
another former member of the Asian American Council whether the collaborative efforts 
between both entities resolved any of the racial tensions, Francis replied, “They don’t do 
anything. Nothing” (Maggie 2010).  In a few conversations I had with both members of 
the Cupertino Chamber of Commerce and the AAC, any cooperative effort between the 
two entities were described as more symbolic than substantive.  When members of the 
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community described the few deliberate interactions between both entities, they often 
described how both entities could do more together for the community and in helping 
newer Chinese businesses.   
 In this project, I juxtapose stories about the celebration of Chinese culture and the 
hostility towards Chinese economic success to show the relationship between racial 
hegemony and economic development in Silicon Valley’s built environments.  These two 
clashing narratives of Cupertino’s present and future reveal the conflicting responses, 
desires, and anxieties over the institutionalization and social reproduction of transpacific 
development within everyday life.  At first glance, Raymond’s story of Silicon Valley’s 
acceptance of Chinese culture across the regional cultural and economic geography 
reflects what some Asian American Studies scholarship describes as the political 
mobilization against anti-Asian racism (Toyota 2010).  In this particular vein, Asian 
Americans Studies considers civic participation, voting, membership on a the local 
school board to operate as both resistance to stereotypes of Asians as civically apathetic 
and as meaningful expressions of national belonging.  While Raymond’s narrative 
follows this line of reasoning, I ask, instead, why only people like Raymond are framed 
as the idealized subjects of Silicon Valley and what the terms of inclusion are for these 
particular subjects.  Similarly, I wonder about the stakes and consequences of 
Chineseness as it circulates transpacifically from Silicon Valley to Greater China and 
back.  Silicon Valley’s multiculturalism, affirmed and portrayed by the economic success 
of Chinese people like Raymond, masks the neoliberal policies and practices of the 
region.   
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 Chinese immigrants with high-tech backgrounds claim their national belonging 
through these practices of neoliberalism in Silicon Valley.  Yet, these practices are 
spatialized with the intention of facilitating the circulation of Chinese labor, capital, and 
knowledge between Silicon Valley and Greater China.  As Chinese culture circulates 
regionally in the form of shopping centers, monster homes, Chinese language study and 
cultural festivals, these spaces become extensions of the state.  These spaces operate as 
forms of governance, where regional government encouraged the consumption of 
Chinese culture for the sake of socially reproducing neoliberal economic policies.  They 
also operate as ideological state apparatuses with the aim of interpellating Chinese and 
non-Chinese into the ideal subjects of Silicon Valley’s global economy.  The place of 
Chinese immigrants in Silicon Valley is not just metaphoric, but physically manifested 
and celebrated in these now iconic spaces of economic activity.   
 In Silicon Valley, regional government appropriates rights discourses of cultural 
recognition to instantiate its neoliberal economic policies.  The complex relationship 
between Chinese immigrant communities and neoliberal economic policies must take into 
account the ways in which Chinese immigrants have both embraced and rejected such 
policies.  Twenty-first century portrayals of racial harmony between white and Chinese 
immigrants seem to be modern day reinventions of the historical exclusionary laws and 
cultural narratives that were central to the founding of Silicon Valley and Santa Clara 
County.  Denise, a Chinese immigrant mother of two who volunteers at a local Chinese 
language school, shared with me why she preferred living in Cupertino rather than North 
San Jose, the place of her family’s first home.  In Cupertino, Denise said she felt safe and 
comfortable because there were more people like her who shared the same class values of 
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educational achievement and upward mobility.  Parents and children of Cupertino valued 
education, exemplified by its nationally ranked public school education.  She found this 
to be a stark contrast to her Mexican neighbors in North San Jose, who she said were very 
loud and often spent their time outside working on their cars.  Denise privileged 
Cupertino’s alleged class-based work ethic against the leisure of the working to lower-
middle class neighborhood of North San Jose (Denise 2010).  This kind of thinking 
affirms dominant ideas of neoliberal governmentality in Silicon Valley where the on-
going development of human capital through education and knowledge determines your 
ability to access privileged spaces and resources.  Those that cannot socially reproduce 
the wealth associated with the Silicon Valley global economy are excluded from cities 
like Cupertino and the educational benefits of its school systems.  Denise’s comments 
corroborated with some other Chinese immigrants I interviewed.  As Chinese immigrants 
made claims to Silicon Valley as equal members as whites, these discourses of belonging 
operate as forms of exclusionary boundary making in Silicon Valley.    
 In a study conducted by the San Jose Mercury, the number of black, Latino, and 
women workers in top tech companies in the Valley dropped significantly between 2005-
2008.   Observers of technology from higher education and marginalized identity-based 
networking organizations claimed that the Valley’s deep ties to Asia and Asian tech 
workers along with other pre-existing business structures of the Valley did not allow for 
corporations to develop the “home-grown” talent of African Americans, Latinos, and 
women.  Between 2006-2008, African Americans and Latinos consisted of 1.5% and 
4.7% of the workforce, respectively, engaging in computer and mathematical 
occupations.  Their Asian and white counterparts consisted of 53.9% and 37.6% of the 
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work forces in these fields, respectively (Swift 2010).  The uneven demographics show 
that racial inclusion matters so long it does not impede business as usual.  Since Chinese 
immigrants arrive with cultural and economic capital that will benefit the already existing 
structure of transpacific economic development, they, not African Americans and 
Latinos, are allowed to participate in Silicon Valley industries.    
 These architectures of community reflect the contradictions at the heart of an 
emerging Chinese hegemony.  White residents complain over the overcrowding of 
streets, freeways, and schools while simultaneously benefitting from increased property 
values that Chinese diversity has brought to their exclusive communities.  While some 
younger white families ally themselves with the older generation in their displeasure with 
Asian culture, some white families I spoke with recognize the need to respect diversity.  
A few white parents specifically mentioned how diversity was a must in light of the 
presence of transpacific business in Silicon Valley.  On some occasions, white residents 
have challenged development with a critical lens.  While sifting through a box of archives 
at the Cupertino Historical Society, a volunteer explained to me that residents protested 
the current exhibit highlighting the local Lehigh Cement Plant.  Rather than celebrate 
what the exhibit highlights as the cement plant’s contributions to American empire, 
residents chose instead to address the harmful neurotoxins the cement plant continues to 
spew into the air on a daily basis.4  The same volunteer mentioned that residents have 
questioned this corporatization of local memory that extends to financial donations made 
by companies such as Apple Computers and Dell Computers to the Cupertino Historical 
Society.   
                                                
4 For more on the Lehigh Cement Plant’s violations, see (Zito 2010) 
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White residents’ lamentations over quality of life issues related to economic 
development must be historically situated in the geographies of whiteness in Silicon 
Valley’s postwar era.  Although Cupertino’s white residents have battled development 
under the banner of preservation and green space, their political position ignores the need 
to rethink land usage, creating sustainable environmental solutions, or environmentally 
safe working conditions in Silicon Valley for working class people.  Instead, what 
mattered most to white residents I spoke with was preservation of the rural as a return to 
a romanticized yeoman era.   Interestingly, preservation for preservation’s sake came 
most distinctly from those residents of Cupertino who were retired engineers and military 
defense workers that were not part of this yeoman era. These particular anxieties over 
density reflect the historical legacies of racially exclusionary post-war suburban planning, 
which John Findlay defines as “Magic Lands.”   
Chinese immigrants of high-tech backgrounds may have transformed existing 
status hierarchies, but some continue to reproduce, if not exacerbate, the same kinds of 
race, gender, and class inequalities with regards to environmental injustice, residential 
segregation, and educational resources.  The white residents against development have 
unfairly criticized Chinese immigrants for lacking “community” and have often blamed 
them for any kind of changes to the white built environment that they are used to seeing 
themselves reflected in.  Case in point, Don shared with me an instance where white 
residents blamed a regional Japanese grocery store for forcing a Longs Drugs Store out of 
their lease.  In actuality, the lease had merely expired and Longs Drugs’ chose not to 
renew the lease due to the fact that the company had recently opened another location 
less than 5 miles away (Don 2009).  White resident’s articulated their investment in the 
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visual and material economies of whiteness by claiming a national chain like Longs 
Drugs as indicative of Cupertino’s local and American culture. It is within this context of 
claims over space, authenticity, and nationalism that Chinese immigrants engage in 
varying ways of achieving a sense of belonging.  For many Chinese immigrants I talked 
to, their sense of belonging often resulted in attempts to become economic citizens and 
participate in local communities through the achievements of upper-middle class status.   
While residents claim that the tensions between white and Chinese residents have 
died down since the 1990s, my research shows these debates over the built environment 
have changed but are still very much a part of the political, economic and social relations 
of Cupertino.  As I have argued in this project, debates over the built environment are 
debates over the future and less about solving conflicts between white and Chinese 
residents or historicizing racial hegemony.  Instead, these debates are more about 
protecting access to educational, economic, and political resources for those that can 
afford it.  
 San Jose’s tentacle-like growth post World War II redeveloped farmland to usher 
in a new economic regime in Santa Clara County.  The same could be said of Silicon 
Valley’s expansion across the United States and the globe in the late 20th and 21st 
century.  Shenglin Chang notes that the importation of Silicon Valley industries and 
status hierarchies to Hsinchu, the Silicon Valley of Taiwan, has created exclusive middle-
class communities for transnational tech workers.  Chang warns, however, that the 
environmental degradation, forced displacement of indigenous communities, and income 
disparities between tech works and non-tech workers have created conflicts between 
locals and the transnational high-tech workers and their families (Chang 2006).  Within 
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the United States, foreign direct investment from China is a widely sought solution to 
regional depressed economies.  As the federal government has created immigration 
programs to facilitate the circulation of Chinese capital, knowledge, and labor into places 
across the United States, the questions and consequences regarding multiculturalism and 
Chinese economic development in Silicon Valley seems particularly important to 
discussions of urban planning in the 21st century.  The aesthetic form and functions of 
these glorified spaces of global economic activity have much to tell us about the costs of 
neoliberalism not only as an economic doctrine, but also as a problematic rights discourse 
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